NATO and energy security

I. Introduction

Energy is vital to every nation-state in the world. Whether the nation-state relies on natural gas, such as Saudi Arabia, nuclear energy, like some nation-states in Europe, or other forms of energy, each nation-state has an energy interest. For nation-states, energy provides the means to power everything from transportation and telecommunications to individual homes and hospitals. Schools and law enforcement rely on energy to power classroom, vehicles, and databases. The banking industry relies on energy to power the massive computer systems that enable the industry to exist. Factories that provide food and medicine to the world’s population rely on energy. A nation-state’s military relies on energy to power its vehicles and move its troops. Knowing all these things about the impact of energy, and its importance to the nation-state, the question remains; how does energy security fit into the current international relations (IR) theories and globalization theories? Does it?

The United States and European countries have already begun discussing the appropriate policies and institutions that could secure their energy security in the future. The Bush Administration, in February 2006, spoke of energy security at a NATO conference. This speech was given with the support of Germany and Britain (Gallis 2006). The European Union has stated that they believe political and economic measures are the first step to ensuring their energy security, although they have yet to outline what those steps will be (Scaroni 2006). Industrialized countries are recognizing the need for energy security, and they are not alone. Developing countries, such as China and India, are engaged in active discussions with the Middle East to secure their energy security (Luft 2009). With all of these individual participants in the energy security debate, is there room for an international institution? Should an international institution, such as NATO, be a participant in energy security?

This paper argues that energy security can be understood by constructivism and neorealism – both current IR theories. Furthermore, this paper suggests that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should, based on constructivist and neorealist theories in IR theory and transformationalist and skeptic theories in globalization, make energy security one of its goals. Even though the motivations of the different theories and perspectives are different, the outcome is the same: NATO should be involved in energy security.

II. Energy Security

What is energy security? Energy security has been defined as protecting the way a nation-state produces its energy (Morse and Richard 2002). This means that, for the global north, energy security means protecting the oil coming from the Middle East; keeping the oil flowing (Morse and Richard 2002). Energy security has also been defined as what a country needs, in terms of energy, to keep its economy and military at the same level it is today (Ebinger, 1982).

Energy security rests on three pillars: supply diversity, transportation diversity and fuel diversity (Rosner 2009). In terms of supply diversity, the Middle East continues to be the largest supplier. In 2006, the Middle East supplied 22 percent of U.S. imports, 36 percent of OECD Europe’s, 40 percent of China’s, 60 percent of India’s, and 80 percent of Japan’s and South Korea’s. Even oil- rich Canada is dependent on the Middle East. Forty five percent of Canada’s oil imports originate in the region[1]. This means that supply diversity is low. Fuel diversity, at this point in time, among industrialized nations is also low; they rely on oil for most of their needs, and use nuclear power and natural gas sparingly (Rosner 2009).

Energy security has been threatened, continually, since the oil embargoes of the 1970s and the price shocks of 1973 and 1979 (Wirth, Gray, Podesta 2003). Of the one trillion estimated barrels of oil reserves that exist in the world, two-thirds of that is found in the Persian Gulf (Ibid). Russia holds the bulk of that balance (Measuring Globalization, 2005). Based on where the oil is located, the world’s dependence on oil, and how the world economy (and individual economies) suffered when oil prices spiked, it is in the interests of the world economy to stabilize energy sources so that such shocks do not occur (Goldstein, Huang, Akan 1997). President Carter said that curtailed oil production in the Middle East was a “clear and present danger to our national security” (Bucknell, 1981).

Energy consumption is higher in the global north than the south, although the global south – which holds the Persian Gulf – is the largest exporter of energy (Goldstein, Huang, Akan 1997). As of 1992, the data indicates that the political instability between the global north and the global south will create energy instability (Ibid). When there is energy instability, there is a lack of economic growth (Ibid). Moreover, energy production that relies on oil – which is still most of the world – is subject to various political and economic instabilities like no other resources (Ebinger 1982). Essentially, the problem seems to be geo-political; the oil reserves are concentrated in an area of the world where there is internal and international political instability (Wirth, Gray, Podesta 2003).

Iran has, again, recently threatened to use its energy reserves to obtain political objectives. Mainly, Iran threatens to cut-off energy supplies to buyers if there are sanctions over its nuclear program (Gallis 2006). Whereas Russia, by increasing its internal stability and rule of law, has been able to increase its oil production in order to use the oil as a political bargaining tool with the West (Morse and Richard 2002).

III. A Very Brief History of NATO[2]

NATO was first established in 1949 with its fundamental role to act as a deterrent against military aggression by the Soviets against the West. When the Berlin Wall fell, and the Cold War ended in the early 1990’s the threat of Soviet aggression also ended, and many thought that NATO would perish.

However, NATO has changed and expanded since that time hand has assumed new responsibilities, including a proactive role, in the international community. NATO undertook its first military operation in 1995, followed by operations throughout the world, including Afghanistan, Iraq, Africa and the protection of waterways from pirates. NATO has assumed a humanitarian role along side its military role.

When NATO was formed, it consisted of 14 countries. Today there are 28 countries that are members of NATO; this includes many former Soviet-republics and client-states. There are even more countries that seek a larger involvement with NATO through its “Partnership for Peace” program and other agreements that NATO has with non-member countries.

IV. Analysis; IR and Globalization Theory

The question is; how does energy security fit into the current theoretical paradigms so that it can be analyzed and policy can be crafted to fit goals of the nation-states in relation to energy security? Interestingly enough, both the constructivist and neorealist IR theories, and transformationalist and skeptic globalization theories, offer answers to this problem. Whereas the constructivist and neorealist positions are normally at odds with each other, in the area of NATO becoming involved in energy security they both have valuable insight to offer. Additionally, the skeptic position and the transformationalist positions in globalization, which match with the neorealist and constructivist positions respectively, can add depth to the analysis that might otherwise be missing. Regardless of which pairing is used – neorealist/skeptic or constructivist/transformationalist – they both would argue that NATO should add energy security to its list of goals.

Realism is based in power (Morgenthau 1974; Waltz 1979). Hans Morgenthau, a realist, said that power can come from a monopoly or quasi-monopoly of scarce natural resources (1974). Waltz said that the state must use its power for the main goal of a state: survival (1979). Neorealists also believe that states must engage in balancing actions to balance the power of other states (Waltz 1979). The balancing actions can result in alliances between nations when they strive to achieve the same end (Waltz 1979). In an international economic system, states have simple goals that show how they promote their self-interest and survival: economic utility, economic growth, social stability and political leverage (Kazenstein, Keohane, Krasner 1998).

Globalization skeptics believe that the nation-state is still central, and that the world economy, and globalization, is really about the interactions of the nation-states with other nation-states in a manner that promotes the self-interest of the nation-states (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, Perraton 1999). This ties the economic interests of a state under neorealism to the skeptic position in globalization by creating a list of motivations for states to participate in international economies, and international alliances, without engaging in actions that would lead to dissolution of their sovereignty (Kazenstein, Keohane, Krasner 1998).

By using neorealism, it is easy to see why states should engage in energy policy with NATO. By engaging in an alliance in the framework of NATO, the various countries are able to ensure their survival in the international alliance. Furthermore, the balancing work of NATO is not finished simply because the Berlin Wall fell. Russia continues to engage in active national security policies designed to have its former enemies become dependent upon it for their energy needs (Rosner 2009). 40 percent of EU gas imports originate from Russia, 30 percent from Algeria and 25 percent from Norway; By 2030, over 60 percent of EU gas imports are expected to come from Russia with overall external dependency expected to reach 80 percent -- and are therefore susceptible to supply disruptions, extortion and price manipulations. So when Europeans talk about energy security their think primarily about electricity and more specifically natural gas, Russian gas (Luft 2009). This means that the EU, most members are also part of NATO, considers the need to balance Russian power and ensure that Russia doesn’t become too powerful, a survival, a national-security issue. Individually, each nation may not have much power to balance Russia, but by joining in an alliance they can ensure their energy security, and thus their national security. NATO, should engage in actively promoting its member nation’s energy security, according to realism.

Additionally, NATO represents US interests. The US has already been engages in active military efforts to secure energy sources, along with other NATO governments (although not NATO as an institution) (Gallis 2006). The Carter Doctrine, put forth by US President Jimmy Carter in 1980, states that any attempt to prevent the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf to the US will be seen as an attack on US vital interests and will be repelled by any means necessary, including military means (Luft 2009). With the US putting forth such a strong military position on energy security in the Persian Gulf, someone, according to neorealism, should balance with position. That someone might be NATO. NATO can engage the various governments involved on how to protect against disruptions in oil supplies, and how to protect the various oil interests in the region, which would place the other countries in the NATO alliance in a balancing position against the US (Gallis 2006).

Additionally, Russia has stated that it has not ruled out the application of force to maintain its position of hydrocarbon supremacy (Rosner 2009). Russia’s revised National Security Strategy to 2020 realizes that such a position might destabilize and unbalance the power in the region, but Russia seeks to maintain its energy dominance (Rosner 2009). According to neorealism, this action must be balanced against to maintain the balance of power in the world (Waltz 1979). NATO is the perfect balancer for this situation since its member nation-states in the EU abut onto the territory Russia controls.

Furthermore, according to the skeptic position on globalization, all nation-states are acting in their own economic interests. This correlates with what has been seen in the world so far: Issues of energy scarcity have triggered levels of competition between NATO allies that might lead to military conflict if left unchecked (Rosner 2009). Additionally, the Middle East states are acting as a cartel that prevents other nation-states from securing their economic interests in the region (Luft 2009). Each time that there has been an energy crisis, the world has suffered a depression in economic terms (Luft 2009). Energy is vital to economic output in developed countries, and is vital to continued economic development in all countries (Wirth, Gray, Podesta 1003). In order to prevent more conflict from occurring over energy security, NATO should actively engage in energy security policies to create an environment where all nation-states can secure their future and promote their economic interests without the fear of engaging in a military conflict within the alliance (Asmus 2002).

NATO can enable nation-states to ensure their security and survival – the basic motivation of nation-states under neorealism. Additionally, economic interests of the member-states, under neorealism, mean that the skeptic position – engaging in international alliances to promote their economic interests in the interests of survival – encourages the use of NATO to sustain member nation-states’ energy security.

The constructivist and transformationalist theories also agree that NATO should have a role to play, although that role appears to be different from the role under neorealism and skepticism. Constructivist theories state that the international organization of nation-states is what the nation-states want, and that it can be changed by changing norms and behaviors through international institutions (Wendt 1992). Transformationalists also believe in the role of international institutions; that international institutions are helping change the way that states believe in sovereignty, the way states act and that state behavior must change as they are no longer in exclusive control of what happens within their state boarders (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, Perraton 1999). When these two positions are combined, they come to meld into a position that maintains that the world can change, and is changing, and that international institutions are a large part of this change (Shaw 1997).

NATO is an international institution, and its existence enables the constructivist and transformationalist positions to be realized in energy security. The reality is that, by 2030 75% of NATO countries’ oil supply will be dependent on a handful of Middle Eastern states, and NATO’s European members will average 60% natural gas dependency on the Russian Federation (Dyner 2000). This means that the NATO countries must change the way they behave because the energy supplies are not within their nation-state boundaries, and they must consider the Middle East when making decisions (Wirth, Gray, Podesta 2003).

By acknowledging the outside influences on the sovereignty of the nation-state, NATO nations are falling within the transformationalist perspective on globalization. This means, like the transformationalist perspective requires, the NATO countries must make use of international institutions – like NATO – to make changes in the world. If NATO countries are concerned about their energy security because most of their supply comes from unstable countries (Shah 2009), then the nation-states must make use of NATO to secure their energy security. With so many nation-states involved in the arena of energy security, it is possible that only an international institution, such as NATO, can prevent a geopolitical cold war over energy sources (Goldstein, Huang, Akan 1997).

NATO has a huge capacity, vested in its civilian and military structure, to analyze energy and its use from a military and civilian standpoint (Rosner 2009). Using this capacity, NATO has the ability, under constructivist theories, to change the way its member nation-states and others view energy. As China follows America’s past patterns, and engages in participation with the Middle East to secure its energy future, it becomes necessary to have international institutions present to prevent military conflict and misunderstandings (Luft 2009). Indeed, if China continues to follow in the footsteps of America, it could lead to a world full of conflict over energy; which is not in the best interest of any nation-state (Luft 2009). Instead, international institutions, such as NATO, should intervene and work with the various energy suppliers and consumers to create a stable environment for energy security (Luft 2006; Rosner 2009; Gallis 2006).

Furthermore, energy security rests on three pillars – one of which is diversity of sources. No one can attach blame for dependence on oil and natural gas in Europe, oil in America, and the developing world’s dependence on oil, to anyone nation-state (With, Gray, Podesta 2003). Instead, the international institutions need to be engaged in cooperating with nation-states to change the view of oil and natural gas dependence into dependence on a different source of energy. Only if energy sources are diversified will energy security be truly promoted; and only an international institution has the power to change such norms and beliefs in the international system (Bucknell 1981).

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was originally formed to be a deterrent for Russian; to prevent Russia from becoming aggressive towards other European nations (Smith, 1990). However, NATO continues to exist long after its détente purpose has ended (Ibid). In fact, NATO continues to grow and expand. As it grows, it searches for purpose. The growth of China and India, non-NATO countries, as energy consumers, and an inability to produce reliable and alternative energies to oil and natural gas, has led to energy producers needing to ensure access for all to energy sources (Scaroni, 2006). NATO already plays a role in energy security. NATO has many countries that desire a closer relationship with it, either through membership or its “Partnership for Peace” program; many of these countries are the ones who need to secure energy resources because they are energy consumers rather than energy producers (Gallis, 2006). NATO governments have been involved in energy security operations on their own, and there is no reason why energy security cannot become a goal of NATO (Gallis 2006).

Another possible solution is alternative energy sources such as wind power, solar power and photovotalic solar cells. However, current research indicates that these power sources, if fully maximized, could only contribute 1.5 trillion kilowatt hours (kwh) to the total net global electricity generation increase of 13.8 trillion kwh between 2006 and 2030[3]. This means that alternative energy sources alone cannot solve the energy security problem facing most nations. Additionally, most renewable energy sources, other than wind and hydro-power, are not economically competitive with oil and natural gas energy[4]. This means there still must be another solution to the energy security problem.

There are problems with all of these proposals. First, realists thought that force could solve problems of energy security in the 1970’s, but they were wrong (Bucknell 1981). Force alone wasn’t sufficient. The problem was that energy security is a matter of asymmetrical interdependence – where some countries are more dependent on others than other countries – and military power alone has not proven to be able to conquer this dependency (Keohane, Nye 1977). Additionally, NATO has already become involved in energy security through its Istanbul Cooperation Initiative of 2004; the allies are in discussions with Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates to build cooperation in energy security[5]. However, the lack of stability in the area of energy security remains (Rosner 2009). It is unknown if time will solve these problems, or if another approach needs to be suggested.

There is another aspect of energy security that needs to be fully expanded upon. The pillars of energy security include supply diversity, transportation diversity and fuel diversity (Rosner 2009). Nuclear energy would solve some of the supply, transportation and fuel diversity problems that currently exist in energy security. Nuclear energy can be a different fuel from oil and natural gas, can be produced at home by most industrialized nations, and is a more reliable supply than oil or natural gas (Ebinger 2009). However, nuclear energy comes with its own set of problems. Most notably, there are problems of storage with the spent fuel – it remains radioactive for decades after it is no longer needed (Ebinger 2009). Nuclear energy also comes with proliferation problems: the material created through the enriching and processing processes, needed to create the nuclear material for civilian use, can also be used as military nuclear material by terrorists (Ebinger 2009). This means that there would have to be significant safeguards against proliferation by terrorists to protect nation-states from a nuclear threat (Ebinger 2009). There are also concerns about how to supply nuclear power to non-nuclear nation-states without those nation-states obtaining the information and materials they need to create nuclear weapons and become a nuclear power (Schneider, Thomas, Froggar, Koplow 2009). In order for nuclear power to become a viable option for the world, rather than just for those nations which already possess it, these issues need to be explored and solutions need to be found for them.

One possible solution, if the constructivist and transformationalist positions are correct, is to use the current international agencies to regulate and control nuclear power. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) could be used to help regulate these issues. However, Iran has posed a successful challenge to the IAEA’s jurisdiction – which can only be invoked if a nation-state allows the IAEA into its country. This is a limitation of the IAEA that would have to be addressed in order for the IAEA to be an international institution that can help with the transition from oil and natural gas power to nuclear power (Schneider, Thomas, Froggar, Koplow 2009).

However, regardless of the success of the approach at the current time, neorealism/sceptics and constructivism/transformationalists all would agree, for different reasons, that NATO is important to the energy security of the nation-states and should be involved in energy security policies.

V. Conclusion

The IR theories of neorealism and constructivism and the globalization perspectives of skepticism and transformationalists give weight to the idea that NATO should become involved in energy security. Neorealism and skeptics say that NATO should be involved for balancing issues and for protection of the nation-states’ continued survival. Transformationalists and constructivists say that NATO should be involved because it is only through international institutions, like NATO, that anything can change in the area of energy security. Although the reasons for NATO to be involved in energy security are different between the various theories and perspectives, the outcome – that NATO should be involved in energy security – is unanimous.

There are other questions raised by this paper that are left unanswered. One of the main questions is: To what extent should NATO become involved in energy security? Additionally, how would NATO address the ongoing instability in the Middle East that contributes to the pessimism about energy security in the future? There is also a large question of what role science, and the discovery of new technology will play in the quest for energy security. It is possible that another theory, or approach, would have the answers to these questions. Continued development of energy sources, energy storage and more energy-efficient technology will also help the energy security issue. It is up to science whether enough energy alternatives and energy-efficient technology can be developed to aid in the fight for energy security.

Energy security will continue to be a security issue, and an issue that all nation-states must address, so long as energy is needed. Regardless of where energy comes from, or how energy gets to where it needs to go, energy is needed. It provides the very basis for the current international society. Without energy, the world would change into something unrecognizable by today’s standards. In order to protect the world from energy crises, energy security should be an issue that all international institutions and nation-states are actively engaged in.

REFERENCES

Asmus, R. Opening NATO’s Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself For A New Era. Columbia, NY, Columbia U. Press, 2002.

Bucknell, H. Energy and the National Defense. Lexington, KY. University Press of Kentucky, 1981.

Dyner, I. Energy Modeling Platforms for Policy and Strategy Support. The Journal of Operantional Research Society, Vol 51:2 (2000) pp. 136-144

Ebinger, C. Security Implications of the Expansion of Nuclear Energy. Brookings Institute (October, 2009).

Ebinger, C. The Critical Link: Energy and National Security in the 1980’s. Cambridge, Mass. Ballinger Publishing Co, 1982.

Gallis, P. NATO and Energy Security. CRS Report for Congress, December 21, 2006

Goldstein, J and Huand, X and Akan, B. Energy in the World Economy, 1950-1992. International Studies Quarterly, Vol 41:2 (June 1997) pp. 241-266.

Held, D and McGrew, A and Goldblatt, D and Perraton, J. Global Transformations. Stanford University Press, Stanford CA, 1999.

Kaplan, L. The Long Entanglement: NATO’s First Fifty Years. Praeger, 1999.

Kendall, B. NATO Searches for Defining Role. BBC, 2005

Keohane, R and Nye, J. Power and Interdependence. Boston, Little Brown Publishing Co. 1977.

Luft, G. Dependence on Middle East Energy and its Impact on Global Security. Retrieved on 11/142009 from www.iags.org archive.

Morgenthau, H. The New Diplomacy Movement. Encounter, 1979.

Morse, E and Richard, J. The Battle For Energy Dominance. Foreign Affairs, Vol 81:2 (Mar-Ap 2002), pp. 16-31.

Rosner, K. Twenty Years After the Fall of the Berlin Wall: NATO’s Enduring Energy Challenge. October 2009. Retrieved from Journal of Energy Security archives on 12/02/2009.

Sandler, T and Hartley K. The Political Economy of NATO: Past, Present and Into the 21^st Century. Cambridge U. Press, 1999.

Schneider, M and Thomas, S and Froggar, A and Koplow, D. World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2009. (August 2009) Retrieved on 12/11/2009 from http://www.bmu.de/english/nuclear_safety/downloads/doc/44832.php.

Shah, A. Reliance on Foreign Sources of Energy and Geopolitics. Retrieved on 12/12/2009 from www.globalissues.org/article/595/energy-security#Relianceonforeignsourcesofenergyandgeopolitics.

Shaw, M. The State of Globalization; Towards a Theory of State Transformation. Review of International Political Economy, Vol 4:3 (Autumn, 1997), pp. 497-513

Smith, J, ed. The Origins of NATO. Exeter, United Kingdom, U. of Exeter Press, 1990

Waltz, K. Theory of International Politics. McGrawHill, NY, 1979.

Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive LLC. Measuring Globalization. Foreign Policy, Vol 148 (May-June 2005). Pp. 52-60.

Wendt, A. Anarchy Is What States Make Of It. International Organization, Vol 46:2 (Spring 1992).

Wirth, T and Boyden Gray, C and Podesta, J. The Future of Energy Policy. Foreign Affairs, Vol 82:4 (July-Aug 2003) pp. 132-155

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[1] Energy Information Administration, http://www.eia.doe.gov/imp/imports.html

[2] All information in this section was obtained at the official NATO website: www.nato.int; a search was performed for “history of NATO” and this is the information that was collected.

[3] US Energy Information Administration , “International Energy Outlook 2009”, May 2009

[4] Ibid.

[5] Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, NATO, Brussels, Jan. 2006

Owen, Layne and Waltz: Liberalism and Structural Realism

Owen: How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace
Layne: Kant or Can't: The Myth of the Democratic Peace
Waltz: Structural Realism After the Cold War

Part I:Summary

The main point of the Layne article is that democratic peace theory (DPT) establishes a correlation between peace and democracies, not a causal link between peace and democracies (p. 209) and that realism is a better predictor of states’ actions (p.178). The DPT has two possible causal links: the absence of war between democracies is attributable to institutions and the absence of was between democracies is because of democratic norms and culture (p. 177). The author states that it is not the institutional attributes that enable democracies to behave peacefully towards other democracies, so it must be the norms that are the causal logic in DPT (p.183). After four case studies (the most recent being 1923 (p.186)) the conclusion is that DPT establishes a correlation between democracies and peace, but not a causal link (p.209). Instead, in all four instances, realist factors provided the reason why the democracies did not go to war (p.209). Showing that DPT is not valid matters in order to show policy makers that they should not focus on the implications of DPT (spreading democracy because democracies don’t make war on each other), but rather on security (realist) concerns (p.217).

The Waltz article’s main point was that structural realism is still the dominant theory because there has been no change in the system that would render the theory obsolete (p.30). Waltz labels the democratic peace theory a “fact” because if democracies don’t fight with other democracies, then that is not an explanation but a statement of fact that needs an explanation (p.31). According to Waltz, international relations theory deals with the system (p. 34) and that no matter how wide spread democracy might be, that is a unit level change (p. 34) and so does not alter the system or shape the system (p. 34, 35, 39). Instead Waltz states that the power of the state is still strong (p. 42) and that the presences of international institutions (p. 44) and interdependence (p. 39) (which arise in times of peace – brought on by democracy says DPT believers (p.38-39)) are simply methods that a state uses to protect itself in the anarchic world and gain power. Countries have always competed for wealth and security and this competition has often led to conflict (p. 59), and will lead to conflict so long as states are in a self-help world (p.65). Until the self-help, anarchic, world has transformed into something else, the structure of the system will remain the same, and so realism is the dominant theory (p. 67).

The Owen article’s main point is that although the institutional (structural) factors and normative factors of DPT don’t explain democratic peace individually, when those two variables are put together they do explain the democratic peace (p.142). He also believes that perception is important because if a state doesn’t perceive another state as liberal (democratic) they the first state will not treat the second state in the same way the first state would treat another liberal state (p. 146). Based on the definition of a liberal democracy as a state that is dominated by liberal norms, and structure (p.152), then a liberal state will avoid war with another state that it believes to be liberal (p.152). In order to demonstrate his idea, Owen uses four case studies, the latest of which is in 1896 (p.154). Owen then concludes, after studying these cases, that the causal mechanism linking liberal structures and norms to peace is the liberal ideas that create the structures and norms in a liberal democracy (p.173).

Part II: Analysis

The Layne article is short-sighted in that the author seems to believe that it has to be either democratic norms or democratic structure that is the causal link between democracies and peace (p. 209). Layne does not consider the position that the two variables might work in tandem. Additionally, he seems to add an element into the DPT: that there has to be an absence of military threats from one democracy to another (p. 184). This seems to be stretching the DPT to a point so that no case-study or situation could fit under the umbrella. The DPT states that democracies do not make war on other democracies (p.177), not that democracies don’t threaten other democracies with military power. This seems to be an addition to DPT that Layne makes, without any good analytical basis for the addition; simply that he thinks the absence of war “sets the threshold of proof too low” (p.185). Lastly, he claims to have four “modern” case-studies, but the most current study is from 1923 (p.186), which isn’t modern at all.

The Waltz article simply seems to reiterate points that we have heard from Waltz before, namely: anarchy, anarchy and balancing. Waltz dismisses nuclear weapons as a unit level concern (p.30), but then contradicts himself when he uses nuclear weapons in his description of what should happen with balancing (p.56). The structure of this article was very confusing to me, because it seemed that he was trying to discredit DPT by saying that DPT states a fact, not a theory (p. 31) and that realism still holds sway because the system (anarchy) hasn’t changed (p. 67). However, he launches into balancing explanations that seem to have nothing to do with DPT or liberalism, and are simply Waltz expounding on the virtues of his definition of realism. Overall, I was confused by this article. Waltz tries to make another case for realism being relevant, but in doing so dismisses all domestic factors that other theories rely on simply by saying: they are changes in the unit level, not the structural level (p. 30). Once again, Waltz seems to lack certain logic to his thoughts.

The Owen article ignores instances later than 1920’s because bipolarity and nuclear weapons change the picture (p.154). This is problematic for the author’s explanation of DPT because (1) democratic peace still exists now, after those factors, so if the theory is valid wouldn’t it need to account for the democratic peace now as well as before the 1920’s? And secondly, if all the DPT applies to is a world without nuclear weapons, what good is this theory today? The world has nuclear weapons, and they are likely not going away, so shouldn’t the theory take into account the fact that we have a democratic peace today? Also, by adding in the proposition that a democracy will not war with another state they perceive to be a democracy (p. 146-147), the author is able to explain away any possible exceptions to the theory, and include all possible situations. Therefore, his explanation over-reaches.

Additionally, it is clear there needs to be a common definition of democracy in the DPT literature. All three articles treated Germany differently in the same time period. One article said Germany was a democracy, one said it wasn’t, and one said it was an illiberal democracy. A common definition would be helpful to provide cohesiveness for the theory.

Mearsheimer: Review of Chapters 3 and 10 of Tragedy of Great Power Politics"

Mearsheimer: Chapters 3 and 10 of "The Tragedy of Great Power Politics"

Part I: Summary

In Chapter 3, Mearsheimer says that power is of two types: latent and effective (or military) power (p.55). Latent power is composed of the resources a state has available to build military power (p. 60). These resources include, but at not limited to, wealth and population (p. 61). Population is important because without people, you cannot build armies (p.61). There must actually be soldiers to fight in the army. Wealth is important because unless a state has wealth, there is no way to equip, train, pay and provide for the military forces of a country (p. 61). However, great wealth does not mean great military power, although great military power means great wealth because it takes a lot of wealth to support an army (p.75). Effective power – military power – is based on the size of a state’s army (p. 56). The indicator is the army because occupation and takeover require actual boots on the ground – which is the function of an army, not a navy or air force (p.56).

Mearsheimer says that his definition of power – that of a measurement of material resources – is the best one to use because power has to be the ability of state A to force state B to do something that state B doesn’t want to do (p. 57). Power must exist before it is exercised, and so the only way to measure that is to measure the resources that a state can use to force their will on another state (p. 60). If the measurement of power was based on the outcomes of conflicts, there would be no way to measure which state was the more powerful state until the outcome is complete (p. 60). Additionally, if power was to be based on outcomes, then there would be no way to account for resources that don’t have to do with capabilities in a calculation of power, such as: strategy, intelligence, morale, health of population, and weather (p. 60). Therefore, the definition of power must be based in resources because they can account for material and non-material sources of power (p. 60).

However, this does not mean that a state with a lot of latent power will be a powerful state and be able to turn that into effective power (p.75). States have different levels of ability to turn latent power into military power (p.79). So a state that can turn latent power into military power more effectively, even if that state might have less latent power, will be more powerful (p. 79). An organized economy can play a great role in the effective transformation of latent power to effective power (p. 81). Additionally, states buy different kinds of military forces. One state will buy more in the navy, while the other will spend more on its army. The states that spend more on its army will have more power, even if the other state has a larger overall military, because boots on the ground equals power (p.81).

The important difference to understand is how wealth and power are distributed among the great powers (p. 82).

In Chapter 10, Mearsheimer states that claiming that security competition and war among great powers is over –to be replaced with cooperation – because the Cold War is over, is wrong (p.361). Cooperation will not replace security competition because all great powers still care about gaining power because states still fear each other and anarchy reigns (p.361). Therefore, because there has been no structural change, there will be no behavioral change (p. 361). Mearsheimer also argues that there will be no structural change because no one wants to give up “being a state” and nationalism is one of the most powerful political forces in the world (p.366).

Part II: Analysis

Mearsheimer says that the balance of power among great powers is equal to the balance of military power (p. 56). However, he then says that the balance of power isn’t a good predictor of military success because there are other factors that can supply one side with an advantage: strategy, intelligence, morale, weather and disease (p. 58). These two ideas seem to be at conflict with each other. If the balance of power is military power, but the balance of power isn’t a good predictor of military success, then how can you know when a hegemon emerges? A hegemon has to have enough military power to rule their part of the world and prevent other states from coming in and interfering. This concept seems to indicate that at some point the balance of power does equal, and must be a good predictor of, military power. Otherwise, a system that is based on military capabilities would have no way of knowing what type of world it was in. Those two statements seem to be inconsistent with each other.

According to Mearsheimer, the world didn’t change after the end of the Cold War (p. 361), and then goes about showing how other theories are wrong. International economic interdependence will not make a structural change because the world is probably not more interdependent than it was in the early 20th century (p. 365). No where does Mearsheimer validate his assumption that there is as much interdependence today as there was then. It is simply a bold statement without any facts to back it up. He also discredits the democratic peace theory on the basis of near misses (p.368). However, near misses indicate that there was no war. The causes behind the near misses are never explained by Mearsheimer, he simply states that they had nothing to do with democracy (p.368). I would be more convinced if he had facts to prove that, instead of assumptive statements. Democracy affects everything in it to some extent, so I have a hard time believing his statement that near misses have nothing to do with democracy. Mearsheimer’s only basis for discrediting other theories is his emphasis on anarchy.

Finnermore and Floker: Constructivism in International Relations and Critics of Constructivism

Finnermoor: Talking Stock: Constructivism
Floker: Constructivism and Neoliberalism Compared

Part I: Summary

The main point of the Finnemore/Sikkink article was constructivism states that ideas are logically connected to the way the IR system works (p.394), and doesn’t provide anything more specific, so constructivism’s minimalist claims must be (and have been) supplemented in order to research the claim that ideas and identities matter (p.394). The constitution of society, the ideas and identities that make it up, are also causal in nature because the explanation of society and its parts are necessarily dependant on how those parts are made up (p.395). Constructivists then assess the evidence presented for their cause and compare it with alternative explanations of the same phenomena while searching for more evidence to further their claims and to disconfirm alternatives (p.395). Using this research design, constructivists focus on studying generalizations that are clustered around a several problems in the IR system including: the effect of global norms vs. local effects on the IR system (p.396), whether it is ideas or power that shape the IR system (p.398), and how identity and state action interact with each other (p.398). When looking at these social construction issues, constructivists also study how the social construction works by looking at ideas such as: the purposive efforts of individuals and groups to change the norms (p.400), the role of international organizations and law in changing social norms (p.401), what effect a group of experts with specialized knowledge can have on norms (p.402), the role of speech, argument and persuasion in changing social norms (p. 403), and what the structural effects are (p.403). Although this research may follow the lines of other, similar research in comparative politics, constructivists (and constructivist research) are not comparative because constructivism has a theoretical identity, whereas comparative studies work to solve problems without a theoretical identity (p. 404).

The main argument in the Sterling-Folker article is that constructivism is not anything new; it is a liberal paradigm and is related to neoliberal institutionalism (p. 98). The failure of constructivism to offer anything new is because its theoretical causal logic uses the same logic as is applied in almost all variants of liberal IR theory (p. 98). This is functional institutional theorizing, which is characterized by assuming pre-given interests, outside of social interaction, of the agents in a world where the function of institutions and social practices is to achieve particular goals for the agents involved based on their collective interests (p.105). Functionalist explanations are concerned with preference formation (p. 101): the particular policies and practices that an actor might adopt in pursuit of their interests, and how the institutions meet those preferences (p. 102). Constructivism follows this logic because they assume the institutions and social norms exists because they fill a collective need of the agents, and therefore the structures that exist must fill those needs or they will change (p.108). Additionally, constructivism uses functionalist causal logic because it focuses on what the institution does – which is a preference rather than an interest (p. 105). By using the functionalist causal arguments, one of the main tenets of constructivism – the importance of interests – is not present because the focus is instead on preferences (p.108). Neoliberal institutionalism and constructivism both state that changing perceptions and beliefs (in constructivist terms: identity and interests) will make cooperation more likely, and that in order to create these changes, the actors must interact so that various institutions can play a part in changing social norms (p.109). Therefore, because of their theoretical similarities and consistent underlying logic, constructivism is not a new paradigm, but rather a liberal/critical theory paradigm come to life again (p. 99).

Part II: Analysis

In the Finnemore article, there is a range of theories that can be called constructivism (p. 392). In order to establish a baseline for comparison, the author uses the features common to all the descriptions of constructivism (p. 392 et al). The author recognizes that constructivism is a framework for thinking and that other sources must be used to make constructivism work for analyzing content and predictive features (p. 393). With this understanding, the author compiles the articles together and does not separate out who uses what additional information, beyond constructivism, to make their claims. It may be that constructivism is compatible with all other theories in the sense that constructivism provides a framework for seeing the world, and the other theories provide the interpretation. Which means that there is no need to falsify all other predictive theories – which is what some of the research cited does. If the theories are all tools, rather than competing tools, then some of the argument goes away.

In the Sterling-Folker article, it’s interesting that she acknowledges differences in the theoretical scheme between constructivism and others (p. 100), but simply relegates them to being “small distinctions (p.100).” Acknowledging that they are different, means that they are different. Functionalist arguments focus on preference formation, rather than interest and identity formation (constructivism) (p. 101). There is even a listing of differences (p. 102). I think this is a case where simply because the results are similar, and because constructivism isn’t clearly defined, someone assumes the two theories have the same underlying theoretical basis, when it is clear that there are differences. Additionally, there are no instances of constructivism that falsifies this claim, and there is no claim that the author has taken into account all constructivist writings. So are the falsifying instances an issue?

Book Review: American Between the Wars, From 11/9 to 9/11

Part I: Summary

Despite President George H.W. Bush’s distinguished service as a diplomat (7), Chapter 1 states that he was unable to create a direction for United States foreign policy after the end of the Cold-War (2). Instead, he made things up as he went along (8) and demonstrated a lack of leadership by engaging in international coalition building rather than promoting the US (10-11), a reliance on old realities and principles that demonstrated a lack of imagination (13) and refused to champion US values (such as democracy and human rights) around the world (26). There was no “new world order,” (7). These mistakes allowed Clinton to campaign on a platform of foreign policy that stressed human rights and democracy (28).

The Democrats believed that they could unify their party and win the next Presidential election (32) by defining a foreign policy based on spreading freedom and democracy (29) and at the same time create a direction for the US, as Bush was unable to do (30). Chapter 2 states that Clinton’s foreign policy was about globalization, democracy, freedom, and empowering individuals (42). Clinton won the election due to his foreign policy push (p.34) and his assertiveness in moral statements in foreign policy (36). Clinton received two memos from Bush’s outgoing staff (43). Although the two memos were different in policy, they both shared the same premise: that the US had an unprecedented opportunity to shape the new international world and that there were a lot of other problems to deal with (48). The memos left Clinton no doubt that his strong words on the role of the US would need to be followed through on (52).

Chapter 3 states that Clinton’s first-year in office was disastrous and due to his ineptitude in international affairs, he lost the ability to have the US define the post-Cold War era (84). The disastrous missions in Somalia (76) and Haiti (82) characterized Clinton’s first year. Rather than standing by the goals of his foreign policy in his action in Haiti and Somalia, as articulated in his campaign, he portrayed uncertainty about being assertive in foreign policy (66) and lacked confidence in his decisions (68). These disasters defined Clinton – and the Democrats – as inept and unable to lead in the new world (84).

The reason that the Contract Republicans (87) took over Congress in 1994, according to Chapter 4, was that Clinton lost his way and appeared muddled on foreign policy issues (90). American foreign policy was simply reactive: from crisis to crisis (91). That, combined with the fact that former-President Jimmy Carter had stepped in and managed to solve the Haiti and North Korea crises (not the President) (96), solidified the perception that Clinton had lost his ability to define a new era (99) and that there was no line from principle to action (100). Instead of delivering on his promises, Clinton was lost and fearful about foreign policy (112).

Although Clinton had a rough start (through 1995) (114), Chapter 5 states that his successful closure of the Bosnia (128-29) and China (136-38) issues enabled him to be re-elected in 1996. It also helped that Clinton worked with the Republicans on these issues (138-39), and they did not have a plan for foreign policy either (144).Clinton might have lacked a grand plan for foreign policy, but he had demonstrated that he didn’t need a plan to execute bold strategies to further American interests (144). Clinton’s success in Bosnia and China improved his – and America’s – image as a competent leader at home and abroad (128, 130, 135).

Chapter 6’s main point is that Clinton’s growing confidence in his foreign policy skills (158) led him to believe that he had to strengthen the US’ international economic leadership (151), and led him to believe that the US was the indispensible nation (147). The concept of the indispensible nation led Clinton to engage in a range of activist international policies, including policies on globalization (148-49). The two most prominent acts of globalization and international economic leadership were getting NAFTA ratified (160-61) and establishing the WTO as GATT’s successor (162). Additionally, it was because of the US’ leadership on economic issues that the Mexico bailout plan worked (166-67). These achievements solidified Clinton’s perception that there was no dividing line between domestic and foreign policy (169). However, despite Clinton’s success and confidence, other states did not agree that the US was “the indispensible nation,” which made global cooperation harder in the face of the new threats (176-77).

The main point of Chapter 7 is that Clinton had a vague policy on dealing with Iraq and Saddam which made for decisions whose purpose was to pass the problem to the next administration and to avoid having Iraq take over all other issues (204). Clinton tried to get the American public behind the perception that Iraq and Saddam were a global threat to America’s security (191). When this did not work, Clinton was unable to have a strong military strategy (193) to deal with the issue. Instead he had a mix of containment (191) – which wasn’t working – and military presence/air strikes (202). Clinton wanted his policy to go both ways: to have economic and military containment and to try and oust Saddam without having to have an actual military campaign (203). This approach, as recognized by all, couldn’t last long – but would last long enough for Clinton’s successor to get in place and for Clinton to try and do other things at home (204).

In Chapter 8, Clinton (243) and domestic forces at home (228) had to decide how America would use its overwhelming power (234). The result of the Kosovo campaign was world-wide concern that the US was too dangerous (226, 228, 230, 232-33). The pursuit of a missile defense shield did nothing to calm this fear among the international community (241-42). Instead of being reassured that the US would use its power only to pursue a responsibility to protect (216) and a greater global good (234), the international community became worried the US would use it in other situations (231).

Chapter 9’s main point is that there were new disorders in the world that Clinton – and the US – was unequipped to deal with (277): globalization caused economic crises to travel fast and not be contained in one region and terrorist threats were the most pressing security threats (262). America’s foreign policy establishment didn’t understand these two threats and as a result were unprepared when crises happened (247). Clinton’s economic policy was simply a reaction to a crisis (252), instead of a policy to build a foundation to prevent crises (248). The intelligence agencies and military were unprepared to deal with terrorist threats, instead of the more conventional threats, and needed restructuring in order to do so (261). All of this resulted in a world composed of disorder (279).

The main point of Chapter 10 is that the Bush Administration continued to look at the world, and national security, in traditional terms – based on nations states and traditional concepts of threat (310). There was acceptance of terrorism based on the support of nations, not because an individual or non-state actor could be a threat by themselves (310-11). Bush wanted a strong military (296) and to use it to prevent focus on state-based threats to clear national interests – not humanitarian goals or globalization (295).

According to Chapter 11, America’s future is defined by the past (329). The liberal concerns over when to go to war and use military force (320) and focus on promoting democracy (318) still shape debate today (318). The conservatives still grapple with legitimizing American action (324) and globalization (326). These are issues from the past decade that are shaping the foreign policy of the current (and future) decade (328-29).

Part II : Analysis

There is a major theme throughout the book: that domestic and international politics cannot be separated. Domestic elections for President are defined in terms of foreign policy (144-45, 269) or trade deals (161). The choices various candidates made for Vice-President were framed in terms of the foreign policy need of the candidates (294). The role and positions of PNAC, a domestic institution, was discussed in Chapter 6(172). Throughout the book, the competing views of Clinton, liberals and conservatives were compared (one example is on 139). The lack of a coherent and dominant role for the US in foreign policy was often blames on domestic factors (86). Speculations that Clinton’s behavior was based on wanting to draw attention away from a domestic scandal was rampant in the various chapters (200).

This focus on the interplay between domestic and international factors makes a case for a more involved model of foreign policy and international relations. Realism relies only on security, whereas liberalism relies mainly on non-security related threats and institutionalism focuses on institutions. None of these models seem capable of taking in all the factors – security, non-security, economic, globalization, terror and non-state actors. Additionally, there is a distrust of a doctrine which can arise from a particular set of circumstances and cause trouble when applied to a new set of circumstances (218). As discussed in class, realism and liberalism developed in the wake of wars and institutionalism developed once institutions developed. It is possible that these doctrines were developed for a specific circumstance and as such have no application to a different set of circumstances. The author believes that the past decisions define the present (329), I do not think that the past models can define a present, and effective model, for international relations. However, we were presented with a model in our last class on December 2, 2008 that takes into account all of these factors. The model doesn’t prescribe a method of bringing them into balance, but it does create a framework for consideration of all factors.

A model that might be used to analyze these factors would be the two-level game theory approach advocated by Putnam. In this model, the analysis is done on a reciprocal basis between how the actor – the leader of a nation – acts at a domestic and international level. Those two levels are seen as playing to each other. The truth of this can be seen in the results of the last election: Bush lost largely because public opinion had turned against his use of force in Iraq. The interplay of domestic and international policy will only become greater, and some method is needed to analyze the two together. Maybe game theory – with its ability to take in a larger number of factors, will prove to be the basis that IR theorists need to model a new theory.
Another theme in the book was the idea of a single doctrine of concept to base foreign policy on. The second Bush’s doctrine became “war on terror,” (312) and has proven to be his downfall (315) – as this past election proved. Clinton lacked a single over-arching concept, although he constantly tried to find one (90, 144, 315). Clinton showed that although he lacked a doctrine, he could execute a bold strategy in response to events (144). Additionally, it was claimed that the actions in Kosovo might be the most important foreign policy achievement since the Gulf War (221), and Clinton undertook those actions without a grand strategy. Berger stated that the Clinton team wanted to build a new role for the US based on experience and not doctrine, regardless of the fact that this made other countries nervous (219).

American policy makers and scholars have been unable to find a singe catch-phrase for the time between n11/9 and 9/11 (315). Kennan says that this is a good thing because a simple foreign policy leads to disaster (315). This perception, that the lack of a simple foreign policy goal is good, would seem to underline my statement that the world has too many variables to be contained in one doctrine. These variables are not magically developed in the post-Cold War era, which might be one reason that the post-Cold War era has been unable to define itself. Rather, the variables of globalization, security, weak and failing states, political stability/instability etc, have been present since the beginning of time. These are not new concepts; it is simply that things can move faster and more freely in a world with technology like we have today, and so these variables become more apparent. Constructivism is a viewpoint that is taking over in the world of today’s IR theories because it seems to be able to handle the complexities that the world is currently seeing (Wendt). However, like the variables present in the world today that have to be considered, constructivism is an old idea in new clothing (Sterling-Folker).
The world is a complex world with many variables that lead to consequences. It is ironic that the most recent President to consider all the variable (Clinton) was also the one looking for the simple solution – for the knight to come riding in (253). Whereas the President with the simple world view of traditional threats (Bush) (310), did not look for a simple answer but used what he thought was a simple answer – the military (297) – and got engaged in a far more complex struggle than could be imagined.

The irony of the situation only underscores the need for a model to analyze complex factors under. Bush was analyzing factors by a traditional realist threat perspective (310) and that got him into a lot of trouble when the variables proved to be far more complex than he imagined (314). When Clinton was trying to promote democracy and interdependence through globalization, using the more complex model of liberalism (of some sort), he also ran into issues where he did not have the ability to analyze all the factors, including security. A model is needed that will take into consideration all the various complexities that exist in the real world so that policy makers can be sure they are not leaving anything out, but are rather at least looking at all possible variables (even if they are discounting them).

Waltz and Fozouni: Is Anarchy Needed to Understand International Relations

Waltz: Anarchic Structure of World Politics
Fozouni: Confutation of Political Realism

SECTION I: Summary

Waltz’s main point is that international relations can only be understood through a systems theory and that system’s theory must separate the international relations domain from any domestic domain (p.49). He defines a system as having two parts: a structure and interacting units (p.49). He has three characteristics of a system: the ordering principle (p.52), the character of the units (p.55) and the distribution of capabilities (p.57). The ordering principle is how the arrangement of the parts within the system (p.52) For Waltz’s theory, this means that all parts of the system (states) stand in relation to each other equally because there is no requirement of one state to obey another (p.52). The character of the units is described by Waltz as states (p.55 and 56) and he also demonstrates how they are all like units (p.55). Waltz does acknowledge that each state has a different capability, but says that regardless, they are like units because they each are alike in being “autonomous political units.” (p.56). The last principle of Waltz’s system can be looked as the distribution of capabilities. Waltz says that capabilities of the units is a relative discussion, whereby a comparison is made between the power of one unit and the character of the other units in the system (p.58). By describing these characteristics of a system, Waltz states that the system is anarchic (p.59). According to Waltz, the anarchic system avoids change by preventing intentions of various actors from being effective, and therefore, a change in the anarchic system would require a system change (p.63). Additionally, the anarchic system has the benefit of having a low organizational cost as there is no organization to maintain (p.65). Lastly, states in an anarchic system, cannot rely on anyone for help, and so they protect themselves (p.64). Therefore, the system is unlikely to change because to change the system requires a full and great structural change (p.63 and 64).

In the Fozouni article, the main point is that realism is a failed theory because there are failures in the logical structure of the theory (p.484) and failures in the empirical analysis that the theory is based on (p. 4486). The failure of the theory’s logical structure can be place on the failure of the premises of the theory to be true (482). The premise that all states will expand when they have the capability to expand (p. 483) does not have enough empirical evidence to support it (p. 484). Therefore, if a premise of the theory is untrue, the theory cannot be logically sound (p. 485).

Additionally, the theory of realism fails an empirical examination (p. 486). There is simply not enough empirical evidence to support realism (p.486). This is because, in supporting realism, theorists tend to use only positive evidence, and ignore the evidence that is not supportive of realism (p.487). Instead, theorists try to create ad hoc additional variables or explanations to keep realism alive (p. 488). The problem with ad hoc explanations is that they don’t take the theory and explain the situation, they take the theory and add something to it, which in essence means the theory is incomplete (p.492). Additionally, realism fails because it focuses solely on power as the only determinate in the theory, and ignores everything else (p. 498 and p.507). This creates the problem of verifying that power is the basis of all decisions because of what we know today after the Cold War, that ideology also plays a role (p. 498).

SECTION II: Analysis

Waltz’s theory suffers from a type of logical fallacy. Waltz uses the structure of his theory as his system. He uses the ordering characteristics, units and capability of units as a description of his structure (p. 52, 55,57) and claims that this exists only in an anarchy, so therefore anarchy must be the system that is used in the analysis (p. 59). This is a type of logical fallacy where the input and output are the same. Additionally, Waltz fails to recognize how a system can change, outside of changing the system (p. 63). His theory does not account for any variables that might change the system. However, he does tackle the issue of non-state actors by stating that if they are powerful enough, they become enough like states to qualify as states in terms of his theory, or else they fail to act in any meaningful way (p. 52). This theory also suffers from oversimplification. This is a clear issue when Waltz declares all states to be functionally similar units – or the same units (p. 56). This glosses over the fact that all states are not functionally similar because they cannot all behave autonomously – Israel cannot behave on its own without consideration of the US and Palestinian governments. Waltz’s theory also neglects various variables such as ideology and economics. Instead, he compounds economics, politics and military into one idea – the capability of the unit – because states use their political and economic structures to grow their military and their military to grow their economic and political structure (p. 56). Once again, this demonstrates the dramatic oversimplification present in the theory.

The Fozouni article seems remarkably well thought out. It covers the logical fallacies that are present in realism both in deductive (p.484) and inductive reasoning (p. 502). Also, the Fozouni article considers the human nature concept in Morgenthau’s realism, and claims he should’ve discarded it as it is not a foundation to the theory (p.484). However, why not simply dispose of the idea with a one line comment – that it is irrelevant to the theory and that realism can be explained without the use of this premise - rather than analyze a piece of information that is not vital to the theory? One thing the Fozouni article does well is provide circumstance in which supporters of realism might have been able to rescue the situation (p. 493), and provides various analysis of what variables Morgenthau should have considered to have a complete and viable theory. However, this article criticizes realism on the basis of all the information we have available today, which includes information that shows how important ideology is in international relations. What might have been interesting is to limit the critique to the materials and examples available at the time Morgenthau created his theory and see if the same problems still exist.

The Role of Domestic Policies and Foriegn Policies in International Relations

Waltz: International Relations Theory Not Foreign Policy
Telhami/Waltz: Neorealism and Foriegn Policy
Putname: Two-Level Games
Walt: Realtion Between International Relations Theory and Policy
Burgos: An N of 1

Part I: Summary

The main point of the Waltz article is that international relations (IR) theory cannot explain foreign policy (p. 54) because international relations theory must be at the system level and a theory that would explain foreign policy must take into account the state-level concerns of the performance of governments (p. 54-55). Waltz points out that the question when analyzing an IR theory should not be what variables should be excluded from the theory that might affect outcomes, but that what variables should be included in order to make it a true IR theory (P. 56). Waltz re-emphasizes that the point of a theory is to explain, not to predict, and therefore a theory of IR necessarily leaves variables out (p.57).

The Telhami article's main point is that although neorealism has much to say about foreign policy, through its analysis of IR theory, it is not a theory of foreign policy because neorealism doesn't explain the motives of states including the component parts (p.170). Telhami states that insights derived from neorealism provide a framework for further inquiry into foreign policy (p. 159). This is because the goals of security and power (p. 160-161) which are so essential for neorealism theory provide an important insight into state behavior some of the time. However, they don't explain the varied motives of states when they create foreign policy (p.163 -164). This is because if a state were to act in a way other than to pursue security and power, that state wouldn't be acting in accord with the neorealist theory (p.164). Therefore, while neorealist theory is an IR theory, it is not a theory of foreign policy (p.170).

The main point of the Burgos article is that IR theory, specifically relating to war, is too narrow and simple to be of any use to policy makers (p. 555). He states the realism doesn't seem to fit into the Iraq conflict, because the conflict has moral and ethical terms rather than power and security terms (p. 552). Also, IR theory treats was as a "costly lottery," so that states tend not to engage in war (p.552). However, that also does not explain the current state of the world (p. 553). Burgos also points out that the composition of an institution changes the behavior of that institution, and so theories dealing with war need to be able to take into account the composition of the Army (p.553). Lastly, current IR theory, and realism in particular, doesn't deal with the power of symbols and the various types of power (p. 554-555). All of these things are lacking from theories, but are important in practice. Therefore, Burgos states that it makes sense that policy makers, who have to deal with reality, don't pay attention to theory (p. 555).

The main point of the Walt article is that there is a gap between theory and policy because the work being done in the theory world isn't relevant to the policy world (p. 25). However, good theory (p. 26-28) can help policy makers because: (1) it can help them diagnose the problem they are facing (p.29-30); (2) it can help them anticipate events (p.31); (3) it can help them by providing a possible remedy (p.32-33); and (4) theory can provide benchmarks to enable an evaluation of success and failure (p.33-34). Current IR theory is too abstract (p.34) and too varied (p.35) to aid in any of these goals because the academic norms of the discipline prevent IR theorists from linking theory to policy (p.37-38). In order to make theory accessible and relevant to policy makers, the academic norms must change (p.40).

The Putnam article provides a possible framework for analysis of national and international affairs (p.427). The domestic and international affairs are tangled together because the state must be concerned about both (p.431) and therefore an analysis must take both levels into account (p.433). The solution, according to Putnam, is to use game theory to construct a two-level game where the national political leader appears at both boards (p.435) – domestic and international (p.434) and that one board can influence the other (p.434). He splits the game into two levels, bargaining which leads to a tentative agreement (level 1) and ratification (level 2) (p.436). The variable in the game is "win-sets" which are the variety of possibilities that will be agreed to at level 1 and ratified at level 2 (p.437). The variable of win-sets can take into account domestic variables such as public opinion, interest groups, and agencies (p.436) and international factors such as defection and reputation of countries (p.438). This framework accounts for the entanglement between domestic politics and international relations (p.460).

Part II: Analysis

Waltz states that his theory of neorealism is not a theory of foreign policy, nor is it meant to be (p.54). However Telhami seems to spend an extraordinary amount of effort proving that it is not a foreign policy theory (p.163). Telhami looks at the basics of neorealism – power (p. 160-161) and the balancing effects (p. 162) – and discounts them as not accounting for enough of foreign policy behavior to be a theory (p. 163). I think that some bigger concepts are missing in the analysis – namely that it's not a foreign policy theory because it wasn't designed to do anything except explain an international system (Waltz, p.54). Trying to salvage neorealism as a foreign policy theory by ignoring variables and outcomes (Waltz, p.55) or adding variables (Waltz, p.56), creates a new theory and doesn't salvage realism as a foreign policy theory, which it wasn't meant to be.

Rather, a new system for understanding multiple variables must come into play. The two-level game system presented in the Putnam article seems to be a start. It can take into account the variables that the Burgos article identified: morality (p.552), distribution of war-making power among branches of government (p.553), partisanship of the institutions (p.553), symbols (p.554) and different types of power (p.555). Under the two-level game, these variables would expand or contract the win-set by driving the domestic game (Putnam p.434) and shaping international opinion of the country (p.444). However, it seems as if every variable can be taken into account, somewhere, in the two-level game. This makes a theory – or game - bulky, hard to understand, and hard to use.

Walt makes the point that a good theory is logically consistent and empirically valid (p.26), complete, predictive (p.27) and simple (p.28). The simple part is especially important for policy usage because policy makers aren't selected for their jobs on the basis of theoretical knowledge (p.24) and so they need to be able to understand a theory to use it (p. 25). I am not sue that the two-level game is simple enough, or predictive enough, to be of use to a policy maker. It is not a simple concept. It involves many game-theory models that a policy maker might not understand (p.447). It is also not terribly predictive if the information is incomplete. In order to determine if your win-set overlaps with another win-set, you have to have complete knowledge about the other player (p. 460). This is not practical in a policy setting where reality and the short time those decisions must be made within. Therefore, I am not sure that the two-game theory model, while interesting, is the right model for use with policy makers.

Mearshiemer and Grieco: Realism and Neorealism Revisited

Mearshiemer: Tragedy of Great Power Politics, chapters 1, 2, and 9
Grieco: Realist International Relations Theory

Part I: Summary

Mearsheimer has a theory of "offensive realism (p.4, 21)" which is that states are always aggressively pursing the goal of ultimate power and becoming a hegemony (p.29) because a hegemony is the ultimate means of guaranteeing a state's survival in an anarchic world (p.40). This means that states will aggressively (p.34) pursue maximization of their relative power because that is how a great power maximizes their security (p.21). This type of aggressiveness (p. 34) by states is caused by being apprehensive about the ultimate interests of other states, awareness that the states operate in a self-help system (anarchy (p.30)), and the understanding that the best way to ensure survival is to be the most powerful state in the system (drive to hegemony) (p.33). In offensive realism, the structure of the system (anarchy) is the determining factor from which all the other factors and assumptions of the theory flow – including the drive to hegemony (p.10). Due to this system, a status quo state (a state which isn't maximizing power) is rarely found because each state in the system is competing to maximize their power, rather than focusing on security alone (p.21).

The result of this aggressiveness, according to Mearsheimer, is that it causes war (p. 335). However there are two factors in determining the risk of an outbreak of wars: power and polarity (p. 5, 356-358). In considering polarity, bipolarity is more stable than balanced multipolarity which is more stable than unbalanced multipolarity (p. 5, 358). An unbalanced multipolarity is the most unstable because it has a potential regional hegemony and their drive for supremacy may lead to an outbreak of war (p. 345). Additionally, other great powers do not want the balance of power to be shifted to hegemony, and so they will work to "balance" the potential hegemony and that can result in war (p.345).

The Grieco article states that realism is a well-developed theory of international relations which focuses on the system that states function in, but that there are several problems (including the question of if the states are security or power maximizers (p.186)) and real world happenings that cannot be accounted for (international cooperation (p.184)), with the realist theory (p.191). The core of the realist theory is based on several assumptions that provide a model in which to view the world: the nation-state is the central actor (p.164), anarchy is the system (p. 164) and that states act rationally, autonomously and as units in the system (p. 165-166). These assumptions lead to several propositions that are common in realist theory: that states are interested in security (p. 166), that anarchy leads to states being defensive positionalists (p. 167), and that states are interested in the survival of their autonomy and independence (p. 167-168).

Grieco uses these assumptions and propositions to test whether the theory of realism has any utility to determine expectations about state behavior and international outcomes (p. 168-177). Specifically, Greico finds that there is solid evidence to support the claim that states do act in a manner that is free from domestic concerns (p. 169) and that the expectation of states acting in a balancing manner is sometimes true and that different realist theorists view balancing differently (p. 170-171). However, Greico also determines that the expectations of bipolarity being more stable (p. 173) and the prediction that states, acting under the realist theory, will lack of international cooperation (p. 176) are not empirically based, and they need more development (possibly with the addition of several variables) before these expectations of realism can be held to be true.

Part II: Analysis

Greico's main problem is that he tries to compact all the various realist theories into one theory that is based on main assumptions about the states and the propositions that realists derive from these assumptions about state behavior (p. 163). He does this in order to deal with realism as a whole in answering the questions of critics and proposing solutions. However, realism has many theorists, and many of these theorists do not have similar assumptions. While it would be difficult to find a realist that doesn't assume that the central actor is a nation-state, you do not have to look far to find realists who do not deal with anarchy as a central assumption (p. 164). Morgenthau and the Cottam theories do not deal with anarchy as a central proposition.

However, Greico assumes that all realist theories deal with anarchy (p. 165). A more creative approach would be renaming this assumption as a "self-interest" assumption – whereby a state acts in its own self-interest because… Under this type of model, anarchy would be a reason that states act in their own self-interest. In addition to the collapse of the differences in the realist theories, Greico tries to respond to all the common critiques of realism: lack of international change (p.178), unit-level variables (p.181), international cooperation (p.184) and the security vs. power maximization (p.186). Rather than trying to respond to each of these critiques, and thereby needing to collapse realism into one theory, it would have been interesting to see how each theory responds to these critiques on its own.

Mearsheimer's theory of offensive realism rests on five basic assumptions: the international system is anarchic, that great powers possess military capabilities, that states can never be certain about other state's intentions, survival is the primary goal of states, and that great powers are rational actors (p.30-31). Mearsheimer's contention is that these five assumptions force states to act aggressively (p.32). I do not see the utility of the first assumption. It could be replaced by an assumption that all states act in their best interest. Additionally, the third assumption – that intentions can never be sure – is blatantly incorrect. If you are unsure of the intentions of another state, a détente strategy is a method for determining them. Additionally, Mearsheimer says that the intention of all the states is to drive towards hegemony because that is their best chance for survival (p.40). Therefore, the intentions of all the states are included in the theory – they are not unknown. If the assumptions on which the theory is based are untrue, then the theory cannot logically flow from the assumptions and remain true as a theory.

Additionally, Mearsheimer lacks a description of power – except to say it is a means to an end of security. He equates power maximization to security maximization. Therefore, Mearsheimer is wrong in his theory of offensive realism.

A Definition of Constructivism for International Relations

Constructivism is not a theory. A theory is a set of statements or principles that is devised to explain a group of facts and can be used to make predictions about natural phenomena[i]. That means, in order for constructivism to be a theory, it must be a set of principles that is devised to explain a group of facts and can be used to make predictions about behavior in the international relations arena. Constructivism does not make predictions. In fact, Wendt identifies constructivism as a tool for analysis, rather than a tool for predictions[ii]. Additionally, constructivism isn’t meant to explain anything - and it doesn’t. Rather than explain a group of facts, constructivism is a point of view about how one might go about changing the IR system. It outlines what issues constructivists would deal with in order to change things. However, it offers two variables (ideas and social norms) with no indication on what to do with those two variables. There is no causal explanation in constructivism. Because of these deficiencies, constructivism is not a theory.


Instead, Constructivism is a commonly shared set of initial conditions that must be present in a theory in order for it to fall into a “constructivist” perspective. Wendt’s basic works on constructivism (he’s considered the founder)[iii] is a reaction to realism, and is intended to counter the idea that self-help and power politics are essential features of anarchy[iv]. Instead, Wendt treats anarchy as a social construct (or practice) rather than an inseparable condition of international relations and the way that states see anarchy[v].


The main focus of this approach is to use theories borrowed from sociology about identity and interest formation[vi] to focus on how a change in identities and interests of states can make a change in their behavior[vii].There are two basic tenants to constructivism: (1) actors act towards objects – including other actors – on the basis of what value those objects have as interpreted by the society in which the actor operates[viii]; and (2) the meanings of the terms on which action (like cooperation) can be organized is based on shared interests[ix]. What these tenants mean is that it is collective meanings placed ob objects – such as anarchy – that constitute the structures that organize actions[x].


Wendt’s famous quote, “anarchy is what states make of it,” illustrates these examples perfectly. If anarchy was an essential feature of international relations, instead of a social construct, there could be no meaning given to it by states. Instead, it would function and other interactions would logically flow from it. Realists argue that self-help and power politics logically flow from anarchy. However, by treating anarchy as a social construct, Wendt is able to show that self-help and power politics don’t naturally flow, but can follow from anarchy[xi]. Wendt is also able to articulate ideas (sovereignty, dynastic relations, trade, goals, etc) that can cause power politics and self-help not to flow from anarchy[xii]. With this analysis, Wendt has changed the focus from anarchy as a must and defining feature of the system, to anarchy as a social construct that can change.


Constructivism offers no real guidance on what to study – except to put the focus on interests and identities of actors because those are socially formed and when changed, can make the system change. But there is no indication of which one changes, or how changes affect the system. Without being able to make some causal argument other than: change can cause change (tautological) then constructivism is not a theory, but a set of initial conditions.


[i] www.wordnet.princeton.edu
[ii] Wendt, Anarchy is what states make of it p. 424
[iii] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constructivism_in_international_relations
[iv] Wendt at 395
[v] Id
[vi] Wendt at 394
[vii] Id at 418
[viii] Id at 397
[ix] Id at 403
[x] Id at 397.
[xi] Id at 399-403
[xii] Id at 396