Showing posts with label finance and globalization. Show all posts
Showing posts with label finance and globalization. Show all posts

Saturday, February 20, 2010

Finance and globalization summary

This essay illustrates how the ideas of Gilpin, Held, and Castelles can be integrated into a cohesive whole while discussing globalization and finance.

Finance is another aspect of the world that is examined when globalization is studied. Just like the Multi-national Corporation and union analyses, the analysis of finance will use Held’s measurement system[i].

The discussion of finance involves the comparison of financial flows over time. This is necessitated by the skeptic position which claims the world is less “globalized” now than in the golden era. In order to determine if the analysis of financial globalization supports the skeptic position, or supports one or more of the other positions, it is necessary to look at finance over time.

The skeptic position argues that the benchmark for a truly globalized financial system is the Gold Standard era, before World War I, and that the world today is not as globalized as the world then (Held 192). For the skeptics, the Gold Standard Era required that states subsume their domestic policies to the international rules of the Gold Standard system (Held 192). Today, according to the skeptics, the nation-state has not been undermined by the forces of globalization, that nation-states do not have to subordinate domestic economies and economic policies to the international system, and that although the role of the nation-state has declined, in some ways, in economics, it has increased in others (Gilpin 349).

Extensity and intensity are the first two criteria examined when analyzing globalization. For the skeptics, the extensity and intensity were greatest in the late 1800s: the markets were truly supreme and the nation-state had little power over economic affairs (Gilpin 350). In order to be a member of the Gold Standard system, a country had to convert their currency into gold on demand and not restrict international gold flows (Held 195). For skeptics, this is the ideal of a globalized financial system; the nation-state being subject to the market. During the late 1800s the extensity allowed the international flow of finance to reach all over the globe; there was a global capital market, multinational banks, and a flow of money between countries, although the flow was highly uneven (Held 198). Additionally, the intensity, the net capital flows around the world, has not been reached at a similar level since that time (Held 198). Since, as skeptics argue, this is not the case today, then globalization is less than it was in the late 1800s (Gilpin 351).

Transformationalists do not dispute that the extensity and intensity of globalization during the golden era were phenomenal, but instead state that the extensity and intensity still relied on domestic policy and a few countries, notably Britain, dominated the system (Held 198). It was centered in Europe, which made it regional rather than global in reach (Held 198). Compare that to today where almost all nation-states participate in the international financial markets either through international bonds, currency trading and setting interest rates (Held 222).

The intensity of the current market, for transformationalist, is much larger today. There is lending between banks- both in national and foreign currency – international bonds, stock markets, derivatives, and international money markets (Held 209). With all of these types of international financial flows, they are more global in nature and less regional. Europe does not dominate the flow of capital (Held 207) and more money flows to developing countries than it ever did in the golden era (Held 211). The various ways that capital and investment can flow without regard for national borders is unprecedented in the current time (Held 223).

Velocity is one area that is undisputed between the various viewpoints. Skeptics, transformationalists, and hyperglobalists all agree that velocity is faster today than it has ever been before (Held 223). This is because of the infrastructure and technological developments in the world. There was no internet to connect the world 24 hours a day, 7 days a week in the late 1800s. There is the Internet today. This allows for instantaneous communication around the globe in the financial markets. When this is compared to the trans-Atlantic cable that allowed for international telegraphs, there is simply no comparison. The velocity is much faster today than in any other period (Gilpin 352).

However, the presence of technology and communication between people is not the same as having a globalized financial system.

The area where there is the most difference between skeptics, hyperglobalists and transformationalists is on the impacts of globalization. For a skeptic, globalization would mean that nation-states must subordinate their national economic policies to the international finance market (Held 6). However, the skeptic maintains that in the world today, nation-states are just as important as the international financial markets and that the international financial markets only operate with the consent of the state, which means there is not globalization (Held 6, Gilpin 354). Skeptics also maintain that the ideal state of globalization, the golden era where the nation-state was required to subsume national economic policy to the requirements of the Gold Standard, is simply not met today (Gilpin 349).

A transformationalist would argue that the international market blurs the line between the nation-state and the international world, and that the international financial market forces nation-states to change the way they pursue their goals (Held 7). A hyperglobalist would argue that the international financial markets are eliminating the need for nation-states; that the nation-state is becoming obsolete in the face of international financial markets (Held 12).

How does the international financial market impact domestic policy and the decisions of nation-states?

Nation-states have to manage macroeconomic policy which consists of fiscal policy and monetary policy (Gilpin 354, Held 228). The nation-state has access to the international fiscal markets for borrowing and financing its debt (Held 229). The nation-state must also consider issues of interest rates and capital mobility when managing macroeconomic policy (Held 229). However, simply because a nation-state must consider these does not mean the nation-state is in decline, or that that nation-state is forced by the market to change their policies (Gilpin 355). Instead, the nation-state must make trade-offs, as it cannot have fixed interest rates, autonomy in macroeconomic policy, and international capital mobility (Gilpin 354).

For skeptics, if the world was truly globalized, then the state would not be able to affect its economic policy and would have to surrender to the global system (Held 192). However, the Federal Reserve still maintains a large control over the United States economic policy, the European Economic Monetary Union maintains control over its interest rates, and Chins has imposed controls on capital movement (Gilpin 355). If this were truly a globalized financial system, these domestic controls would not be possible because the domestic policy would have to be subordinate to the international policy and the nation-state would not be able to make the choices they do – like the EEMU, China and the Fed. Rather, the presence of the international financial system has made macroeconomic policy more complex (Gilpin 357), but has not negated the importance of the nation-state.

Castells, a hyperglobalist, admits that most of a nation-states’ economy is based on the domestic sector, but claims that the globalized core – the financial markets – creates a global economy that influences and diminishes the nation-state (311). In the financial markets, money can move instantaneously and at any time of day or night because of the Internet (Castells 312). However, this is an argument about velocity, not about impacts. The impact of the international financial markets cannot be seen merely in the presence of technology – that is infrastructure- but must be seen in how the nation-state is making, or not making, its own decisions. The lack of information from hyperglobalists about the impacts of the transactions, rather than merely showing that there is more velocity in the transactions, supports the skeptic position that globalization is being exaggerated.

Transformationalists also under-emphasize the impacts of financial globalization on the decisions of nation-states. In order for the transformationalist perspective to be the one with the most support, they would have to show that the globalization of international financial markets is changing the way that states think about sovereignty and the way states make decisions.

Although the presence of international markets has changed the way that nation-states do business, it is still the nation-states doing the business (Held 229). It is the German Bundesbank that determines the inflation rate, monetary supply and economic policy of Germany and although international markets have made this more complex, they have not taken that authority away from the German nation-state (Held 229). Financial liberalization has given nation-states more options regarding their finances, like borrowing from investors who might impose terms and conditions on the borrowing, but it is still the nation-state making the choices (Held 229). What this might signal is a shifting in the way a state thinks of itself. Instead of thinking that everything the nation-state does must be paid for by the nation-state, the nation-state might be willing to enter the international bond market and accept a reduction of its ability to make decisions in the future (Held 230). However, it is still the nation-state that must make the initial choice to reduce their abilities, and not all nation-states make this choice. This means that the nation-state is still the primary actor.

The strongest argument against the skeptic position is the way that risk is distributed throughout the system (Held 233). If the markets are truly globalized, then the risk of the market will be globalized as well. What happens when one market crashes in a globalized system? All markets crash. This is what happened in 1982, and in 2007-08 (Held 233, New York Times). The risk of the system was spread among the world and was not confined to one area, or one nation-state (Held 234).

The hyperglobalist and transformationalist positions simply do not have enough evidence to support them. While these positions claim that the state is declining in importance, the state, even in their proffered evidence, does not seem to decline in importance. Markets, such as stock markets and futures markets, are nationally based. Nation-states make decisions to seek out loans with certain terms and conditions. Nation-states still set domestic economic policy. While the nation-state may take into account certain international financial issues, it is unclear that the nation-state is declining in importance or in their decision-making power. This leaves the skeptic position, that globalization is being exaggerated, as the strongest position.

Wednesday, December 9, 2009

Afghanistan and globalization: an author's perspective from 'Winter in Kabul"

These are notes on globalization and how it relates to Afghanistan based on the information provided in "Winter in Kabul." It should be noted that I don't agree with what the author presents, but rather I am presenting it to help others who might need the information.

Afghanistan

I. Basics
a. 34 Provinces
b. GDP $2.3 billion/per capital $800
c. Pashtuns 42%
d. Tajiks 27%
e. Hazara, Uzbek etc – 3%
f. Sunni 80%
g. Bonn Conference 2001:
i. The transitional government is named:
a. Warlords were the ones who were able to take power- they are the mujahidin
b. Constitution in 2004
c. First presidential elections at end of 2004 – Karzai wins – kind of re-elected in October
i. Worked for Unical during the transitional government
ii. When members of the Taliban come to th State Dept in 1997, he plays a role in those negotiations
d.
ii. Flaws: Women’s rights are pushed way down and not given, women’s rights are trampled on
h. International Security Assistance Force (2003)
i. It gets turned over to NATO
ii. Also the American Forces separate from NATO
1. Mission: Build stability and nation-building
II. In the Streets
a. Causes of conflict
i. Between families
ii. Between tribes
iii. Between ethnicities
iv. We armed them
v. Domestic:
1. Want to control the poppy trade, water, trade routes
vi. Regional forces:
1. Ideological forces (communism)
a. The conflict isn’t over whether Islam should be the religion – but whether the fundamentalist Islam should rule or not.
2. Kashmir conflict has resulted in multiple states/multiple nations in close geographical proximity – creates conflicts (India/Pakistan)
3. Control over trade routes
4. Tribalism
5.
vii. International factors
1. Ideological: Permanently undermine communism
2. Natural resources: build a pipeline (economic interest)
3. Geopolitical: Deal with terrorist networks; Prevent Iran to become a regional hegemon in the region.
4. Military reasons: Stability; preventing the Taliban from coming back into power because the US has made an enemy out of them and they will attack the US
viii.
b. Critique of American Foreign Policy
i. Carter (1973-19): Soviet Invasion; US response: Arm and train the mujahidin against the Soviets (tens of millions); US getting information from ISI (Pakistani Intelligence) and recommend an extreme violent fundamentalist for the leader
ii. Reagan: Continuation of the same policy
iii. Soviet withdraw 1989
iv. 1989-196: Civil war; the different factions are fighting for power
v. 1992 – Transitional government; which then breaks down into civil war
vi. 1996 – Taliban comes into power
vii. Problems with this: We armed and supported a non-democratic/extremist position in the country because we relied on non-reliable sources and were too eager to prevent Iran from having power (suggesting the moderate who should be in power). The US’s distain for communism is so strong that it turns its aggression against a moderate in support of the extremists/fundamentalists
viii. Problems: The US has no ability to know the region and so cannot interpret any intel they are getting, and they are getting bad intel – the US thinks that what is good for America is good for everyone.
III. Prisons
a. Constitution
i. Sources of law: Custom, Sharia, Penal/Civil code
ii. Sources of misogyny – all the laws
iii. What hope of change? Not a lot, but they have the theoretical right to vote; so maybe other things might change
IV. Schools/Reconstruction
a. Promises and pitfalls of reconstruction
b. What is going wrong with the reconstruction of the schools in Afghanistan?
i. The people that would teach can make more money doing other jobs – so there are not enough teachers – especially at the primary level.
ii. The NGOs don’t stay long enough – the emphasis is on producing the numbers for the reports and not the goal of education- this is the commercialization of education and commercialization of nation-building
c. Anything positive?
i. Something is better than nothing
ii. Some groups are able to empower certain individuals or regions
1. Help improve language skills to become employed
2. Bring some clothes to some people
3. Help some widows who couldn’t go out to get food find food
V. Policy Recommendations
a. Troop Increase
b. Reconstruction
i. In the 1960s the women had the rights to go to school, to university, to wear what they want…..why did this happen? Because the political elite was interacting with the rest of the world…..the rest of the world influenced the political elite.
1. Can the US use its foreign aid to establish influence?
2. Yes – exchange programs to expose people to different norms
3. Make the elite attracted to trends of other countries so those trends appear in the government (like women’s rights)
ii. In order for the repressive culture to end means to find a way to cut down on fundamentalism
iii. Afghanistan will also have to develop its economy and infrastructure – get rid of the poppy trade – in order to develop their economy and gain traction away from fundamentalism
iv. Must be continuity in foreign aid so that there can be long-term support for new values and cultures in the families/culture that would support the new values.

Tuesday, December 8, 2009

Globalization: Production and Trade

Production, Trade and Globalization
Questions to answer:
How has corporate power changed throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries?
What are the key historical junctures in the evolution of MNCs?
What are the domestic, decisional, distributional, and structural impacts of the globalization of business?
Is corporate power eviscerating state power?
Lowering wages and exporting jobs?
Exporting human rights?
What are the key historical junctures in the evolution of the global trading system?
How have states become enmeshed in the global trading system?
According to Irwin, what are the arguments in favor of free trade? For protectionism?
Are global trade relations eviscerating state sovereignty?
What is fair trade?
Does Hamilton make a fair case?
How have fair trade strategies been implemented?
Is it a viable strategy for LDC development or is it radical chic?
It is liberal chic because it doesn’t do anything. There is no enforcement. And there is disruption at the local level if the fair trade fails because the fair trade brings in more money, and then fails. Also, it can make a place susceptible to takeover because it seems more prosperous for the neighbors to take because of the influx of fair trade market. The number of fair trade is also so small and doesn’t affect anything to do with the government and state-owned industries.

I. PRODUCTION
a. Evolution
i. 4 factors Held will use throughout to determine if globalization is happening:
1. Extensity
2. Intensity
3. Velocity
4. Impacts
ii. With production, how does extensity change from the first wave of globalization to post 1944 (or 1944-89 and 1989 and after):
1. Increased in extensity in post-WWII era
a. FDI is moving to E.Asian LDC’s because of surplus labor (late 60’s – mid 70’s).
b. 1944-60: US largest FDI exporter, exporting to W.Europre/Canada
i. FDR had the Marshall Plan
ii. FDR wanted FDI to be invested “Greenfield” – physical plant machinery that cannot be easily moved
iii. FDR did not want “Portfolio” investment – which was financial investment, stocks and bonds, not investing in manufacturing.
1. When Keynes is making his case for regulation of FDI, he wants restrictions on portfolio investment and limits on it, but wants almost unlimited ability to invest in Greenfield investments. Keynes wants people to invest in actual production
iv. After 1989 mergers and acquisitions are going to be huge in FDI.
v. After 1989 – FDI moves around the world, not just Europe.
c. The contemporary period differs because it is more extensive, wider spread, than past FDI periods.
2. Increased intensity in the post-war period as well. Look at GDP and the growth
3. Emergance of MNC
a. Skeptic: MNCs are driven by national agendas and are driven by national agendas and rules – they still serve the interests of their country and their country can put restrictions on them
i. Countries can control MNC by
1. Tax policy
2. Regulations
3. Licensing
a. So a skeptic would say that the MNCs are simply serving their own interests – same as they were in the earlier time periods.
b. Transformationalist: The MNCs are forming trade and production networks and can evade state control. A new global economy.
i. The networks make more and more transactions outside of the market (Held says)
1. They want monopolies and oligopolies
2. Vertical integration
3. Horizontal integration
4. Intra-firm pricing/Transfer pricing
a. 2 companies are owned by the same corporation so you don’t have the market interfering.
b. Market forces don’t determine price, the corporations do.
c. Why do MNCs like this?
i. Get away from taxes
ii. Funnel resources to places based on tax rates rather than where production is taking place
5. Intra-industry collaboration
a. A few firms in a particular industry will collaborate and agree.
ii. Not that the state has lost complete control; but the state cannot control the activity as much as they want to.
c. Hyperglobalist: The nation state doesn’t have any power anymore, MNCs go wherever labor is cheapest and do what they want – MNCs run the show. Corporations are stronger than the states themselves.

iii. Aspect of production that is essential for the 21st century which wasn’t important before:
1. SUBCONTRACTING
a. Distributes power in the international political economy
i. Allows SME (small-medium enterprises) to have more power because they can subcontract, or be subcontractors
1. Nokia
2. United Colors of Beneton
3. Louis Viutton
b. Distributes risk
c. Makes this period in globalization unique compared to all prior periods.
b. Impacts (Held Chapters)
i. Decisional
1. Skeptics: No difference states still retain control
2. Transformationalist: States still have some control, but some of their control has been taken away
3. Hyperglobalist: States have no control
4. How does this affect state policy?
a. Demand management no longer works b/c of changes in production
i. Makes it harder for sates to follow a Keynesian economy
ii. Cannot support the national champions (France) as well because their influence has been reduced
1. Strategic trade policy
b. Unemployment policies have become harder to manage
c. Cost-benefit analysis are harder b/c the cross boarders
ii. Distributional
1. Skeptics:
2. Transformationalist:
3. Hyperglobalist:
4. Labor looses as production shifts to lower paying countries
a. Sweden is the only place where labor can still win
5. Production shifts to having different levels of production/different parts of the production of the whole – located in different countries
6. Increased demand for skilled workers
7. Unskilled labor has been hurt the most because that type of labor can move to a different place where labor is cheaper.
iii. Institutional (International Political Economy)
1. Skeptics:
2. Transformationalist:
3. Hyperglobalist:
4. More competition will be taken place
a. Particularly within the sub-contractor area
iv. Structural
1. Skeptics:
2. Transformationalist:
3. Hyperglobalist:
4. State v. market
a. Held sees a shift to the market and corporate power
5. Performance of MNCs have become decoupled from national economic performance
a. This is another piece of evidence Held could use to show that the skeptics underestimate this trend of globalization
c. Other
i. Frobel “New Int’l Division of Labor”
1. One of the first to document “deindustrialization”
a. Deindustrialization: moving industrial jobs from the industrial world to the developing nations
b. Uses German textile industry as a statistical and empirical example
2. During this period (1970s) you have:
a. OPEC
b. Rising inflation
c. Rising unemployment
d. Low growth levels
e. Wages fall
f. Collapse of Keynesian economics
i. Clear by 1977 that they couldn’t resurrect Keynesian economics
g. FDI is going to LDCs
3. Shift of productive capacity from the developed world to the developing world
ii. Arrighi “Industrial Convergence”
1. They are responding to claim that the hierarchy has changed but there is still a hierarchy (Transformationalist perspective)
2. There has not been a convergence and there is still significant stratification and the stratification is still clear cut – North/South
3. They call into question whether development/industrialization is really good for LDCs
a. b/c it can overlook important details
b. Questioning development paradigms
4. Deindustrialization argument is a specific political choice made by developing countries – specifically the US
a. They needed to find another area they could control b/c they lost hegemonic power in the industrialization area
b. This has the affect of undermining development
c. And it was intentional in order for the US to regain hegemonic power in an area
d. Create increased competition for finance capital
5. Not explicitly clear about the competition among development paradigms
a. Chile/Argentina/Brazil/Uruguay/Mexico: all of these made significant progress in 1960s with rises in living standards, public education, GDP doubled – this suggest that they might have come up with a persuasive form of developmentatlism or neo-Keynesianism.
i. So the Nixon administration and others tried to dismantle the paradigm and stop this by redirecting flow of capital back into the US
6. When they draw the distinction between market capital and development capital – the US and others have written the rules so that the developing countries can never become developed countries (updating List and Kicking Away the Ladder)
7. Comment: application of applied theory to the issue - they use Schumpeter (creative destruction) to apply capitalism to the analysis they do.
a. Creative Destruction: You have to destroy the part of the economy that is hindering creativity in order to become creative and innovative
iii. Hirst/Thompson “Globalization, a Necessary Myth?”
1. Best known SKEPTICS
2. Why do they think production and its consequences are fundamentally unchanged from the golden era of globalization:
a. Investment is still in the FDI
b. The networks are still regional, not global
i. Reactors are fewer and thy will be more restricted in their geographical scope
c. They say that a real globalization market has never happened
i. Held says that if you can see that foreign competitors are competing with local producers/national producers within a certain industry – you see globalization
d. MNCs don’t exist
i. Look at where HQ and R&D are taking place
1. If a company is truly transnational, it wouldn’t matter where these things take place
2. However, since there are no MNC’s – this does matter, and HQ/R&D take place in their home nations.
iv. Dicken “A New Geo-economy”
1. Uses production chains to show there is a movement towards globalization
2. Shows the tension between state regulation (state hasn’t been eviscerated) but MNCs are growing in their power
a. This puts him in a Transformationalist perspective
v. Spar “Spotlight and Bottom Line.”
1. Is she too optimistic about how companies can control human rights?
2. Is she giving too much credit to MNCs watching human rights?
a. Puts a lot of emphasis on the public spotlight
b. Wanting the public glare to take care of being a conscience for the MNCs
c. But the problem is that this is more interest groups related than MNC related
3. Codes of conduct/Glare of spotlight
4. No regulatory agency for the MNCs to answer to for the human rights violations
a. She overlooks that the “fair-trade” movement might have gone as far as it can
5. She’s suggesting that under certain conditions the interests of the MNC will overlap with the human rights interest to create movement towards better human rights.
6. Is she a Transformationalist?
a. She has Transformationalist tendencies
b. She’s identifying the origins of the regulatory regime that would have to exist for MNCs to care about human rights.
II. TRADE
a. Evolution
i. Accd to Held – why is this period different from earlier periods?
1. Technology has changed, so barriers to trade have changed
a. What are the institutions most responsible for reducing barriers to trade?
i. GATT: post-WWII/1947 – a treaty not an organization
1. Establishes the principles for a free trade system
2. By 1979 with the Tokyo agreement you reach the lowest tariffs on manufactured products
3. What were the limitations of GAAT?
a. Limited enforcement mechanisms
b. Issues GAAT did not address:
i. Agriculture
ii. What did GAAT come up with in the early 1960’s to try and appease developing countries with agriculture?
iii. GSP – generalized system of preferences: would give preferred status to some of their exports to industrial countries (India and textiles was the first one)
ii. WTO: 1995
1. Stronger enforcement mechanism
2. Still doesn’t address agriculture
3.
iii.
b. When we reach the contemporary globalization period; tariffs are at their lowers point every
ii. Extensively: More countries than ever are involved in international trade
iii. Intensity: No longer just raw materials and final luxury products being traded international – the types and numbers of goods being traded are going to increase/services are added to trade
1. How does this affect US in terms of manufacturing?
a. Reducing for low capital gods, but they are being traded more
2. Number of goods being manufactured in US have declined, but those industries still producing are producing more and being competitive
3. Country’s GDP related to international trade is increasing
a. In US – 12% relating to exports
b. In Germany – almost double what US is
b. Impacts
i. Decisional
1. Cannot be protectionist in policy (because of WTO rules)
2. Attitudes about free trade have shifted – ideological shift
3. Everything becomes more sector specific and less class based on who is benefiting and losing from trade – becomes more difficult to build and sustain coalitions
a. Example: Labor unions in Oakland (Longhsoremen/docks)
i. They should be opposed to globalization because it reduces demand for their labor, but it has increased demand for their services at the Port, so they are okay with it.
ii. Distributional
1. Who benefits: Skilled workers
2. Who loses: Unskilled workers
a. The “retraining” argument cannot hold when white collar jobs get traded out to another country (engineering, computers etc)
b. But not those whose services (plumbers et al) whose services have to be local
iii. Institutional
1. How this has affected changes in the international economy – how they have affected different actors
a. Welfare state: the welfare state/demand management policies become more difficult with an open trading system
i. But Netherlands, Sweden, Germany have open trading and welfare states
iv. Structural
1. Biggest impact on states: demand management policies
a. National autonomy is declining over economic policies
b. What needs to be developed to make states respond to trade issues: human capital, retraining
i. Options of states have been reduced to this level
ii. TAA (1962) Trade Adjustment Assistance Act (Kennedy and Congress) – if one could prove that the job had been lost to international competition, then you could get extended benefits – and retraining.
c. Other
i. Rodrick “Advice to …”
1. What advice would he give to a developing country in terms of trade policy?
i.
b. Comes out of a centrist tradition; not associated with the left
c. Critical of some of the major aspects of neoliberalism
d.
ii. Leclair ‘Fair Trade”
1. Two things that can help developing countries
a. GSP: from the GAAT – helps developing countries who can export certain goods
b. STABEX: European stabilization fund
i. Developed by the European Community (Africa and the Carribean)
ii. Whenever the primary product the country exported, whenever the price of the product fell below a certain level, the country could take out $$ from the stabilization fund.
iii. By time get to 1980’s/1990’s – will rule that the GSP violates international trade standards.
iv. The EU decides to discontinue STABEX
c. The policies of the EU to the developing world has been equally as stern/exploitative as the US
2. How can fair trade address the dismantling of the 2 institutions
a. Fair trade
i. Tries to get a fair price for the producers of products
1. Not individually owned farms/corporation owned farms
2. But use cooperative; the people who live on the cooperative must have a say in how the profits are going to be used.
a. Tries to get cooperatives to make their own decisions for education and medical institutions – with the profits from the fair-trade agreements
ii. Gets a lot of the product from the producers and sells at a higher market in the developing world – brings that money back to the developing country and keep it in the country
iii. Gets a guaranteed price above the standard market price for that product (based on the C-market in NY)

Saturday, November 28, 2009

Globalization and Finance: Held, Castells, and Gilpin

Finance is another aspect of the world that is examined when globalization is studied. Just like the Multi-national Corporation and union analyses, the analysis of finance will use Held’s measurement system.
The discussion of finance involves the comparison of financial flows over time. This is necessitated by the skeptic position which claims the world is less “globalized” now than in the golden era. In order to determine if the analysis of financial globalization supports the skeptic position, or supports one or more of the other positions, it is necessary to look at finance over time.
The skeptic position argues that the benchmark for a truly globalized financial system is the Gold Standard era, before World War I, and that the world today is not as globalized as the world then (Held 192). For the skeptics, the Gold Standard Era required that states subsume their domestic policies to the international rules of the Gold Standard system (Held 192). Today, according to the skeptics, the nation-state has not been undermined by the forces of globalization, that nation-states do not have to subordinate domestic economies and economic policies to the international system, and that although the role of the nation-state has declined, in some ways, in economics, it has increased in others (Gilpin 349).
Extensity and intensity are the first two criteria examined when analyzing globalization. For the skeptics, the extensity and intensity were greatest in the late 1800s: the markets were truly supreme and the nation-state had little power over economic affairs (Gilpin 350). In order to be a member of the Gold Standard system, a country had to convert their currency into gold on demand and not restrict international gold flows (Held 195). For skeptics, this is the ideal of a globalized financial system; the nation-state being subject to the market. During the late 1800s the extensity allowed the international flow of finance to reach all over the globe; there was a global capital market, multinational banks, and a flow of money between countries, although the flow was highly uneven (Held 198). Additionally, the intensity, the net capital flows around the world, has not been reached at a similar level since that time (Held 198). Since, as skeptics argue, this is not the case today, then globalization is less than it was in the late 1800s (Gilpin 351).
Transformationalists do not dispute that the extensity and intensity of globalization during the golden era were phenomenal, but instead state that the extensity and intensity still relied on domestic policy and a few countries, notably Britain, dominated the system (Held 198). It was centered in Europe, which made it regional rather than global in reach (Held 198). Compare that to today where almost all nation-states participate in the international financial markets either through international bonds, currency trading and setting interest rates (Held 222).
The intensity of the current market, for transformationalist, is much larger today. There is lending between banks- both in national and foreign currency – international bonds, stock markets, derivatives, and international money markets (Held 209). With all of these types of international financial flows, they are more global in nature and less regional. Europe does not dominate the flow of capital (Held 207) and more money flows to developing countries than it ever did in the golden era (Held 211). The various ways that capital and investment can flow without regard for national borders is unprecedented in the current time (Held 223).
Velocity is one area that is undisputed between the various viewpoints. Skeptics, transformationalists, and hyperglobalists all agree that velocity is faster today than it has ever been before (Held 223). This is because of the infrastructure and technological developments in the world. There was no internet to connect the world 24 hours a day, 7 days a week in the late 1800s. There is the Internet today. This allows for instantaneous communication around the globe in the financial markets. When this is compared to the trans-Atlantic cable that allowed for international telegraphs, there is simply no comparison. The velocity is much faster today than in any other period (Gilpin 352).
However, the presence of technology and communication between people is not the same as having a globalized financial system.
The area where there is the most difference between skeptics, hyperglobalists and transformationalists is on the impacts of globalization. For a skeptic, globalization would mean that nation-states must subordinate their national economic policies to the international finance market (Held 6). However, the skeptic maintains that in the world today, nation-states are just as important as the international financial markets and that the international financial markets only operate with the consent of the state, which means there is not globalization (Held 6, Gilpin 354). Skeptics also maintain that the ideal state of globalization, the golden era where the nation-state was required to subsume national economic policy to the requirements of the Gold Standard, is simply not met today (Gilpin 349).
A transformationalist would argue that the international market blurs the line between the nation-state and the international world, and that the international financial market forces nation-states to change the way they pursue their goals (Held 7). A hyperglobalist would argue that the international financial markets are eliminating the need for nation-states; that the nation-state is becoming obsolete in the face of international financial markets (Held 12).
How does the international financial market impact domestic policy and the decisions of nation-states?
Nation-states have to manage macroeconomic policy which consists of fiscal policy and monetary policy (Gilpin 354, Held 228). The nation-state has access to the international fiscal markets for borrowing and financing its debt (Held 229). The nation-state must also consider issues of interest rates and capital mobility when managing macroeconomic policy (Held 229). However, simply because a nation-state must consider these does not mean the nation-state is in decline, or that that nation-state is forced by the market to change their policies (Gilpin 355). Instead, the nation-state must make trade-offs, as it cannot have fixed interest rates, autonomy in macroeconomic policy, and international capital mobility (Gilpin 354).
For skeptics, if the world was truly globalized, then the state would not be able to affect its economic policy and would have to surrender to the global system (Held 192). However, the Federal Reserve still maintains a large control over the United States economic policy, the European Economic Monetary Union maintains control over its interest rates, and Chins has imposed controls on capital movement (Gilpin 355). If this were truly a globalized financial system, these domestic controls would not be possible because the domestic policy would have to be subordinate to the international policy and the nation-state would not be able to make the choices they do – like the EEMU, China and the Fed. Rather, the presence of the international financial system has made macroeconomic policy more complex (Gilpin 357), but has not negated the importance of the nation-state.
Castells, a hyperglobalist, admits that most of a nation-states’ economy is based on the domestic sector, but claims that the globalized core – the financial markets – creates a global economy that influences and diminishes the nation-state (311). In the financial markets, money can move instantaneously and at any time of day or night because of the Internet (Castells 312). However, this is an argument about velocity, not about impacts. The impact of the international financial markets cannot be seen merely in the presence of technology – that is infrastructure- but must be seen in how the nation-state is making, or not making, its own decisions. The lack of information from hyperglobalists about the impacts of the transactions, rather than merely showing that there is more velocity in the transactions, supports the skeptic position that globalization is being exaggerated.
Transformationalists also under-emphasize the impacts of financial globalization on the decisions of nation-states. In order for the transformationalist perspective to be the one with the most support, they would have to show that the globalization of international financial markets is changing the way that states think about sovereignty and the way states make decisions.
Although the presence of international markets has changed the way that nation-states do business, it is still the nation-states doing the business (Held 229). It is the German Bundesbank that determines the inflation rate, monetary supply and economic policy of Germany and although international markets have made this more complex, they have not taken that authority away from the German nation-state (Held 229). Financial liberalization has given nation-states more options regarding their finances, like borrowing from investors who might impose terms and conditions on the borrowing, but it is still the nation-state making the choices (Held 229). What this might signal is a shifting in the way a state thinks of itself. Instead of thinking that everything the nation-state does must be paid for by the nation-state, the nation-state might be willing to enter the international bond market and accept a reduction of its ability to make decisions in the future (Held 230). However, it is still the nation-state that must make the initial choice to reduce their abilities, and not all nation-states make this choice. This means that the nation-state is still the primary actor.
The strongest argument against the skeptic position is the way that risk is distributed throughout the system (Held 233). If the markets are truly globalized, then the risk of the market will be globalized as well. What happens when one market crashes in a globalized system? All markets crash. This is what happened in 1982, and in 2007-08 (Held 233, New York Times). The risk of the system was spread among the world and was not confined to one area, or one nation-state (Held 234).
The hyperglobalist and transformationalist positions simply do not have enough evidence to support them. While these positions claim that the state is declining in importance, the state, even in their proffered evidence, does not seem to decline in importance. Markets, such as stock markets and futures markets, are nationally based. Nation-states make decisions to seek out loans with certain terms and conditions. Nation-states still set domestic economic policy. While the nation-state may take into account certain international financial issues, it is unclear that the nation-state is declining in importance or in their decision-making power. This leaves the skeptic position, that globalization is being exaggerated, as the strongest position.