Wednesday, April 21, 2010

Cameron: Veto Bargaining

This article, by Cameron, explains how the president can use his veto power to bargain with Congress, and what Congress' responses can be to the president's use of his veto power.

i. The veto enables presidents to influence legislative outcomes

ii. Divided government does not make governing impossible, it simply encourages more bargaining

iii. Analyzes all 434 vetoes from Truman to Bush, emphasis on how veto rates are affected by unified or divided government as well as the relative importance of a piece of legislation.

1. Vetoes are rare under unified government

2. When a government is divided and legislation is important:

a. Vetoes are not rare

b. Vetoes are often part of veto chains – sequential bargaining process between Congress and President

c. Presidents routinely use vetoes to extract policy concessions from congress (80% of his cases, Congress made some sort of concession)

iv. Builds on Neustadt’s idea that presidential reputation is critical to bargaining power.

v. Agrees with Mayhew’s claim that divided government does not decrease legislative productivity but argues that divided government does influence the nature of those laws passed – more veto bargaining happens

vi. Preference driven approach

vii. Three models of Veto Bargaining

1. Romer-Rosenthal model (take it or leave it bargaining) – President and Congress have complete information; Cameron wants to replace this because It is too simple. But despite the simplicity – it suggests that the power to veto can shape the content of legislation even if vetoes are never used.

2. Override model: Three players (floor median, the president, the override pivot); used when the floor median is closer to the override pivot than to the president. The floor will design a bill that it knows will be vetoed, but hopes to override the veto. The focus is not on the president, but the override pivot.

a. Assumes that the ideal point of any potential override player is much closer to that of the congressional majority than the president’s ideal point.

b. Congress will not make concessions with the president because the goal is to override the president

c. There is the probability of a breakdown after the veto – that the bill simply dies and never gets reformulated and passed: Cameron says this possibility reflects the importance of the bill

3. Sequential Veto Bargaining: Used when the president’s ideal point is closer to the floor median than the override pivot. Congress will try to pass something acceptable to the president. In this, Congress amends the bill at each round (in Model 2, failure to override is poor luck, here failure to override is necessary). Each veto reveals information about the president’s true ideal point so Congress modifies its proposals accordingly.

a. Cameron says the uncertainty of the president’s ideal point is related to the president’s reputation

i. Played when the president’s ideal point is closer than the override’s pivot point.

Application of the Models: Congress is more productive under unified government than under divided government; during divided government a few items are taken off the legislative table that would have found a place under unified government, then those are often resolved with lengthy haggling.

Monday, April 19, 2010

Rose: A Chief not an Executive

This article is from the 1970s and discusses how a president should lead the bureaucracy and why he makes the choices he does. Rose, the author, states that the president is a chief not an executive; which is how the article got its name.

i. The president is a chief – a leader with unique personal attributes

ii. Staff must look after his personal and political priorities and policy character to keep negative priorities out of spotlight and keep president out of trouble

1. Establish a buffer institution to stand between himself and problem

2. Avoid establishing institutions that will deliver controversy to Oval office.

iii. There are 2 major choices a president can make, organizationally

1. Size of his staff

a. Dictated by the function the president serves

b. The larger the staff the greater aggregate resources the president has to influence the executive branch

c. The larger the staff the less person interaction a president has with each member

2. Clarity with which responsibility is fixed for tasks

a. The more adept a president is at giving instructions to the intuitions, the greater his political impact

b. The greater the clarity he assigns tasks, the greater the economy of time and effort.

c. The greater the clarity with which he assigns tasks, the fewer sources of information the president has about an issue

i. Time is purchased at the cost of knowledge

ii. Overlapping tasks offer multiple views on issues

iii. Too many advisors means being pulled in too many directions.

iv. These result in 4 types of organizations

1. Absolute Monarchy

a. Large staff, clean hierarchy of tasks and responsibilities – not feasible with this size of government

2. Saturation

a. Large staff, overlapping tasks (Johnson/Nixon)

b. Thought behind this: If you throw enough staff at a problem, with enough different attempts, something will stick

c. Assumes that more = better

d. Extra political costs because you have to control in-fighting and internal politics.

3. Rule of Law Feudalism *Seen as an appropriate choice depending on extent president wants to consolidate or extend influence.

a. Clearly defined tasks and small staff 9Eisenhower)

b. A contract between top man and staff details relationship – enforced by common acknowledgment of the rule of law.

c. Feudal model – the president’s power is limited

d. By making fewer claims, the country will be better governed.

e. Even though the president isn’t getting involved, he is still subject to having his alternatives foreclosed by concentrating the channels of power into fewer people

4. Free Enterprise *Seen as an appropriate choice depending on extent president wants to consolidate or extend influence.

a. Overlapping tasks, small staff

b. FDR: master of this type of governance

c. JKF tried to do this too

d. Protects the president from being constrained by the flow of information by having overlapping areas

e. Based on assumption that the constitution does not make the president the sole source of authority within the executive branch – not the sole object of blame.

v. President must use his staff to establish his priorities:

1. Establish reputation

a. Presentation of self

b. When large #s support the president he can get Congress to more easily follow him

c. How effective he is on the hill

d. Housekeeping – hoe the President lives

2. Political priorities: the course of action the president feels the government should take

a. These two are positive priorities, and he needs relatively few resources to meet these

i. Examples: During Eisenhower’s heart attacks and Watergate, the executive branch continued to function without direction from the president, so executive agencies really aren’t his concern.

3. Negative priorities

a. Keeping out of trouble

b. Program implementation

c. Program evaluation

d. Inter-agency coordination (brings problems to president)

e. Inter-governmental coordination (federalism concerns)

i. Can solve these by having a buffer agency to keep the President out of things

ii. He can also engage in abstention

1. Not taking a policy on initiatives he’s not committed too

2. Delaying

Stating views in a vague, non-directive forms

Sunday, April 18, 2010

Moe: The Politicized Presidency

Here is a summary of Moe's "The Politicized Presidency"

i. Modern presidents politicize administrative arrangements and centralize policy related concerns in WH

ii. Politicization: commonly disliked for its effects on institutional memory, expertise, professionalism, objectivity, and institutional competence

iii. Centralization: disliked because it circumnavigates institutions and places and relies on WH

iv. How institutions develop

1. Environment shapes path of institutional development because it dictates structures, incentives and resources

2. Institutions will only change when there are the right incentives

v. What development means to institutional presidency

1. Huge gaps between performance expectations and capacity of president to meet expectations

2. Modern presidents are driven by all the expectations to seek control/order over the bureaucracy because he has limited constitutional powers and needs the help of the institutions

3. 2 main directions of change to encourage responsive competence from institutions so president can keep going

a. Increasing centralization of the institution presidency in the WH because then he can count on support from his own people

b. Increase politicization of the institutional system

i. Attractive because its anchored in formal presidential power – appointment power – and can use it to reach all areas – not just the WH

ii. Congress tends to oppose attempts to do this

vi. Illustration

1. Institutional presidency began with Budget Act of 1921 -> created Bureau of Budget who submitted budgets to Congress, was intended to help rationalize chaotic budget process of Congress.

2. FDR couldn’t deal with the BB sp he became WHY centric when the institutions couldn’t help him reach his goals

3. In his second term he brought the BB under the executive office – OMB

4. Truman and Eisenhower – had to work with the institutions they were given and then had to grow and enlarge the WH competence by formalizing and elaborating on the practices of the past

5. Reagan made a drive to congruence

a. Congruence = bringing the centralization of institutions and politicization of institutions together in an institutional presidency

vii. Standard Criticisms re politicization and centralization de-bunked

1. Centralization and politicization are denounced because:

a. Claim they undermine and circumvent the competence of established institutions

b. Inhibit development of new sources of institutional support

c. Shift decision making responsibilities to those least capable of handling them

i. So instead recommendations are administrative in nature that are aimed at respecting/nurturing neutral competence and organizational integrity (normative)

viii. Conclusion: Moe view the presidency as an institution whose development is driven by incongruence among structures, incentives and resources.

ix. Basis for incongruence in American politics is the expectations of the president far exceed his ability to perform

x. So president has strong incentive to maximize his capacity to do things by initiating reforms and making adjustments in the administrative apparatus around them

xi. But because of inflexibility, lack of resources, constraints of political and bureaucratic opposition, institutions inertia and time pressures: presidents go for areas of greatest flexibility and change – politicization and centralization

xii. Politicization and centralization have grown over time because of the nature of the institutions and the role/location of the presidents within them (systematic causes)

Thursday, April 15, 2010

Skowronek: The Politics Presidents Make

This is a short summary of Skowronek's 1993 article "The Politics Presidents Make"

i. There is a cycle to all presidencies, and so presidents in similar political times can be compared with each other, even through they may be separated by decades of time.

1. The idea of great presidents and incompetent presidents is not a difference of individual skills and ability (Neustadt) but arises out of the current political order (see below).

ii. Presidents can be classified over two dimensions

1. Their affiliation with, or opposition to, a given regime order

2. The extent to which that order is robust or vulnerable

a. Reconstruction: the great regime over-throwers and builders – opposed to a vulnerable order.

i. Thomas Jefferson is best example because he operated in a near void of organized opposition at a very early moment in government development.

ii. Jackson, Lincoln, FDR, Regan

1. Can reconcile the order-shattering and order-affirming needs by creating new constitutional governance – so they are successful.

b. Articulation: affiliated with a robust order.

c. Disjunction: affiliated with a collapsing order.

d. Preemption: opposed to a robust order

iii. The presidency is order-shattering, order-affirming, and order-creating in its properties.

iv. Finds there are 4 eras in presidential time (secular time)

1. Patrician Era (1789-1832)

a. Leaders who stood above faction and interests and governed on the strength of their personal reputation among notables.

2. Partisan Era (1832-1900)

a. Leadership was a form of executive patronage to party factions and local machines.

3. Pluralist Era (1900-1972)

a. The rise of bureaucracy and institutional elites required more complex bargaining and negotiating between competing interests.

4. Plebiscitary Era (1972 – current)

a. More candidate-centered presidential campaigns and a greater emphasis on direct political relationships with the public.

b. Government has become so “thick” that it resists presidential initiatives and change – impasse is the result.

v. Closes with the idea that all presidents should be preemptors now because the government is robust, and they should stand in opposition to this.

1. Gives no examples or descriptions of someone who would be this way.

2. Gives no clear reasons why there should be a preemptor.

Tuesday, April 13, 2010

Canes-Wrone: President's Legislative Influence from Public Appeals

Here is a short summary of Canes-Wrone's 2001 article "President's Legislative Influence From Public Appeals."

a. Canes-Wrone (2001) President’s legislative influence from public appeals

i. Presidents must choose which issues to promote to the public.

ii. The president will promote issues

1. On which his view is popular

2. Congress is not likely to act in the president’s favor unless the president goes public

iii. Assumes:

1. President is rational and policy driven

2. Going public has the effect of increasing salience

3. Congress do not always vote the way their constituents want (for a number of reasons)

4. Congress will most likely vote the way their constituents want if the issue is salient to the public

5. Going public too frequently causes people to pay less attention to the president

iv. Assumptions imply:

1. The president won’t go public unless the public supports his view – otherwise Congress will vote against him

v. A president should gain influence on policy issues he chooses to promote in public appeals (and does)

vi. A president’s likelihood of appealing to the public over an issues will increase when Congress is likely to not act in his favor otherwise.

Monday, April 12, 2010

Kernell: Going Public

Here is a quick summary of Kernell's book, Going Public

a. Kernell (2007) “Going Public”

i. A shift away from Neustadt’s bargaining focus to a more confrontational tactic – going public.

1. Still using same pluralist world view: competing factions mobilize and counter-mobilize, persuading and arguing until policy arrives at what the typical citizen would want.

ii. Going public: A strategy whereby a president promotes himself and his policies in Washington by appealing to the American public for support.

a. Also can be any political elite making a conscious appeal for support to their constituents.

b. Conflicts with bargaining because:

i. Includes fluff, not substance that is necessary for bargaining

ii. Doesn’t extend benefits for compliance, but imposes costs for noncompliance

iii. Entails posturing – which makes bargaining more difficult

iv. Undermines legitimacy of other politicians.

2. Use of this strategy is on the rise because of: institutional change

3. Can force a reluctant Congress to go along with a certain policy

a. Against Neustadt’s idea of a “bargaining president”

4. Change caused by changes to communication and transportation

5. Involves major and minor speeches, travel and appearances, and a conscious appeal to the public.

6. Uses the public opinion to influence other lawmakers (indirect lobbying).

iii. Institutional change which caused going public to be a strategy:

1. Move from institutional pluralism (where every Congressman has the institutions to back themselves up) to individual pluralism (decline of party system).

2. Traditionally politics in Washington were conducted in a system of mutually beneficial interactions and bargains. (Institutional pluralism)

a. Political elite were the decision makers

b. Coalitions shape the system and options available to presidents

iv. New Washington represents seniority, party system, and institutions are on the decline

1. Congressmen support themselves by gaining access to constituents.

2. Less interested in sacrificing short-term goals for long-run bargaining.

v. Constraints on going public:

1. It can politically embarrass the president if it fails

2. The message must be popular for this to have any effect

3. Message/ballot fatigue

4. Loss of flexibility (however Reagan often staked out a strong position and then caved in)

5. Should be last resort.

vi. Going public is on the rise because:

1. Bargaining between the executive and legislative branches has grown ineffective.

a. Since 1956 an increasingly divided government makes it harder to negotiate.

2. Presidents are nominated by general public and not political elites, so no longer beholden to party leadership.

3. Also technology has made it easier

Saturday, April 10, 2010

Questions to answer about justice

These are some questions about justice, posited by a professor. These questions concern the readings of Tocqueville (Democracy in America), Ostrom (Governing the Commons), Aristotle, Plato, Schaar, Sandel, Rawls, and Isaiah Berlin.

The questions are common questions about justice that students have when reading Plator and Aristotle, or having to compare Aristotle's concerns about a democracy to Madison's concerns in Federalist 10. The first questions - the difference between a liberal view of justice and a Greek view of justice - is important from a comparative perspective. The other questions are more about the substantive differences in the readings.

A comparison of classical Greek and liberal approaches to justice

Classical Greek: The classical Greek approach to justice is one that is based on ends, the telos, of the city-state. For the Greeks, everyone served their place in society so that society could reach its telos – the promotion of the common good. Aristotle wanted the city-state to enable people to live the good life, and that was an end. Additionally, inherent in the Greek idea of justice is the notion that justice comes from the Gods, the higher beings, and we are trying to reach that level of justice.

Liberal: The liberal concept of justice rest on individuals and procedures, rather than the commons and the ends. Also liberals do not believe that justice is from God, or from any higher being, rather that justice is a set of procedures which, if followed, mean that we are just.

Sandel’s critique of Rawls’ veiled contractors, how he thinks his point affects Rawls’

conclusions, and how Sandel would provide for what’s missing

Sandel’s critique of Rawls: The basic idea is that Sandel believes Rawls’ commitment to right over good makes his idea of a person untenable. Sandlel believes that Rawls theory is untenable because it is asking people to think about justice, divorced from the very things that make us people – the characteristics that make us able to think about the concept of justice. Michael Sandel argues that the concept of the self as a purely rational chooser on which Rawls relies is unrealistic since every individual is in fact already steeped in the values of their particular society, and will not be able to participate in society if they are truly the people represented as Rawls’ veiled contractors. For Rawls, the distributive principle – that everything must benefit those who have the least, the most – the idea that whatever an individual has is based on what accidental characteristics they were given; for example the model who earns more because she is beautiful earns more because it was luck, or an accident, that gave her those good looks. So, because what she has was given to her as an accident, the goods she has actually belong to the society, that society has a prior claim on her assets because as an individual she doesn’t deserve anything since what she got was acquired by accident. Sandel says that in order to assume a principle of sharing, which is what the distributive principle is – there has to be some common moral tie among the people in a society which states that sharing is good, and that sharing with those less fortunate is good, and that all people should have access to basic levels of goods. Otherwise, there is no reason why the acquired assets shouldn’t serve the needs of the person who got them just like they would serve the needs of the society who got them by accident. If there is nothing tying the people in a community, in a society, together, than how would the society really distribute the assets in a way that was better than the individual – who also has no ties to others. However, to suppose that a community must have a moral good that ties it together means that the veiled contractors, who are supposed to be devoid of any such ties, really are not the unencumbered selves that Rawl’s wants them to be. On the other hand, it might mean – if the individuals really are the unencumbered selves – that the community is really not a community at all and the goods are simply accidental to the community as well as to the individual so there is no reason that the goods shouldn’t be left to serve the arbitrary ends of the individual rather than the arbitrary ends of the community.

Sandel says that to cure this deficiency, to really show that there is a way to distribute the goods, would be to require the difference principle to detail a way that the people who I am sharing with, who I hold things in common with, that I am morally indebted to do this with them. It is a constitutive and moral end of an individual that Rawls’ veiled contractors are denied, but need, in order to make the distributive theory work properly.

Berlin and Tocqueville on positive freedom

Berlin: Berlin believes positive freedom to be the answer to the question of: Who, or what, is the source of control or interference that causes someone to be, or to do, this rather than that? It is a concept of freedom that depends on factors internal to the person, rather than negative liberty which is the factors external to the person. Positive freedom examines the internal factors that cause someone, or a group of some people, to act autonomously. In the political arena, positive freedom is often seen of as being achieved through collective action: The degree to which a community (or state) is self-determining in accordance with the general will and an individual is free if they participate in this self-determination process. In a less political, and more individual sense, the concept of freedom means that an individual is free if they have a way to self-realize who they truly are.

Tocqueville: Tocqueville uses the concept of positive freedom to describe the participation in American government. Tocqueville says that positive freedom is not just being protected from power, but participating in power.

Democratic equality for Schaar

For Schaar, democratic equality is being and belonging (equality of community and membership) and being treated equally under the law. Schaar disputes the notion that equality of opportunity is really democratic equality because all equality of opportunity leads to is people developing those talents which are highly valued by a given society at a certain time. Schaar says that equality of opportunity really leads to further inequality because it will lead to identifying those, at an early age, who are the best and giving them more resources – which is not equal at all. Equality of opportunity gives false hope because it doesn’t take into account the way people start off, or what they are really being given an equal opportunity to do. Instead, Schaar focuses on equality of belonging to a community – that everyone has the same ability and chance at this – and that everyone should be equal under the law. This is Schaar’s idea of democratic equality – which, as he notes, is not what is practiced in the world while he was writing.

Tocqueville’s question, concerning the majority’s power, whether he contradicts

himself.

Tocqueville asserts that in a democracy the people have a right to do anything, and the majority rules. He wonders whether these two statements contradict each other.

In a way he is contradictory, but he goes on to reconcile the contradiction. In his initial statement, that politically, people have right to do anything, and that the majority rules there is a contradiction. If the majority rules, how does a person in the minority have a right to do anything if the majority has outlawed that as illegal? This is an inherent contradiction.

However, Tocqueville reconciles this point by saying that there is a higher law than the majority – it is the law of justice that a majority of humankind has agreed to, and laws the majority makes may not violate this higher law of humankind. If the majority does use its power to violate this higher law, then a person can disobey the law. Soverignty comes from the people, but the people don’t have a right to do anything they want. Instead they are confined to laws and decisions within the bounds of justice that the majority of mankind has agreed to. Additonally, Tocqueville points out that saying the majority can do whatever they want is the language of a slave, not a citizen, so a citizen who participates would never agree to the principle that the majority can do whatever they want.

Ostrom’s contributions, if any, to a study of justice

Ostrom’s contributions might be, out of all the things we have read in the class, that she finds a way to blend the concepts of procedural and substantive justice regarding a single item. The other theorists speak of justice rather broadly, as applied to states and societies. Ostrom points to a form of justice regarding common pool resources. She combines procedural and substantive justice. Her idea of substantive justice, the end, is that it is good that common pool resources be preserved. She also says that there are certain preconditions that humans need – access to water, food, and fuel, and a legal system. To the extent that these are ends, she believes in a substantive concept of justice regarding these things. However, she also believes in procedural justice to reach these ends. She is saying that a procedure that is just respects everyone’s rights to use the common pool resource. This is procedural. So in respect to combining procedural and substantive justice into one theory, regarding a specific real-life instance, Ostrom does contribute to a study of justice.