Kernell: Going Public

Here is a quick summary of Kernell's book, Going Public

a. Kernell (2007) “Going Public”

i. A shift away from Neustadt’s bargaining focus to a more confrontational tactic – going public.

1. Still using same pluralist world view: competing factions mobilize and counter-mobilize, persuading and arguing until policy arrives at what the typical citizen would want.

ii. Going public: A strategy whereby a president promotes himself and his policies in Washington by appealing to the American public for support.

a. Also can be any political elite making a conscious appeal for support to their constituents.

b. Conflicts with bargaining because:

i. Includes fluff, not substance that is necessary for bargaining

ii. Doesn’t extend benefits for compliance, but imposes costs for noncompliance

iii. Entails posturing – which makes bargaining more difficult

iv. Undermines legitimacy of other politicians.

2. Use of this strategy is on the rise because of: institutional change

3. Can force a reluctant Congress to go along with a certain policy

a. Against Neustadt’s idea of a “bargaining president”

4. Change caused by changes to communication and transportation

5. Involves major and minor speeches, travel and appearances, and a conscious appeal to the public.

6. Uses the public opinion to influence other lawmakers (indirect lobbying).

iii. Institutional change which caused going public to be a strategy:

1. Move from institutional pluralism (where every Congressman has the institutions to back themselves up) to individual pluralism (decline of party system).

2. Traditionally politics in Washington were conducted in a system of mutually beneficial interactions and bargains. (Institutional pluralism)

a. Political elite were the decision makers

b. Coalitions shape the system and options available to presidents

iv. New Washington represents seniority, party system, and institutions are on the decline

1. Congressmen support themselves by gaining access to constituents.

2. Less interested in sacrificing short-term goals for long-run bargaining.

v. Constraints on going public:

1. It can politically embarrass the president if it fails

2. The message must be popular for this to have any effect

3. Message/ballot fatigue

4. Loss of flexibility (however Reagan often staked out a strong position and then caved in)

5. Should be last resort.

vi. Going public is on the rise because:

1. Bargaining between the executive and legislative branches has grown ineffective.

a. Since 1956 an increasingly divided government makes it harder to negotiate.

2. Presidents are nominated by general public and not political elites, so no longer beholden to party leadership.

3. Also technology has made it easier

News media and citizens

Jamieson and Waldman, The Press Effect.
Pew Report “News Interest and Knowledge” http://people-press.org/report/?pageid=1356
Baumgartner, Jody, and Jonathan Morris. 2006. “The Daily Show Effect
American Politics Research, Vol. 34, No. 3, 341-367 (2006)

The first reading focuses on what key news audiences are, and how much the key audiences know. The truth is that the studies have been surprisingly consistent: Education and socio-economic status (in this report they are referred to as “Those with higher annual incomes”) are the two most important determinants of a person’s knowledge level about politics, both national and international. The second most important characteristic is gender, although this study (and the others) seem to indicate that gender is more about where someone gets their news from than whether they get news at all. Overall, there was nothing surprising in this report. It simply confirmed the prior readings that indicate better educated people with higher socio-economic status follow news, and are more knowledgeable about politics.
In light of the fact that people get their news from the news media – the press – The Press Effect’s conclusions are a little disturbing. The point of the book is to show how the press frames political events, and sometimes ignore the truth and ignores facts in order to “frame” the events in a manner that is consistent with the need to provide coherence to the stories that are being presented. In order to show how the press ignores facts, the authors have analyzed specific news media coverage, and shown how the press has ignored facts in order to provide coherence to a story. One of the instances cited in this book is when the young woman testified that she had seen young babies throw from incubators by Iraqi soldiers – when in fact this never happened. The story was adopted by the President who used it to symbolize the human rights needs of invading Iraq. However, the incident was later proven never to have happened, and the press ignored the falsehood in order to give coherence to the human rights story. The authors of The Press Effect see the main task of journalists as being the watchers of facts, not the reporters of stories. The authors conclude their book with a list of things that journalists should do to return to being fact-based, instead of story based. Is this distinction important for the average news viewer? There is no research about how the viewers and readers react to retractions and corrections in the news. It is possible that once the news reports a story, and it enters into the person’s mind, that something else will not correct it – even if the initial story is false. This type of fact rejection has been shown to be the case in the Kuklinski study where he shows that misinformed people, even when exposed to the facts, don’t change their opinion. Therefore, it would seem, if we are a society that values truth, that the authors of The Press Effect are correct – that the facts need to be presented the first time around, and that the press (since they are the people who give the news to others) need to be more conscious of the facts, and less conscious of telling a story.
However, there has been substantial research done that presentation of the facts in written form leads only to further the information gap between the socio-economic classes. Jerit et al showed that television increases all people’s levels of knowledge, while written information (which tends to be more fact heavy) only increases the knowledge of those with education and higher socio-economic status to begin with. Does this mean that television doesn’t relate facts, or that facts aren’t an effective communication tool across all classes? I hope not. That would be a sad state of commentary on the citizens: That only information in story form is acceptable to all classes, rather than facts. However, it is something to consider when focusing on the drive for facts balanced against the need to tell a story.
The article on The Daily Show seemed to show that, among young college students, watching The Daily Show increased cynicism and that increased cynicism leads to reduced political participation. The authors do not explicitly state the “therefore” of their argument: That watching The Daily Show decreases political participation, but it is a logical conclusion to their research. However, they measured cynicism by asking the participants if “I trust all the news media to cover political events fairly and accurately.” This seems to be too broad of a question, both for the definition of news media and because there is an emphasis on “all.” No one is going to answer yes to this question. This is the question that was used to measure cynicism, and it simply seems like too broad of a question to base an assumption on.

A review of The Race Card

This book was somewhat of a cross between an easy read and a research book. The main point of the book is that if there is an implicit appeal to race, that type of appeal will be far more effective in activating stereotypes than an explicit appeal to race. As an example, the author uses Willie Horton and the 1998 election. In this example, the image of Willie Horton was talked about simultaneously with issues of crime and poverty. Never was it mentioned that Horton was black, however the pictures were shown and the message was conveyed implicitly.
In truth, Mendelberg is examining political communication. She’s examining what implicit communication about race, by elites to the public, is about. She concludes that implicit racial appeals activate racial stereotypes, resentments and fear. The author declares that these factors shape our decisions when they are least discussed – by implicit appeals. This is a way for the elite to activate norms and beliefs in the voters regarding race, without having the voters recognize or respond negatively.
Mendelberg’s view of political communication is top-down. She sees the communication being done by the elites to the masses. This coincides with the views of Zaller, who also believes that the elites drive communication. However, both of these points of view do not indicate how the racial stereotypes were conceived in the first place. Rather, they assume that the stereotypes are driven from the top down, and will continue to be driven from the top down because it is the elites who benefit from keeping the stereotypes alive so that they can use them in implicit communication appeals.
This also ties neatly with Lakoff. Implicit communications, using key words or images, can be used to activate one family structure or the other, and then depending on which structure is activated, the person responds differently to the message. In Mendelberg’s view, the implicit racial appeals are activating the strict father model – with the attendant fear, resentment and “protect myself and my family from outsiders” feelings that she argues are activated with implicit racial appeals. However, on the flip side, when an explicit racial appeal is made, it seems to activate the nurturing parent model, where equality is key, because people react negatively to the explicit appeals.
Mendelberg sees these appeals as a harm to democracy. She views them as a slippery slope that can be used to argue gender or sexual orientation. Instead, she wants people to recognize the implicit appeal and react as negatively to it as they do to the explicit model. However, this type of implicit appeal almost seems to fall within the realm of heuristics – and there is some (slight) evidence to show that heuristics lead people to the same votes they would’ve made otherwise. What I mean is that an implicit appeal activates certain pathways and ways of thinking (according to Mendelberg). This is what happens in heuristics as well – a message, idea or concept activates a certain pathway of thoughts, that leads to a conclusion without the person ever having to think about it. So in some ways, implicit racial appeals are similar to heuristics. However, this doesn’t make the good, it simply links them to a shortcut.
However, does this really matter? Implicit racial appeals tend to be made on policy areas that the common people have very little, if anything, to do with. Most people do not get to vote on welfare, parole reform, prison spending, and other issues where implicit racial appeals can communicate a message. In fact, Mendelberg found that it is those who are most educated that are least likely to succumb to an implicit appeal. It is also those who are most educated that are likely to be involved in politics to such a degree as to make decisions on matters where race can communicate values, or where racial stereotypes matter. Therefore, if the people involved in the issues are the ones most likely to reject implicit racial appeals, does it matter that they are made?
Additionally, Mendelberg showed a fake newscast of a welfare reform proposal in order to evaluate the feelings about race in different people. The problem is, most people cannot separate their views on poverty and whether people should be self sufficient from race. If we were to examine this experiment using Lakoff’s models, then this experiment wouldn’t show anything about race relations, but would rather show which people on the panel are a strict-father type and which are the nurturing-parent type. I believe Lakoff wouldn’t have anything to say about race, but rather about how a person views the world. Also ,welfare reform is an issue where people have polarized racial opinions because there are very high numbers of African-Americans on welfare compared to all other races. Welfare reform isn’t an implicit racial appeal issue – the appeal is explicit due to the very nature of the subject. This might cause a conflation of opinions in the people who were interviewed and participated in the study.

Outline of Moral Politics - Lakoff

1. What is the basic questions: Lakoff’s basic question that he is trying to answer is what divides conservatives and liberals when they are talking about politics, and how does this division relate back to metaphors we use to explain life.
2. What are the key themes, arguments and findings:
a. Themes:
i. Conservatives use the strict father model of family
ii. Liberals use the nurturing family model
iii. These family models directly relate to the metaphors that people use to explain and understand politics – and shape their own opinions.
iv. Without understanding the different models, you cannot understand the various political positions that people take.
1. He doesn’t use neutral terminology as you read. When you read his descriptions, the feeling you get about the Strict Father is that it is bad, dark and negative – mainly because he doesn’t associate a lot of positives with it. Whereas the feeling after reading the nurturing family model is more positive and rosy.
b. Arguments:
i. Lakoff argues that which family model you use defines your political choices.
ii. The two family models cannot be intertwined, and there are only a few deviations from these central models.
iii. Conservative and liberal “family models” relate directly to Republican and Democrats – although I would change this and say that they relate to the Religious Right and the Far Left.
iv. Whichever family model you choose, you also receive the associated metaphors – which explain various attitudes on various social, economic and moral issues.
v. You can use more than one family type in your life – just not more than one in each portion of your life.
1. I think he’s wrong here. I think that people can use the Strict Father model for most politics, but then use the Nurturing family model for social issues.
c. Findings:
i. He uses the metaphors that arise out of each type of family to explain how conservatives and liberals – really R’s and D’s – explain and see each issue (framing).
3. How was the argument constructed:
a. The argument was constructed using social cognitive theory: which says that underlying all the arguments is “common sense” or a way that people view the world which may be unconscious but is still a deliberate and distinctive model.
b. His theory, as he says (p.17) must explain:
i. Analysis of mode of reasoning
ii. How those models of reasoning fit together
iii. How different forms of each model are really related to the same model (radial categories and central categories)
iv. Show the link between forms of political reasoning and forms of moral reasoning (which he does through his metaphors)
v. How moral reasoning in politics is ultimately based on models of the family
vi. Must show how the models fit together – and why we don’t have random political thinking.
4. How does this advance our knowledge of the topic: This book advances one possible view into how to relate ideas between conservatives and liberals because if you understand where someone is reasoning from, you can more accurately fit your words into their “frames” and so work with them, rather than have them simply throw out your ideas because they do not fit their world view.
5. How do this week’s readings fit with other week’s: Last week’s readings were on characteristics that are particular to conservatives and liberals, although it was more of “these are the characteristics” rather than “these are the characteristics and here is how they are used in politics.” This week’s reading was also about particular characteristics of liberals and conservatives – the model of family that each uses and how if affect their political thought.
6. What is missing? How do current/recent events fit with the topic: I think what is missing is explaining how you get Libertarians, or people who combine aspects of both – who use the strict father model but then use Liberation theology or some other liberal social theory. Also missing is any conception of why these models might not hold, or how personality can overcome the model (Obama election et al).
7. What interesting issues, ideas or related findings came to your mind as you were reading:
a. How would both sides respond to the bailout in Lakoff’s idealized world?
b. How would both sides respond to the California budget situation?
i. Raising taxes
ii. Cuts
iii. Banking on federal bailout money
c. Why do these fit so well together, and why do people think that there cannot be a combination of the two to create a new model?
d. Why are the ideas presented as mutually exclusive?

OUTLINE OF THE BOOK
Ch. 1 – The Mind and Politics
- Contemporary politics is about worldview.
- The political division between red/blue (Republican/Democrat – not conservative/liberal as he writes) is based on morality.
- Morality is based on the type of family model you have – Structure (Strict father) vs. Nurturance (Nurturing model).
- These models explain what conservatives and liberals call “common sense,” which is simply ideas based at such a deep level that people may not be aware of it.
Ch. 2 – The Worldview Problem for American Politics
Raises questions to be answered about conservative and liberal ideologies; questions each side has about each other; what positions “group” together to be liberal and conservative.
- Why do conservatives think that virtue and morality should be indentified with their political agenda and what view of morality do they profess?
o Conservatives don’t conceptualize regulation as a form of protection – only interference.
- Liberals also hold contradictory positions (Lakoff presents this as a series of questions and not as a morality puzzle (which is just part of his mistreatment of the two) although liberals also hold moral positions on their issues).
- So what cognitive scientists do is:
o Satisfy 2 conditions with a theory: (1) the worldviews must make the collections of political stands on each side into two natural categories; (2) descriptions for these two categories must show why, what is a puzzle for one side isn’t for the other.
o Also must explain the topic choice, word choice and discourse forms for liberals and conservatives.
- Basic claim of the book – morality comes from family, so morality in politics comes from family.
Ch 3 –
The basis for all metaphors in morality.
- Political perspectives are derived from morality – which is derived from your family model.
- Moral action causes good things.
- Immoral action causes ill-being or hurt.
- It is how you characterize hurt and good that makes your morality.
Ch 4- Keeping the Moral Books (Moral Accounting)
The most basic metaphor for morality.
- The most basic way we understand morality is through accounting metaphors – I owe you, you owe me, I am in your debt, they wrote a check they cannot cash etc.
- The metaphor: Well-Being as Wealth.
- Types of moral accounting
o Reciprocation – you do something for me I owe you and visa-versa.
o Restitution – you do something bad, you need to do something good to account for it
o Retribution (lawful authority) and Revenge (unlawful authority or personal) – you do something to me and I am going to do something equally bad to you.
- You can gain “moral credit” with altruism – you do something good without getting anything in return.
- Metaphors for work (54-55)
- Metaphors for rights and duties (56-59)
- Fairness (59-62)
Ch 5-Strict Father Morality
Strict Father model.
- Background view: life is difficult and the world is fundamentally dangerous.
- Assumption: That the exercise of authority is moral in and of itself
o So if someone isn’t exercising authority morally, the metaphor breaks down.
- Reward and punishment are necessary because you need them to be self-disciplined and controlled.
- What kind of moral world?
o Meritocracy (based on how hard you work – concept of the American Dream)
o Hierarchy (based in authority)
- Responsibilities of those in authority (p. 70)
- Related metaphors (p.71)
- Moral Strength (72)
o Built two ways: through self-discipline to meet your hardships and difficulties and through self-denial to further self-discipline
o Metaphor of moral strength
§ Being good is being upright
§ Being bad is being low
§ Doing evil is falling/failing
§ Evil is a force
§ Morality is strength
- He uses morality as if it is a dirty word – which it isn’t
- Structure of system – p. 99
- Priorities in system:
o Moral strength
o Moral self-interest
o Moral nurturance
Ch 6-Nurturant Parent Model
Nurturing parent model.
- Model – p. 109
- Morality as empathy, nurturance
- Priorities in system
o Nurturance group
o Self-interest group
o Strength group
o Notice the variation in terms from the SFM
Ch 7-Why We Need A New understanding of American Politics
Why such an analysis is needed and where previous analysis has failed.
- Three analytical failures of liberals
o Conservative is the ethos of selfishness
o Conservatives just believe in less government
o Conservatism is a conspiracy of the ultra-rich
- Three principal conservative descriptions of conservatism
o Against big government
o For traditional values
o What the Bible tells us
Ch 8- Nature of the Model
Explanitory nature of the model.
- Based on the ‘Nation as Family metaphor”
o Nation is a family
o Government is parents
o Citizens are children
Ch 9-
Moral categories brought about by the two systems.
- Conservatives have moral actions, ideal citizen and demons
- Liberal have moral actions, ideal citizens and demons
Ch 10- Social Programs and taxes
Ch 11- Crime and Punishment and Death Penalty
Ch 12 – Regulation and Environment
Ch 13- Culture Wars: Affirmative Action and the Arts
- Gay rights
- Standards
- education
Ch 14- Two models of Christianity
- strict father Christianity
- nurturing parent Christianity
Ch 15- Abortion
Ch 16- Love Country, hate government
Ch 17- Varieties of Liberals and Conservatives
Variations within the conservatives and liberals.

Bob Dole: Great Political Wit

Bob Dole: Great Political Wit

For those of you who think Bob Dole is stuffy and unfunny, read this book. It is an easy read at 190 pages - much of it being quotes and stories. I finished it in about 2 hours. It was hilarious.

He split the book up into "subtopics" around which various political arguments are made. Then he tells funny stories from his life, or that have been related to him, or that he found through study, about those issues. They are really great, and show that people in politics do have a sense of humor, even if they seem dry.

I would recommend this book as a present to anyone who is a political junkie, politics student, or otherwise involved in government. It is a fun read, and Bob Dole presents many different sides of various politicians. Many of the stories are about past Presidents and First Ladies. Abigail Adams, Barbara Bush and Nancy Regan are all included. Presidents Clinton, Ford, Coolidge, Truman and FDR are also included.

It is simply a fun, easy read. Nothing intense about it.

Mearsheimer: Review of Chapters 3 and 10 of Tragedy of Great Power Politics"

Mearsheimer: Chapters 3 and 10 of "The Tragedy of Great Power Politics"

Part I: Summary

In Chapter 3, Mearsheimer says that power is of two types: latent and effective (or military) power (p.55). Latent power is composed of the resources a state has available to build military power (p. 60). These resources include, but at not limited to, wealth and population (p. 61). Population is important because without people, you cannot build armies (p.61). There must actually be soldiers to fight in the army. Wealth is important because unless a state has wealth, there is no way to equip, train, pay and provide for the military forces of a country (p. 61). However, great wealth does not mean great military power, although great military power means great wealth because it takes a lot of wealth to support an army (p.75). Effective power – military power – is based on the size of a state’s army (p. 56). The indicator is the army because occupation and takeover require actual boots on the ground – which is the function of an army, not a navy or air force (p.56).

Mearsheimer says that his definition of power – that of a measurement of material resources – is the best one to use because power has to be the ability of state A to force state B to do something that state B doesn’t want to do (p. 57). Power must exist before it is exercised, and so the only way to measure that is to measure the resources that a state can use to force their will on another state (p. 60). If the measurement of power was based on the outcomes of conflicts, there would be no way to measure which state was the more powerful state until the outcome is complete (p. 60). Additionally, if power was to be based on outcomes, then there would be no way to account for resources that don’t have to do with capabilities in a calculation of power, such as: strategy, intelligence, morale, health of population, and weather (p. 60). Therefore, the definition of power must be based in resources because they can account for material and non-material sources of power (p. 60).

However, this does not mean that a state with a lot of latent power will be a powerful state and be able to turn that into effective power (p.75). States have different levels of ability to turn latent power into military power (p.79). So a state that can turn latent power into military power more effectively, even if that state might have less latent power, will be more powerful (p. 79). An organized economy can play a great role in the effective transformation of latent power to effective power (p. 81). Additionally, states buy different kinds of military forces. One state will buy more in the navy, while the other will spend more on its army. The states that spend more on its army will have more power, even if the other state has a larger overall military, because boots on the ground equals power (p.81).

The important difference to understand is how wealth and power are distributed among the great powers (p. 82).

In Chapter 10, Mearsheimer states that claiming that security competition and war among great powers is over –to be replaced with cooperation – because the Cold War is over, is wrong (p.361). Cooperation will not replace security competition because all great powers still care about gaining power because states still fear each other and anarchy reigns (p.361). Therefore, because there has been no structural change, there will be no behavioral change (p. 361). Mearsheimer also argues that there will be no structural change because no one wants to give up “being a state” and nationalism is one of the most powerful political forces in the world (p.366).

Part II: Analysis

Mearsheimer says that the balance of power among great powers is equal to the balance of military power (p. 56). However, he then says that the balance of power isn’t a good predictor of military success because there are other factors that can supply one side with an advantage: strategy, intelligence, morale, weather and disease (p. 58). These two ideas seem to be at conflict with each other. If the balance of power is military power, but the balance of power isn’t a good predictor of military success, then how can you know when a hegemon emerges? A hegemon has to have enough military power to rule their part of the world and prevent other states from coming in and interfering. This concept seems to indicate that at some point the balance of power does equal, and must be a good predictor of, military power. Otherwise, a system that is based on military capabilities would have no way of knowing what type of world it was in. Those two statements seem to be inconsistent with each other.

According to Mearsheimer, the world didn’t change after the end of the Cold War (p. 361), and then goes about showing how other theories are wrong. International economic interdependence will not make a structural change because the world is probably not more interdependent than it was in the early 20th century (p. 365). No where does Mearsheimer validate his assumption that there is as much interdependence today as there was then. It is simply a bold statement without any facts to back it up. He also discredits the democratic peace theory on the basis of near misses (p.368). However, near misses indicate that there was no war. The causes behind the near misses are never explained by Mearsheimer, he simply states that they had nothing to do with democracy (p.368). I would be more convinced if he had facts to prove that, instead of assumptive statements. Democracy affects everything in it to some extent, so I have a hard time believing his statement that near misses have nothing to do with democracy. Mearsheimer’s only basis for discrediting other theories is his emphasis on anarchy.

Book Review: American Between the Wars, From 11/9 to 9/11

Part I: Summary

Despite President George H.W. Bush’s distinguished service as a diplomat (7), Chapter 1 states that he was unable to create a direction for United States foreign policy after the end of the Cold-War (2). Instead, he made things up as he went along (8) and demonstrated a lack of leadership by engaging in international coalition building rather than promoting the US (10-11), a reliance on old realities and principles that demonstrated a lack of imagination (13) and refused to champion US values (such as democracy and human rights) around the world (26). There was no “new world order,” (7). These mistakes allowed Clinton to campaign on a platform of foreign policy that stressed human rights and democracy (28).

The Democrats believed that they could unify their party and win the next Presidential election (32) by defining a foreign policy based on spreading freedom and democracy (29) and at the same time create a direction for the US, as Bush was unable to do (30). Chapter 2 states that Clinton’s foreign policy was about globalization, democracy, freedom, and empowering individuals (42). Clinton won the election due to his foreign policy push (p.34) and his assertiveness in moral statements in foreign policy (36). Clinton received two memos from Bush’s outgoing staff (43). Although the two memos were different in policy, they both shared the same premise: that the US had an unprecedented opportunity to shape the new international world and that there were a lot of other problems to deal with (48). The memos left Clinton no doubt that his strong words on the role of the US would need to be followed through on (52).

Chapter 3 states that Clinton’s first-year in office was disastrous and due to his ineptitude in international affairs, he lost the ability to have the US define the post-Cold War era (84). The disastrous missions in Somalia (76) and Haiti (82) characterized Clinton’s first year. Rather than standing by the goals of his foreign policy in his action in Haiti and Somalia, as articulated in his campaign, he portrayed uncertainty about being assertive in foreign policy (66) and lacked confidence in his decisions (68). These disasters defined Clinton – and the Democrats – as inept and unable to lead in the new world (84).

The reason that the Contract Republicans (87) took over Congress in 1994, according to Chapter 4, was that Clinton lost his way and appeared muddled on foreign policy issues (90). American foreign policy was simply reactive: from crisis to crisis (91). That, combined with the fact that former-President Jimmy Carter had stepped in and managed to solve the Haiti and North Korea crises (not the President) (96), solidified the perception that Clinton had lost his ability to define a new era (99) and that there was no line from principle to action (100). Instead of delivering on his promises, Clinton was lost and fearful about foreign policy (112).

Although Clinton had a rough start (through 1995) (114), Chapter 5 states that his successful closure of the Bosnia (128-29) and China (136-38) issues enabled him to be re-elected in 1996. It also helped that Clinton worked with the Republicans on these issues (138-39), and they did not have a plan for foreign policy either (144).Clinton might have lacked a grand plan for foreign policy, but he had demonstrated that he didn’t need a plan to execute bold strategies to further American interests (144). Clinton’s success in Bosnia and China improved his – and America’s – image as a competent leader at home and abroad (128, 130, 135).

Chapter 6’s main point is that Clinton’s growing confidence in his foreign policy skills (158) led him to believe that he had to strengthen the US’ international economic leadership (151), and led him to believe that the US was the indispensible nation (147). The concept of the indispensible nation led Clinton to engage in a range of activist international policies, including policies on globalization (148-49). The two most prominent acts of globalization and international economic leadership were getting NAFTA ratified (160-61) and establishing the WTO as GATT’s successor (162). Additionally, it was because of the US’ leadership on economic issues that the Mexico bailout plan worked (166-67). These achievements solidified Clinton’s perception that there was no dividing line between domestic and foreign policy (169). However, despite Clinton’s success and confidence, other states did not agree that the US was “the indispensible nation,” which made global cooperation harder in the face of the new threats (176-77).

The main point of Chapter 7 is that Clinton had a vague policy on dealing with Iraq and Saddam which made for decisions whose purpose was to pass the problem to the next administration and to avoid having Iraq take over all other issues (204). Clinton tried to get the American public behind the perception that Iraq and Saddam were a global threat to America’s security (191). When this did not work, Clinton was unable to have a strong military strategy (193) to deal with the issue. Instead he had a mix of containment (191) – which wasn’t working – and military presence/air strikes (202). Clinton wanted his policy to go both ways: to have economic and military containment and to try and oust Saddam without having to have an actual military campaign (203). This approach, as recognized by all, couldn’t last long – but would last long enough for Clinton’s successor to get in place and for Clinton to try and do other things at home (204).

In Chapter 8, Clinton (243) and domestic forces at home (228) had to decide how America would use its overwhelming power (234). The result of the Kosovo campaign was world-wide concern that the US was too dangerous (226, 228, 230, 232-33). The pursuit of a missile defense shield did nothing to calm this fear among the international community (241-42). Instead of being reassured that the US would use its power only to pursue a responsibility to protect (216) and a greater global good (234), the international community became worried the US would use it in other situations (231).

Chapter 9’s main point is that there were new disorders in the world that Clinton – and the US – was unequipped to deal with (277): globalization caused economic crises to travel fast and not be contained in one region and terrorist threats were the most pressing security threats (262). America’s foreign policy establishment didn’t understand these two threats and as a result were unprepared when crises happened (247). Clinton’s economic policy was simply a reaction to a crisis (252), instead of a policy to build a foundation to prevent crises (248). The intelligence agencies and military were unprepared to deal with terrorist threats, instead of the more conventional threats, and needed restructuring in order to do so (261). All of this resulted in a world composed of disorder (279).

The main point of Chapter 10 is that the Bush Administration continued to look at the world, and national security, in traditional terms – based on nations states and traditional concepts of threat (310). There was acceptance of terrorism based on the support of nations, not because an individual or non-state actor could be a threat by themselves (310-11). Bush wanted a strong military (296) and to use it to prevent focus on state-based threats to clear national interests – not humanitarian goals or globalization (295).

According to Chapter 11, America’s future is defined by the past (329). The liberal concerns over when to go to war and use military force (320) and focus on promoting democracy (318) still shape debate today (318). The conservatives still grapple with legitimizing American action (324) and globalization (326). These are issues from the past decade that are shaping the foreign policy of the current (and future) decade (328-29).

Part II : Analysis

There is a major theme throughout the book: that domestic and international politics cannot be separated. Domestic elections for President are defined in terms of foreign policy (144-45, 269) or trade deals (161). The choices various candidates made for Vice-President were framed in terms of the foreign policy need of the candidates (294). The role and positions of PNAC, a domestic institution, was discussed in Chapter 6(172). Throughout the book, the competing views of Clinton, liberals and conservatives were compared (one example is on 139). The lack of a coherent and dominant role for the US in foreign policy was often blames on domestic factors (86). Speculations that Clinton’s behavior was based on wanting to draw attention away from a domestic scandal was rampant in the various chapters (200).

This focus on the interplay between domestic and international factors makes a case for a more involved model of foreign policy and international relations. Realism relies only on security, whereas liberalism relies mainly on non-security related threats and institutionalism focuses on institutions. None of these models seem capable of taking in all the factors – security, non-security, economic, globalization, terror and non-state actors. Additionally, there is a distrust of a doctrine which can arise from a particular set of circumstances and cause trouble when applied to a new set of circumstances (218). As discussed in class, realism and liberalism developed in the wake of wars and institutionalism developed once institutions developed. It is possible that these doctrines were developed for a specific circumstance and as such have no application to a different set of circumstances. The author believes that the past decisions define the present (329), I do not think that the past models can define a present, and effective model, for international relations. However, we were presented with a model in our last class on December 2, 2008 that takes into account all of these factors. The model doesn’t prescribe a method of bringing them into balance, but it does create a framework for consideration of all factors.

A model that might be used to analyze these factors would be the two-level game theory approach advocated by Putnam. In this model, the analysis is done on a reciprocal basis between how the actor – the leader of a nation – acts at a domestic and international level. Those two levels are seen as playing to each other. The truth of this can be seen in the results of the last election: Bush lost largely because public opinion had turned against his use of force in Iraq. The interplay of domestic and international policy will only become greater, and some method is needed to analyze the two together. Maybe game theory – with its ability to take in a larger number of factors, will prove to be the basis that IR theorists need to model a new theory.
Another theme in the book was the idea of a single doctrine of concept to base foreign policy on. The second Bush’s doctrine became “war on terror,” (312) and has proven to be his downfall (315) – as this past election proved. Clinton lacked a single over-arching concept, although he constantly tried to find one (90, 144, 315). Clinton showed that although he lacked a doctrine, he could execute a bold strategy in response to events (144). Additionally, it was claimed that the actions in Kosovo might be the most important foreign policy achievement since the Gulf War (221), and Clinton undertook those actions without a grand strategy. Berger stated that the Clinton team wanted to build a new role for the US based on experience and not doctrine, regardless of the fact that this made other countries nervous (219).

American policy makers and scholars have been unable to find a singe catch-phrase for the time between n11/9 and 9/11 (315). Kennan says that this is a good thing because a simple foreign policy leads to disaster (315). This perception, that the lack of a simple foreign policy goal is good, would seem to underline my statement that the world has too many variables to be contained in one doctrine. These variables are not magically developed in the post-Cold War era, which might be one reason that the post-Cold War era has been unable to define itself. Rather, the variables of globalization, security, weak and failing states, political stability/instability etc, have been present since the beginning of time. These are not new concepts; it is simply that things can move faster and more freely in a world with technology like we have today, and so these variables become more apparent. Constructivism is a viewpoint that is taking over in the world of today’s IR theories because it seems to be able to handle the complexities that the world is currently seeing (Wendt). However, like the variables present in the world today that have to be considered, constructivism is an old idea in new clothing (Sterling-Folker).
The world is a complex world with many variables that lead to consequences. It is ironic that the most recent President to consider all the variable (Clinton) was also the one looking for the simple solution – for the knight to come riding in (253). Whereas the President with the simple world view of traditional threats (Bush) (310), did not look for a simple answer but used what he thought was a simple answer – the military (297) – and got engaged in a far more complex struggle than could be imagined.

The irony of the situation only underscores the need for a model to analyze complex factors under. Bush was analyzing factors by a traditional realist threat perspective (310) and that got him into a lot of trouble when the variables proved to be far more complex than he imagined (314). When Clinton was trying to promote democracy and interdependence through globalization, using the more complex model of liberalism (of some sort), he also ran into issues where he did not have the ability to analyze all the factors, including security. A model is needed that will take into consideration all the various complexities that exist in the real world so that policy makers can be sure they are not leaving anything out, but are rather at least looking at all possible variables (even if they are discounting them).