Mearsheimer: Chapters 3 and 10 of "The Tragedy of Great Power Politics"
Part I: Summary
In Chapter 3, Mearsheimer says that power is of two types: latent and effective (or military) power (p.55). Latent power is composed of the resources a state has available to build military power (p. 60). These resources include, but at not limited to, wealth and population (p. 61). Population is important because without people, you cannot build armies (p.61). There must actually be soldiers to fight in the army. Wealth is important because unless a state has wealth, there is no way to equip, train, pay and provide for the military forces of a country (p. 61). However, great wealth does not mean great military power, although great military power means great wealth because it takes a lot of wealth to support an army (p.75). Effective power – military power – is based on the size of a state’s army (p. 56). The indicator is the army because occupation and takeover require actual boots on the ground – which is the function of an army, not a navy or air force (p.56).
Mearsheimer says that his definition of power – that of a measurement of material resources – is the best one to use because power has to be the ability of state A to force state B to do something that state B doesn’t want to do (p. 57). Power must exist before it is exercised, and so the only way to measure that is to measure the resources that a state can use to force their will on another state (p. 60). If the measurement of power was based on the outcomes of conflicts, there would be no way to measure which state was the more powerful state until the outcome is complete (p. 60). Additionally, if power was to be based on outcomes, then there would be no way to account for resources that don’t have to do with capabilities in a calculation of power, such as: strategy, intelligence, morale, health of population, and weather (p. 60). Therefore, the definition of power must be based in resources because they can account for material and non-material sources of power (p. 60).
However, this does not mean that a state with a lot of latent power will be a powerful state and be able to turn that into effective power (p.75). States have different levels of ability to turn latent power into military power (p.79). So a state that can turn latent power into military power more effectively, even if that state might have less latent power, will be more powerful (p. 79). An organized economy can play a great role in the effective transformation of latent power to effective power (p. 81). Additionally, states buy different kinds of military forces. One state will buy more in the navy, while the other will spend more on its army. The states that spend more on its army will have more power, even if the other state has a larger overall military, because boots on the ground equals power (p.81).
The important difference to understand is how wealth and power are distributed among the great powers (p. 82).
In Chapter 10, Mearsheimer states that claiming that security competition and war among great powers is over –to be replaced with cooperation – because the Cold War is over, is wrong (p.361). Cooperation will not replace security competition because all great powers still care about gaining power because states still fear each other and anarchy reigns (p.361). Therefore, because there has been no structural change, there will be no behavioral change (p. 361). Mearsheimer also argues that there will be no structural change because no one wants to give up “being a state” and nationalism is one of the most powerful political forces in the world (p.366).
Part II: Analysis
Mearsheimer says that the balance of power among great powers is equal to the balance of military power (p. 56). However, he then says that the balance of power isn’t a good predictor of military success because there are other factors that can supply one side with an advantage: strategy, intelligence, morale, weather and disease (p. 58). These two ideas seem to be at conflict with each other. If the balance of power is military power, but the balance of power isn’t a good predictor of military success, then how can you know when a hegemon emerges? A hegemon has to have enough military power to rule their part of the world and prevent other states from coming in and interfering. This concept seems to indicate that at some point the balance of power does equal, and must be a good predictor of, military power. Otherwise, a system that is based on military capabilities would have no way of knowing what type of world it was in. Those two statements seem to be inconsistent with each other.
According to Mearsheimer, the world didn’t change after the end of the Cold War (p. 361), and then goes about showing how other theories are wrong. International economic interdependence will not make a structural change because the world is probably not more interdependent than it was in the early 20th century (p. 365). No where does Mearsheimer validate his assumption that there is as much interdependence today as there was then. It is simply a bold statement without any facts to back it up. He also discredits the democratic peace theory on the basis of near misses (p.368). However, near misses indicate that there was no war. The causes behind the near misses are never explained by Mearsheimer, he simply states that they had nothing to do with democracy (p.368). I would be more convinced if he had facts to prove that, instead of assumptive statements. Democracy affects everything in it to some extent, so I have a hard time believing his statement that near misses have nothing to do with democracy. Mearsheimer’s only basis for discrediting other theories is his emphasis on anarchy.
Showing posts with label Theories of International Relations. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Theories of International Relations. Show all posts
Wednesday, December 24, 2008
Sunday, December 21, 2008
Finnermore and Floker: Constructivism in International Relations and Critics of Constructivism
Finnermoor: Talking Stock: Constructivism
Floker: Constructivism and Neoliberalism Compared
Part I: Summary
The main point of the Finnemore/Sikkink article was constructivism states that ideas are logically connected to the way the IR system works (p.394), and doesn’t provide anything more specific, so constructivism’s minimalist claims must be (and have been) supplemented in order to research the claim that ideas and identities matter (p.394). The constitution of society, the ideas and identities that make it up, are also causal in nature because the explanation of society and its parts are necessarily dependant on how those parts are made up (p.395). Constructivists then assess the evidence presented for their cause and compare it with alternative explanations of the same phenomena while searching for more evidence to further their claims and to disconfirm alternatives (p.395). Using this research design, constructivists focus on studying generalizations that are clustered around a several problems in the IR system including: the effect of global norms vs. local effects on the IR system (p.396), whether it is ideas or power that shape the IR system (p.398), and how identity and state action interact with each other (p.398). When looking at these social construction issues, constructivists also study how the social construction works by looking at ideas such as: the purposive efforts of individuals and groups to change the norms (p.400), the role of international organizations and law in changing social norms (p.401), what effect a group of experts with specialized knowledge can have on norms (p.402), the role of speech, argument and persuasion in changing social norms (p. 403), and what the structural effects are (p.403). Although this research may follow the lines of other, similar research in comparative politics, constructivists (and constructivist research) are not comparative because constructivism has a theoretical identity, whereas comparative studies work to solve problems without a theoretical identity (p. 404).
The main argument in the Sterling-Folker article is that constructivism is not anything new; it is a liberal paradigm and is related to neoliberal institutionalism (p. 98). The failure of constructivism to offer anything new is because its theoretical causal logic uses the same logic as is applied in almost all variants of liberal IR theory (p. 98). This is functional institutional theorizing, which is characterized by assuming pre-given interests, outside of social interaction, of the agents in a world where the function of institutions and social practices is to achieve particular goals for the agents involved based on their collective interests (p.105). Functionalist explanations are concerned with preference formation (p. 101): the particular policies and practices that an actor might adopt in pursuit of their interests, and how the institutions meet those preferences (p. 102). Constructivism follows this logic because they assume the institutions and social norms exists because they fill a collective need of the agents, and therefore the structures that exist must fill those needs or they will change (p.108). Additionally, constructivism uses functionalist causal logic because it focuses on what the institution does – which is a preference rather than an interest (p. 105). By using the functionalist causal arguments, one of the main tenets of constructivism – the importance of interests – is not present because the focus is instead on preferences (p.108). Neoliberal institutionalism and constructivism both state that changing perceptions and beliefs (in constructivist terms: identity and interests) will make cooperation more likely, and that in order to create these changes, the actors must interact so that various institutions can play a part in changing social norms (p.109). Therefore, because of their theoretical similarities and consistent underlying logic, constructivism is not a new paradigm, but rather a liberal/critical theory paradigm come to life again (p. 99).
Part II: Analysis
In the Finnemore article, there is a range of theories that can be called constructivism (p. 392). In order to establish a baseline for comparison, the author uses the features common to all the descriptions of constructivism (p. 392 et al). The author recognizes that constructivism is a framework for thinking and that other sources must be used to make constructivism work for analyzing content and predictive features (p. 393). With this understanding, the author compiles the articles together and does not separate out who uses what additional information, beyond constructivism, to make their claims. It may be that constructivism is compatible with all other theories in the sense that constructivism provides a framework for seeing the world, and the other theories provide the interpretation. Which means that there is no need to falsify all other predictive theories – which is what some of the research cited does. If the theories are all tools, rather than competing tools, then some of the argument goes away.
In the Sterling-Folker article, it’s interesting that she acknowledges differences in the theoretical scheme between constructivism and others (p. 100), but simply relegates them to being “small distinctions (p.100).” Acknowledging that they are different, means that they are different. Functionalist arguments focus on preference formation, rather than interest and identity formation (constructivism) (p. 101). There is even a listing of differences (p. 102). I think this is a case where simply because the results are similar, and because constructivism isn’t clearly defined, someone assumes the two theories have the same underlying theoretical basis, when it is clear that there are differences. Additionally, there are no instances of constructivism that falsifies this claim, and there is no claim that the author has taken into account all constructivist writings. So are the falsifying instances an issue?
Floker: Constructivism and Neoliberalism Compared
Part I: Summary
The main point of the Finnemore/Sikkink article was constructivism states that ideas are logically connected to the way the IR system works (p.394), and doesn’t provide anything more specific, so constructivism’s minimalist claims must be (and have been) supplemented in order to research the claim that ideas and identities matter (p.394). The constitution of society, the ideas and identities that make it up, are also causal in nature because the explanation of society and its parts are necessarily dependant on how those parts are made up (p.395). Constructivists then assess the evidence presented for their cause and compare it with alternative explanations of the same phenomena while searching for more evidence to further their claims and to disconfirm alternatives (p.395). Using this research design, constructivists focus on studying generalizations that are clustered around a several problems in the IR system including: the effect of global norms vs. local effects on the IR system (p.396), whether it is ideas or power that shape the IR system (p.398), and how identity and state action interact with each other (p.398). When looking at these social construction issues, constructivists also study how the social construction works by looking at ideas such as: the purposive efforts of individuals and groups to change the norms (p.400), the role of international organizations and law in changing social norms (p.401), what effect a group of experts with specialized knowledge can have on norms (p.402), the role of speech, argument and persuasion in changing social norms (p. 403), and what the structural effects are (p.403). Although this research may follow the lines of other, similar research in comparative politics, constructivists (and constructivist research) are not comparative because constructivism has a theoretical identity, whereas comparative studies work to solve problems without a theoretical identity (p. 404).
The main argument in the Sterling-Folker article is that constructivism is not anything new; it is a liberal paradigm and is related to neoliberal institutionalism (p. 98). The failure of constructivism to offer anything new is because its theoretical causal logic uses the same logic as is applied in almost all variants of liberal IR theory (p. 98). This is functional institutional theorizing, which is characterized by assuming pre-given interests, outside of social interaction, of the agents in a world where the function of institutions and social practices is to achieve particular goals for the agents involved based on their collective interests (p.105). Functionalist explanations are concerned with preference formation (p. 101): the particular policies and practices that an actor might adopt in pursuit of their interests, and how the institutions meet those preferences (p. 102). Constructivism follows this logic because they assume the institutions and social norms exists because they fill a collective need of the agents, and therefore the structures that exist must fill those needs or they will change (p.108). Additionally, constructivism uses functionalist causal logic because it focuses on what the institution does – which is a preference rather than an interest (p. 105). By using the functionalist causal arguments, one of the main tenets of constructivism – the importance of interests – is not present because the focus is instead on preferences (p.108). Neoliberal institutionalism and constructivism both state that changing perceptions and beliefs (in constructivist terms: identity and interests) will make cooperation more likely, and that in order to create these changes, the actors must interact so that various institutions can play a part in changing social norms (p.109). Therefore, because of their theoretical similarities and consistent underlying logic, constructivism is not a new paradigm, but rather a liberal/critical theory paradigm come to life again (p. 99).
Part II: Analysis
In the Finnemore article, there is a range of theories that can be called constructivism (p. 392). In order to establish a baseline for comparison, the author uses the features common to all the descriptions of constructivism (p. 392 et al). The author recognizes that constructivism is a framework for thinking and that other sources must be used to make constructivism work for analyzing content and predictive features (p. 393). With this understanding, the author compiles the articles together and does not separate out who uses what additional information, beyond constructivism, to make their claims. It may be that constructivism is compatible with all other theories in the sense that constructivism provides a framework for seeing the world, and the other theories provide the interpretation. Which means that there is no need to falsify all other predictive theories – which is what some of the research cited does. If the theories are all tools, rather than competing tools, then some of the argument goes away.
In the Sterling-Folker article, it’s interesting that she acknowledges differences in the theoretical scheme between constructivism and others (p. 100), but simply relegates them to being “small distinctions (p.100).” Acknowledging that they are different, means that they are different. Functionalist arguments focus on preference formation, rather than interest and identity formation (constructivism) (p. 101). There is even a listing of differences (p. 102). I think this is a case where simply because the results are similar, and because constructivism isn’t clearly defined, someone assumes the two theories have the same underlying theoretical basis, when it is clear that there are differences. Additionally, there are no instances of constructivism that falsifies this claim, and there is no claim that the author has taken into account all constructivist writings. So are the falsifying instances an issue?
Friday, December 12, 2008
The Role of Domestic Policies and Foriegn Policies in International Relations
Waltz: International Relations Theory Not Foreign Policy
Telhami/Waltz: Neorealism and Foriegn Policy
Putname: Two-Level Games
Walt: Realtion Between International Relations Theory and Policy
Burgos: An N of 1
Part I: Summary
The main point of the Waltz article is that international relations (IR) theory cannot explain foreign policy (p. 54) because international relations theory must be at the system level and a theory that would explain foreign policy must take into account the state-level concerns of the performance of governments (p. 54-55). Waltz points out that the question when analyzing an IR theory should not be what variables should be excluded from the theory that might affect outcomes, but that what variables should be included in order to make it a true IR theory (P. 56). Waltz re-emphasizes that the point of a theory is to explain, not to predict, and therefore a theory of IR necessarily leaves variables out (p.57).
The Telhami article's main point is that although neorealism has much to say about foreign policy, through its analysis of IR theory, it is not a theory of foreign policy because neorealism doesn't explain the motives of states including the component parts (p.170). Telhami states that insights derived from neorealism provide a framework for further inquiry into foreign policy (p. 159). This is because the goals of security and power (p. 160-161) which are so essential for neorealism theory provide an important insight into state behavior some of the time. However, they don't explain the varied motives of states when they create foreign policy (p.163 -164). This is because if a state were to act in a way other than to pursue security and power, that state wouldn't be acting in accord with the neorealist theory (p.164). Therefore, while neorealist theory is an IR theory, it is not a theory of foreign policy (p.170).
The main point of the Burgos article is that IR theory, specifically relating to war, is too narrow and simple to be of any use to policy makers (p. 555). He states the realism doesn't seem to fit into the Iraq conflict, because the conflict has moral and ethical terms rather than power and security terms (p. 552). Also, IR theory treats was as a "costly lottery," so that states tend not to engage in war (p.552). However, that also does not explain the current state of the world (p. 553). Burgos also points out that the composition of an institution changes the behavior of that institution, and so theories dealing with war need to be able to take into account the composition of the Army (p.553). Lastly, current IR theory, and realism in particular, doesn't deal with the power of symbols and the various types of power (p. 554-555). All of these things are lacking from theories, but are important in practice. Therefore, Burgos states that it makes sense that policy makers, who have to deal with reality, don't pay attention to theory (p. 555).
The main point of the Walt article is that there is a gap between theory and policy because the work being done in the theory world isn't relevant to the policy world (p. 25). However, good theory (p. 26-28) can help policy makers because: (1) it can help them diagnose the problem they are facing (p.29-30); (2) it can help them anticipate events (p.31); (3) it can help them by providing a possible remedy (p.32-33); and (4) theory can provide benchmarks to enable an evaluation of success and failure (p.33-34). Current IR theory is too abstract (p.34) and too varied (p.35) to aid in any of these goals because the academic norms of the discipline prevent IR theorists from linking theory to policy (p.37-38). In order to make theory accessible and relevant to policy makers, the academic norms must change (p.40).
The Putnam article provides a possible framework for analysis of national and international affairs (p.427). The domestic and international affairs are tangled together because the state must be concerned about both (p.431) and therefore an analysis must take both levels into account (p.433). The solution, according to Putnam, is to use game theory to construct a two-level game where the national political leader appears at both boards (p.435) – domestic and international (p.434) and that one board can influence the other (p.434). He splits the game into two levels, bargaining which leads to a tentative agreement (level 1) and ratification (level 2) (p.436). The variable in the game is "win-sets" which are the variety of possibilities that will be agreed to at level 1 and ratified at level 2 (p.437). The variable of win-sets can take into account domestic variables such as public opinion, interest groups, and agencies (p.436) and international factors such as defection and reputation of countries (p.438). This framework accounts for the entanglement between domestic politics and international relations (p.460).
Part II: Analysis
Waltz states that his theory of neorealism is not a theory of foreign policy, nor is it meant to be (p.54). However Telhami seems to spend an extraordinary amount of effort proving that it is not a foreign policy theory (p.163). Telhami looks at the basics of neorealism – power (p. 160-161) and the balancing effects (p. 162) – and discounts them as not accounting for enough of foreign policy behavior to be a theory (p. 163). I think that some bigger concepts are missing in the analysis – namely that it's not a foreign policy theory because it wasn't designed to do anything except explain an international system (Waltz, p.54). Trying to salvage neorealism as a foreign policy theory by ignoring variables and outcomes (Waltz, p.55) or adding variables (Waltz, p.56), creates a new theory and doesn't salvage realism as a foreign policy theory, which it wasn't meant to be.
Rather, a new system for understanding multiple variables must come into play. The two-level game system presented in the Putnam article seems to be a start. It can take into account the variables that the Burgos article identified: morality (p.552), distribution of war-making power among branches of government (p.553), partisanship of the institutions (p.553), symbols (p.554) and different types of power (p.555). Under the two-level game, these variables would expand or contract the win-set by driving the domestic game (Putnam p.434) and shaping international opinion of the country (p.444). However, it seems as if every variable can be taken into account, somewhere, in the two-level game. This makes a theory – or game - bulky, hard to understand, and hard to use.
Walt makes the point that a good theory is logically consistent and empirically valid (p.26), complete, predictive (p.27) and simple (p.28). The simple part is especially important for policy usage because policy makers aren't selected for their jobs on the basis of theoretical knowledge (p.24) and so they need to be able to understand a theory to use it (p. 25). I am not sue that the two-level game is simple enough, or predictive enough, to be of use to a policy maker. It is not a simple concept. It involves many game-theory models that a policy maker might not understand (p.447). It is also not terribly predictive if the information is incomplete. In order to determine if your win-set overlaps with another win-set, you have to have complete knowledge about the other player (p. 460). This is not practical in a policy setting where reality and the short time those decisions must be made within. Therefore, I am not sure that the two-game theory model, while interesting, is the right model for use with policy makers.
Telhami/Waltz: Neorealism and Foriegn Policy
Putname: Two-Level Games
Walt: Realtion Between International Relations Theory and Policy
Burgos: An N of 1
Part I: Summary
The main point of the Waltz article is that international relations (IR) theory cannot explain foreign policy (p. 54) because international relations theory must be at the system level and a theory that would explain foreign policy must take into account the state-level concerns of the performance of governments (p. 54-55). Waltz points out that the question when analyzing an IR theory should not be what variables should be excluded from the theory that might affect outcomes, but that what variables should be included in order to make it a true IR theory (P. 56). Waltz re-emphasizes that the point of a theory is to explain, not to predict, and therefore a theory of IR necessarily leaves variables out (p.57).
The Telhami article's main point is that although neorealism has much to say about foreign policy, through its analysis of IR theory, it is not a theory of foreign policy because neorealism doesn't explain the motives of states including the component parts (p.170). Telhami states that insights derived from neorealism provide a framework for further inquiry into foreign policy (p. 159). This is because the goals of security and power (p. 160-161) which are so essential for neorealism theory provide an important insight into state behavior some of the time. However, they don't explain the varied motives of states when they create foreign policy (p.163 -164). This is because if a state were to act in a way other than to pursue security and power, that state wouldn't be acting in accord with the neorealist theory (p.164). Therefore, while neorealist theory is an IR theory, it is not a theory of foreign policy (p.170).
The main point of the Burgos article is that IR theory, specifically relating to war, is too narrow and simple to be of any use to policy makers (p. 555). He states the realism doesn't seem to fit into the Iraq conflict, because the conflict has moral and ethical terms rather than power and security terms (p. 552). Also, IR theory treats was as a "costly lottery," so that states tend not to engage in war (p.552). However, that also does not explain the current state of the world (p. 553). Burgos also points out that the composition of an institution changes the behavior of that institution, and so theories dealing with war need to be able to take into account the composition of the Army (p.553). Lastly, current IR theory, and realism in particular, doesn't deal with the power of symbols and the various types of power (p. 554-555). All of these things are lacking from theories, but are important in practice. Therefore, Burgos states that it makes sense that policy makers, who have to deal with reality, don't pay attention to theory (p. 555).
The main point of the Walt article is that there is a gap between theory and policy because the work being done in the theory world isn't relevant to the policy world (p. 25). However, good theory (p. 26-28) can help policy makers because: (1) it can help them diagnose the problem they are facing (p.29-30); (2) it can help them anticipate events (p.31); (3) it can help them by providing a possible remedy (p.32-33); and (4) theory can provide benchmarks to enable an evaluation of success and failure (p.33-34). Current IR theory is too abstract (p.34) and too varied (p.35) to aid in any of these goals because the academic norms of the discipline prevent IR theorists from linking theory to policy (p.37-38). In order to make theory accessible and relevant to policy makers, the academic norms must change (p.40).
The Putnam article provides a possible framework for analysis of national and international affairs (p.427). The domestic and international affairs are tangled together because the state must be concerned about both (p.431) and therefore an analysis must take both levels into account (p.433). The solution, according to Putnam, is to use game theory to construct a two-level game where the national political leader appears at both boards (p.435) – domestic and international (p.434) and that one board can influence the other (p.434). He splits the game into two levels, bargaining which leads to a tentative agreement (level 1) and ratification (level 2) (p.436). The variable in the game is "win-sets" which are the variety of possibilities that will be agreed to at level 1 and ratified at level 2 (p.437). The variable of win-sets can take into account domestic variables such as public opinion, interest groups, and agencies (p.436) and international factors such as defection and reputation of countries (p.438). This framework accounts for the entanglement between domestic politics and international relations (p.460).
Part II: Analysis
Waltz states that his theory of neorealism is not a theory of foreign policy, nor is it meant to be (p.54). However Telhami seems to spend an extraordinary amount of effort proving that it is not a foreign policy theory (p.163). Telhami looks at the basics of neorealism – power (p. 160-161) and the balancing effects (p. 162) – and discounts them as not accounting for enough of foreign policy behavior to be a theory (p. 163). I think that some bigger concepts are missing in the analysis – namely that it's not a foreign policy theory because it wasn't designed to do anything except explain an international system (Waltz, p.54). Trying to salvage neorealism as a foreign policy theory by ignoring variables and outcomes (Waltz, p.55) or adding variables (Waltz, p.56), creates a new theory and doesn't salvage realism as a foreign policy theory, which it wasn't meant to be.
Rather, a new system for understanding multiple variables must come into play. The two-level game system presented in the Putnam article seems to be a start. It can take into account the variables that the Burgos article identified: morality (p.552), distribution of war-making power among branches of government (p.553), partisanship of the institutions (p.553), symbols (p.554) and different types of power (p.555). Under the two-level game, these variables would expand or contract the win-set by driving the domestic game (Putnam p.434) and shaping international opinion of the country (p.444). However, it seems as if every variable can be taken into account, somewhere, in the two-level game. This makes a theory – or game - bulky, hard to understand, and hard to use.
Walt makes the point that a good theory is logically consistent and empirically valid (p.26), complete, predictive (p.27) and simple (p.28). The simple part is especially important for policy usage because policy makers aren't selected for their jobs on the basis of theoretical knowledge (p.24) and so they need to be able to understand a theory to use it (p. 25). I am not sue that the two-level game is simple enough, or predictive enough, to be of use to a policy maker. It is not a simple concept. It involves many game-theory models that a policy maker might not understand (p.447). It is also not terribly predictive if the information is incomplete. In order to determine if your win-set overlaps with another win-set, you have to have complete knowledge about the other player (p. 460). This is not practical in a policy setting where reality and the short time those decisions must be made within. Therefore, I am not sure that the two-game theory model, while interesting, is the right model for use with policy makers.
Monday, December 1, 2008
A Definition of Constructivism for International Relations
Constructivism is not a theory. A theory is a set of statements or principles that is devised to explain a group of facts and can be used to make predictions about natural phenomena[i]. That means, in order for constructivism to be a theory, it must be a set of principles that is devised to explain a group of facts and can be used to make predictions about behavior in the international relations arena. Constructivism does not make predictions. In fact, Wendt identifies constructivism as a tool for analysis, rather than a tool for predictions[ii]. Additionally, constructivism isn’t meant to explain anything - and it doesn’t. Rather than explain a group of facts, constructivism is a point of view about how one might go about changing the IR system. It outlines what issues constructivists would deal with in order to change things. However, it offers two variables (ideas and social norms) with no indication on what to do with those two variables. There is no causal explanation in constructivism. Because of these deficiencies, constructivism is not a theory.
Instead, Constructivism is a commonly shared set of initial conditions that must be present in a theory in order for it to fall into a “constructivist” perspective. Wendt’s basic works on constructivism (he’s considered the founder)[iii] is a reaction to realism, and is intended to counter the idea that self-help and power politics are essential features of anarchy[iv]. Instead, Wendt treats anarchy as a social construct (or practice) rather than an inseparable condition of international relations and the way that states see anarchy[v].
The main focus of this approach is to use theories borrowed from sociology about identity and interest formation[vi] to focus on how a change in identities and interests of states can make a change in their behavior[vii].There are two basic tenants to constructivism: (1) actors act towards objects – including other actors – on the basis of what value those objects have as interpreted by the society in which the actor operates[viii]; and (2) the meanings of the terms on which action (like cooperation) can be organized is based on shared interests[ix]. What these tenants mean is that it is collective meanings placed ob objects – such as anarchy – that constitute the structures that organize actions[x].
Wendt’s famous quote, “anarchy is what states make of it,” illustrates these examples perfectly. If anarchy was an essential feature of international relations, instead of a social construct, there could be no meaning given to it by states. Instead, it would function and other interactions would logically flow from it. Realists argue that self-help and power politics logically flow from anarchy. However, by treating anarchy as a social construct, Wendt is able to show that self-help and power politics don’t naturally flow, but can follow from anarchy[xi]. Wendt is also able to articulate ideas (sovereignty, dynastic relations, trade, goals, etc) that can cause power politics and self-help not to flow from anarchy[xii]. With this analysis, Wendt has changed the focus from anarchy as a must and defining feature of the system, to anarchy as a social construct that can change.
Constructivism offers no real guidance on what to study – except to put the focus on interests and identities of actors because those are socially formed and when changed, can make the system change. But there is no indication of which one changes, or how changes affect the system. Without being able to make some causal argument other than: change can cause change (tautological) then constructivism is not a theory, but a set of initial conditions.
[i] www.wordnet.princeton.edu
[ii] Wendt, Anarchy is what states make of it p. 424
[iii] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constructivism_in_international_relations
[iv] Wendt at 395
[v] Id
[vi] Wendt at 394
[vii] Id at 418
[viii] Id at 397
[ix] Id at 403
[x] Id at 397.
[xi] Id at 399-403
[xii] Id at 396
Instead, Constructivism is a commonly shared set of initial conditions that must be present in a theory in order for it to fall into a “constructivist” perspective. Wendt’s basic works on constructivism (he’s considered the founder)[iii] is a reaction to realism, and is intended to counter the idea that self-help and power politics are essential features of anarchy[iv]. Instead, Wendt treats anarchy as a social construct (or practice) rather than an inseparable condition of international relations and the way that states see anarchy[v].
The main focus of this approach is to use theories borrowed from sociology about identity and interest formation[vi] to focus on how a change in identities and interests of states can make a change in their behavior[vii].There are two basic tenants to constructivism: (1) actors act towards objects – including other actors – on the basis of what value those objects have as interpreted by the society in which the actor operates[viii]; and (2) the meanings of the terms on which action (like cooperation) can be organized is based on shared interests[ix]. What these tenants mean is that it is collective meanings placed ob objects – such as anarchy – that constitute the structures that organize actions[x].
Wendt’s famous quote, “anarchy is what states make of it,” illustrates these examples perfectly. If anarchy was an essential feature of international relations, instead of a social construct, there could be no meaning given to it by states. Instead, it would function and other interactions would logically flow from it. Realists argue that self-help and power politics logically flow from anarchy. However, by treating anarchy as a social construct, Wendt is able to show that self-help and power politics don’t naturally flow, but can follow from anarchy[xi]. Wendt is also able to articulate ideas (sovereignty, dynastic relations, trade, goals, etc) that can cause power politics and self-help not to flow from anarchy[xii]. With this analysis, Wendt has changed the focus from anarchy as a must and defining feature of the system, to anarchy as a social construct that can change.
Constructivism offers no real guidance on what to study – except to put the focus on interests and identities of actors because those are socially formed and when changed, can make the system change. But there is no indication of which one changes, or how changes affect the system. Without being able to make some causal argument other than: change can cause change (tautological) then constructivism is not a theory, but a set of initial conditions.
[i] www.wordnet.princeton.edu
[ii] Wendt, Anarchy is what states make of it p. 424
[iii] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constructivism_in_international_relations
[iv] Wendt at 395
[v] Id
[vi] Wendt at 394
[vii] Id at 418
[viii] Id at 397
[ix] Id at 403
[x] Id at 397.
[xi] Id at 399-403
[xii] Id at 396
Friday, November 14, 2008
Fozouni: Confutation of Political Realism
This is an outline of the article, Confutation of Political Realism, written by B.Fozouni and published in International Studies Quarterly (1995).
CONFUTATION OF POLITICAL REALISM
Main Point: Political realism as a theory in international relations, properly understood, is an empirically untenable theory (p. 479).
The theory we are analyzing:
Morgenthau has the central tenant of realism being: the sole basis of all international relations is the struggle among nations to optimize their power (p.480-481)
Power is defined as the quest to reach optimal power (influence) in relation to other states (p.481).
Rationally acting states optimize one's power (p.482)
He also mentions that there is an assumption regarding human nature – that all men are power driven (483)
M didn't need this assumption. He should've not dealt in it. (484)
Simply because if you add this to the premises – and all premises must be true – there is no proven truth in this statement.
So we can ignore it right?
Deductive-Nomological Theory (D-N)
Must have a valid structure – particular initial conditions and general laws (the premises) result in the event or observation to be explained (482)
Must also have the following 3 things:
The premises must have empirical content
The premises must contain at least one universal generalizations (laws)
These are assumed to have proven empirical basis
The premises must be true – a presupposition
If all the premises of realism are true – the realism has created a grand theory that should encompass everything (485)
No mention of human nature in the theoretical structure – therefore it is unnecessary (see above)
So why can't we discard it as unnecessary and use the rest?
Particular Initial conditions (483)
State A has the capability to expand its influence in its geopolitical sphere
State A's relative power position in its geopolitical sphere is underextended
General Laws (483)
All states that have the capability to expand their influence, and whose relative power positions in their geopolitical spheres are underextended, will expand their influence to power optimization
Therefore: (483)
State A will expand its influence in its geopolitical sphere (prediction)
State A did expand its influence in the geopolitical sphere (explanation/reason)
Empirical Liabilities of Realism
The question of the empirical analysis is: How well confirmed are the observed historical patterns that M uses to justify realism's central tenet of power optimization.
CONFUTATION OF POLITICAL REALISM
Main Point: Political realism as a theory in international relations, properly understood, is an empirically untenable theory (p. 479).
The theory we are analyzing:
Morgenthau has the central tenant of realism being: the sole basis of all international relations is the struggle among nations to optimize their power (p.480-481)
Power is defined as the quest to reach optimal power (influence) in relation to other states (p.481).
Rationally acting states optimize one's power (p.482)
He also mentions that there is an assumption regarding human nature – that all men are power driven (483)
M didn't need this assumption. He should've not dealt in it. (484)
Simply because if you add this to the premises – and all premises must be true – there is no proven truth in this statement.
So we can ignore it right?
Deductive-Nomological Theory (D-N)
Must have a valid structure – particular initial conditions and general laws (the premises) result in the event or observation to be explained (482)
Must also have the following 3 things:
The premises must have empirical content
The premises must contain at least one universal generalizations (laws)
These are assumed to have proven empirical basis
The premises must be true – a presupposition
If all the premises of realism are true – the realism has created a grand theory that should encompass everything (485)
No mention of human nature in the theoretical structure – therefore it is unnecessary (see above)
So why can't we discard it as unnecessary and use the rest?
Particular Initial conditions (483)
State A has the capability to expand its influence in its geopolitical sphere
State A's relative power position in its geopolitical sphere is underextended
General Laws (483)
All states that have the capability to expand their influence, and whose relative power positions in their geopolitical spheres are underextended, will expand their influence to power optimization
Therefore: (483)
State A will expand its influence in its geopolitical sphere (prediction)
State A did expand its influence in the geopolitical sphere (explanation/reason)
Empirical Liabilities of Realism
The question of the empirical analysis is: How well confirmed are the observed historical patterns that M uses to justify realism's central tenet of power optimization.
Monday, November 10, 2008
Cottam/Fozouni, Holsti, Snyder and Peterson et al
The articles reviewed in this section are:
Cottam and Fozouni's Chapter 1: Return of Political Strategy
Holsti: Theories of International Relations and Foreign Policy
Snyder: One World, Many Theories
Peterson, et al: Teaching and Research Practices in International Relations
I. PART ONE: Analytical Summary
In the Snyder article, the main point is that while all three international relations traditions have some relevance to policy today, none of them are capable of explaining all of the changes occuring today (p. 61). Snyder states that instead of creating new theories, the theories have been changed to meet the new situations in the international world (p.53). He states that realists keep to the basic principles of realism, regardless of the changing situation, and that is the weakness of the realist tradition (p. 56). Liberalism, while accounting for the US tactic of spreading democracy, fails to take into account what occurs in emerging democracies (p.58). Constructivism, or Liberalism, emphasizes cultural values but fails to take into account how those values might change and the structures which would cause these to change (p.60). Snyder goes through all three traditions and points out that they all have relevance and weaknesses when assessing today’s international political environment.
Holsti’s main point is to understand how realism, and the critics and critiques of realism, will help us understand international relations in the post-Cold War era (p.56). Holsti states the five basic principles of realism: the central point is to study the conditions of war and peace, that the structure of the system is required to be understood, the focus on geography, rational behavior, and unitary actors (p. 36-37). He also states that there are crucial problems with realism and activities realism cannot explain (p.38). Holsti then posits that the theories of liberalism (p.43), world-system theories (p.45), and decision-making theories (p.47) all cover the aspects of international relations that realism cannot explain. Although the other theories can account for some of the weakness of realism, he states that we should not dismiss realism. Instead, because the possibility of war is always there, realism has relevance in the current world, regardless of its weaknesses (p. 58).
The Peterson et al article emphasized the responsiveness of academia to real world events in the post-Cold War era (p.10). This can clearly be seen in the responses they gather to questions 56 and 57 (p.38) where the experts were asked what area of the world has the greatest importance today and in 20 years. The answers clearly show a shift away from USSR/Eastern Europe towards Middle East/North Africa and Asia (p.38). The article also emphasizes that research changes more slowly than teaching (p.36).
Cottam and Fozouni emphasized that in the post-Cold War era, politics are removed from strategy in international relations theories, or a lack of political strategy (p.24). This is demonstrated by the applying the seven criteria for political strategy (p.28) to various theories, such as Keenan’s (p.34-35). Under this test, no current theory used to describe post-Cold War international relations meets the criteria for political strategy (pp. 34-36, 48-50, 56-59 [discussion of each theory and criteria for political strategy]). The lack of political strategy emphasizes a secondary point: that due to nuclear weapons, new theories need to be constructed to deal with the world that include the ability to take change into account (p.38).
II. PART TWO: Critical Evaluation
A common theme throughout all of these articles is the lack of a cohesive theory to explain international relations. The Holsti article claims that all the theories, when taken together can explain international relations (see above). However, this conglomeration of theories is unwieldy and leads to no cohesive analysis. By simply combining all the theories together, you are avoiding the prospect of creating a theory that would be analyze-able. Rather, you create a situation in which any change can be explained by a large conglomeration. This does not lead to a clear and simplified explanation of the world, which is one of the goals of a theory.
Then Snyder makes essentially the same claim, but in different words. Snyder claims that all theories have a role in international relations, although none of them can be used, individually, to explain the current international situation (see above). This also lacks the clarity that a single theory would provide. Rather than offering any solutions, Snyder simply states what each theory does well, and why that particular theory does not work on its own. He also fails to provide a solution.
This could be, in part, because of the lack of change in academia. The Peterson et al survey demonstrates that although academia recognizes change and responds to change within the classroom, it fails to recognize that same change in its research (see above). If academia was to recognize the change within its own research, it is possible that a new, comprehensive theory would emerge.
With a new emergent theory, it is possible that political strategy would return to international relations. Cottam and Fozouni's article states that no current theory can explain the post-Cold War world, in terms of political strategy. The claim is that theory has split from strategy, and lacks the ability to explain anything in the current world. This is due to the inability of any theory to be considered political strategy (see above). However, how valid are the criteria for political strategy? Must a theory fit all seven criteria in order to be relevant to explaining the current world? The authors do not state where the foundations of the seven criteria come from. The criteria are simply presented to the reader, and applied to the theories to support their point that no current theory meets the criteria. It is a somewhat circular argument.
So how can a theory be relevant to today’s world? The articles fail to explore what a coherent theory would look like, and instead focus on critiquing the theories that currently exist.
Cottam and Fozouni's Chapter 1: Return of Political Strategy
Holsti: Theories of International Relations and Foreign Policy
Snyder: One World, Many Theories
Peterson, et al: Teaching and Research Practices in International Relations
I. PART ONE: Analytical Summary
In the Snyder article, the main point is that while all three international relations traditions have some relevance to policy today, none of them are capable of explaining all of the changes occuring today (p. 61). Snyder states that instead of creating new theories, the theories have been changed to meet the new situations in the international world (p.53). He states that realists keep to the basic principles of realism, regardless of the changing situation, and that is the weakness of the realist tradition (p. 56). Liberalism, while accounting for the US tactic of spreading democracy, fails to take into account what occurs in emerging democracies (p.58). Constructivism, or Liberalism, emphasizes cultural values but fails to take into account how those values might change and the structures which would cause these to change (p.60). Snyder goes through all three traditions and points out that they all have relevance and weaknesses when assessing today’s international political environment.
Holsti’s main point is to understand how realism, and the critics and critiques of realism, will help us understand international relations in the post-Cold War era (p.56). Holsti states the five basic principles of realism: the central point is to study the conditions of war and peace, that the structure of the system is required to be understood, the focus on geography, rational behavior, and unitary actors (p. 36-37). He also states that there are crucial problems with realism and activities realism cannot explain (p.38). Holsti then posits that the theories of liberalism (p.43), world-system theories (p.45), and decision-making theories (p.47) all cover the aspects of international relations that realism cannot explain. Although the other theories can account for some of the weakness of realism, he states that we should not dismiss realism. Instead, because the possibility of war is always there, realism has relevance in the current world, regardless of its weaknesses (p. 58).
The Peterson et al article emphasized the responsiveness of academia to real world events in the post-Cold War era (p.10). This can clearly be seen in the responses they gather to questions 56 and 57 (p.38) where the experts were asked what area of the world has the greatest importance today and in 20 years. The answers clearly show a shift away from USSR/Eastern Europe towards Middle East/North Africa and Asia (p.38). The article also emphasizes that research changes more slowly than teaching (p.36).
Cottam and Fozouni emphasized that in the post-Cold War era, politics are removed from strategy in international relations theories, or a lack of political strategy (p.24). This is demonstrated by the applying the seven criteria for political strategy (p.28) to various theories, such as Keenan’s (p.34-35). Under this test, no current theory used to describe post-Cold War international relations meets the criteria for political strategy (pp. 34-36, 48-50, 56-59 [discussion of each theory and criteria for political strategy]). The lack of political strategy emphasizes a secondary point: that due to nuclear weapons, new theories need to be constructed to deal with the world that include the ability to take change into account (p.38).
II. PART TWO: Critical Evaluation
A common theme throughout all of these articles is the lack of a cohesive theory to explain international relations. The Holsti article claims that all the theories, when taken together can explain international relations (see above). However, this conglomeration of theories is unwieldy and leads to no cohesive analysis. By simply combining all the theories together, you are avoiding the prospect of creating a theory that would be analyze-able. Rather, you create a situation in which any change can be explained by a large conglomeration. This does not lead to a clear and simplified explanation of the world, which is one of the goals of a theory.
Then Snyder makes essentially the same claim, but in different words. Snyder claims that all theories have a role in international relations, although none of them can be used, individually, to explain the current international situation (see above). This also lacks the clarity that a single theory would provide. Rather than offering any solutions, Snyder simply states what each theory does well, and why that particular theory does not work on its own. He also fails to provide a solution.
This could be, in part, because of the lack of change in academia. The Peterson et al survey demonstrates that although academia recognizes change and responds to change within the classroom, it fails to recognize that same change in its research (see above). If academia was to recognize the change within its own research, it is possible that a new, comprehensive theory would emerge.
With a new emergent theory, it is possible that political strategy would return to international relations. Cottam and Fozouni's article states that no current theory can explain the post-Cold War world, in terms of political strategy. The claim is that theory has split from strategy, and lacks the ability to explain anything in the current world. This is due to the inability of any theory to be considered political strategy (see above). However, how valid are the criteria for political strategy? Must a theory fit all seven criteria in order to be relevant to explaining the current world? The authors do not state where the foundations of the seven criteria come from. The criteria are simply presented to the reader, and applied to the theories to support their point that no current theory meets the criteria. It is a somewhat circular argument.
So how can a theory be relevant to today’s world? The articles fail to explore what a coherent theory would look like, and instead focus on critiquing the theories that currently exist.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
