Legro/Moravcsik: Is Anybody Still a Realist?
Coyle: Liberalism and World Politics Revisited
Moravcsik: Taking Preferences Seriously
Part I: Summary
The Lergo and Moravcsik article focused on the idea that minimal realism (p. 6) has degenerated realism (p. 53) to the point where realism today can include all the claims that traditional realists reject (p. 7), and exclude no claims (p.53). The solution to this problem, as seen by the authors, is to define a core set of assumptions for the realist paradigm that would be true to all realist theories (p. 8). The core assumptions of realism are: (1) actors are rational, unitary political units that pursue distinctive goals within an anarchic setting (p. 12); (2) that state preferences are fixed and are in conflict with all other states (p. 13); and (3) that capabilities, or the distribution of material resources, is what the outcomes of bargaining depend on (p. 17). If all three assumptions are possessed by realist theories, then the theories will become a distinct paradigm rather than be a conglomeration of all theories including: realism, liberalism, epistemism, and intuitionalism (p.46).
The main point of the Moravcsik article is that liberal theory should be treated as its own paradigm, rather than as a subset of other paradigms or as an ideological concept (p. 515). Moravcsik defines the core assumptions of liberal theory – the fundamental actors in international politics are individuals and private groups (p. 516), political institutions represent the domestic society and it is those preferences the state acts on in international relations (p. 518), and that the configuration of the state shapes state preferences (p. 521) – and states that these assumptions define liberalism as a parsimonious and coherent theory (p. 533).
The Doyle article's main point is that Kant's theory of liberal internationalism helps explain the periods of international stability and peace among those states who share liberal principles and institutions (p. 94). Kant's theory rejects the notion that a specific democratic or liberal institution is responsible for the peace and stability (p. 100) and instead says that in combination constitutional, international and cosmopolitan sources connect the characteristics of liberal politics and economies with the sustained stability and peace the world can/is experiencing (p. 100). However, Kant extends this peace and stability only to relations between liberal states (p. 102) and says that with non-liberal states, liberal states will be in a constant state of war because they feel threatened by states that aren't constrained by representational ideals, as liberal states are (p. 102).
Part II: Analysis
The Lergo and Moravcsik article is a little confusing. The authors stress the importance of creating a realist paradigm that is separate from all other paradigms, rather that the confusing mash of ideas that is "realism" today (p. 53). Then, according to the authors, you can test the causal links of the theory (p. 47). However, it is clear that realism only holds true when there are periods of intense conflicts between states (p. 49). So I am confused as to why the authors would then want realism to be a separate paradigm. If realism is only useful in periods of intense conflict, then what is its usefulness at other times? The authors propose using "two-level" games to include other aspects into realist theory (p. 51). However, this results in the same "mashing" of idea that the authors are opposed to in the first place. But in a two-level game, instead of mashing the ideas into one theory, you are able to use separate theories, and then mash the conclusions together. Instead of synthesizing domestic variables, economic variables or changing preferences into realist theory (as the authors demonstrate that various realists do), you simply conduct two analyses and then merge the results. To me, this is a semantic distinction about where you combine ideas, rather than a helpful and useful idea.
The Moravcsik article is also focused on creating a paradigm – which seems to be his standard method of analysis. However, it is focused on a liberal paradigm rather than a realist paradigm. Moravcsik makes three core assumptions of liberal theory – the fundamental actors in international politics are individuals and private groups (p. 516), political institutions represent the domestic society and it is those preferences the state acts on in international relations (p. 518), and that the configuration of the state shapes state preferences (p. 521) – and states that these assumptions define liberalism as a parsimonious and coherent theory (p. 533). However, Moravcsik then states that these assumptions are commonsensical and tautological (p. 521). He also insists that this framework of liberalism creates an easy and clear connection between previously unrelated areas, and that his theory can also include non-liberal ideas (p.533). It seems ridiculous to create a theory that can explain everything. It also seems as if the theory loses its usefulness if it can explain everything. I think that Moravcsik misses the mark in defining liberal theory, and instead is too concerned with proving that liberalism can encompass everything realism does and more (p. 533). To that end, he fashioned his three assumptions too broadly, so that liberalism can include everything, and exclude nothing. Therefore, his assumptions need secondary assumptions that explain the outcomes – which means that his theory cannot explain anything and is useless.
A different picture of liberalism is presented by Doyle. He simply takes three kinds of liberalism – liberal pacifism (p. 84), liberal imperialism (p. 87), and liberal internationalism (p. 88) – and analyzes which of the three of these gives the most complete picture of why liberalism has created a period of stability and peace (p. 88, 92). Doyle comes up with the answer that Kant's theory of liberal internationalism is the most predictive because it connects multiple variables to peace, and not just one variable. It also can explain the stability and peace that liberalism brings and the war that exists in a world with liberal states (p. 100). However, Kant's theory rests on the concept of a "man" who is individual, rational and capable of appreciating the moral equality of all, rather than treating individuals as a means (p. 101). One of the strengths of this theory is that it explains something, but not everything. Also, liberal internationalism, unlike Moravcsik's theory, doesn't need additional variables to be an analytical tool – it stands on its own. In that sense, the theories presented in Doyle's article are useful analytical tools. It is unclear whether these theories of liberalism can be synthesized into one theory because their understanding of the role of the individual and causal connection to state politics is different. After reading this article, it is possible to understand why liberalism is having a hard time being considered a paradigm, as each liberalist theory seems to have a different understanding of the causal factors.
Showing posts with label neorealism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label neorealism. Show all posts
Monday, December 15, 2008
Friday, December 12, 2008
The Role of Domestic Policies and Foriegn Policies in International Relations
Waltz: International Relations Theory Not Foreign Policy
Telhami/Waltz: Neorealism and Foriegn Policy
Putname: Two-Level Games
Walt: Realtion Between International Relations Theory and Policy
Burgos: An N of 1
Part I: Summary
The main point of the Waltz article is that international relations (IR) theory cannot explain foreign policy (p. 54) because international relations theory must be at the system level and a theory that would explain foreign policy must take into account the state-level concerns of the performance of governments (p. 54-55). Waltz points out that the question when analyzing an IR theory should not be what variables should be excluded from the theory that might affect outcomes, but that what variables should be included in order to make it a true IR theory (P. 56). Waltz re-emphasizes that the point of a theory is to explain, not to predict, and therefore a theory of IR necessarily leaves variables out (p.57).
The Telhami article's main point is that although neorealism has much to say about foreign policy, through its analysis of IR theory, it is not a theory of foreign policy because neorealism doesn't explain the motives of states including the component parts (p.170). Telhami states that insights derived from neorealism provide a framework for further inquiry into foreign policy (p. 159). This is because the goals of security and power (p. 160-161) which are so essential for neorealism theory provide an important insight into state behavior some of the time. However, they don't explain the varied motives of states when they create foreign policy (p.163 -164). This is because if a state were to act in a way other than to pursue security and power, that state wouldn't be acting in accord with the neorealist theory (p.164). Therefore, while neorealist theory is an IR theory, it is not a theory of foreign policy (p.170).
The main point of the Burgos article is that IR theory, specifically relating to war, is too narrow and simple to be of any use to policy makers (p. 555). He states the realism doesn't seem to fit into the Iraq conflict, because the conflict has moral and ethical terms rather than power and security terms (p. 552). Also, IR theory treats was as a "costly lottery," so that states tend not to engage in war (p.552). However, that also does not explain the current state of the world (p. 553). Burgos also points out that the composition of an institution changes the behavior of that institution, and so theories dealing with war need to be able to take into account the composition of the Army (p.553). Lastly, current IR theory, and realism in particular, doesn't deal with the power of symbols and the various types of power (p. 554-555). All of these things are lacking from theories, but are important in practice. Therefore, Burgos states that it makes sense that policy makers, who have to deal with reality, don't pay attention to theory (p. 555).
The main point of the Walt article is that there is a gap between theory and policy because the work being done in the theory world isn't relevant to the policy world (p. 25). However, good theory (p. 26-28) can help policy makers because: (1) it can help them diagnose the problem they are facing (p.29-30); (2) it can help them anticipate events (p.31); (3) it can help them by providing a possible remedy (p.32-33); and (4) theory can provide benchmarks to enable an evaluation of success and failure (p.33-34). Current IR theory is too abstract (p.34) and too varied (p.35) to aid in any of these goals because the academic norms of the discipline prevent IR theorists from linking theory to policy (p.37-38). In order to make theory accessible and relevant to policy makers, the academic norms must change (p.40).
The Putnam article provides a possible framework for analysis of national and international affairs (p.427). The domestic and international affairs are tangled together because the state must be concerned about both (p.431) and therefore an analysis must take both levels into account (p.433). The solution, according to Putnam, is to use game theory to construct a two-level game where the national political leader appears at both boards (p.435) – domestic and international (p.434) and that one board can influence the other (p.434). He splits the game into two levels, bargaining which leads to a tentative agreement (level 1) and ratification (level 2) (p.436). The variable in the game is "win-sets" which are the variety of possibilities that will be agreed to at level 1 and ratified at level 2 (p.437). The variable of win-sets can take into account domestic variables such as public opinion, interest groups, and agencies (p.436) and international factors such as defection and reputation of countries (p.438). This framework accounts for the entanglement between domestic politics and international relations (p.460).
Part II: Analysis
Waltz states that his theory of neorealism is not a theory of foreign policy, nor is it meant to be (p.54). However Telhami seems to spend an extraordinary amount of effort proving that it is not a foreign policy theory (p.163). Telhami looks at the basics of neorealism – power (p. 160-161) and the balancing effects (p. 162) – and discounts them as not accounting for enough of foreign policy behavior to be a theory (p. 163). I think that some bigger concepts are missing in the analysis – namely that it's not a foreign policy theory because it wasn't designed to do anything except explain an international system (Waltz, p.54). Trying to salvage neorealism as a foreign policy theory by ignoring variables and outcomes (Waltz, p.55) or adding variables (Waltz, p.56), creates a new theory and doesn't salvage realism as a foreign policy theory, which it wasn't meant to be.
Rather, a new system for understanding multiple variables must come into play. The two-level game system presented in the Putnam article seems to be a start. It can take into account the variables that the Burgos article identified: morality (p.552), distribution of war-making power among branches of government (p.553), partisanship of the institutions (p.553), symbols (p.554) and different types of power (p.555). Under the two-level game, these variables would expand or contract the win-set by driving the domestic game (Putnam p.434) and shaping international opinion of the country (p.444). However, it seems as if every variable can be taken into account, somewhere, in the two-level game. This makes a theory – or game - bulky, hard to understand, and hard to use.
Walt makes the point that a good theory is logically consistent and empirically valid (p.26), complete, predictive (p.27) and simple (p.28). The simple part is especially important for policy usage because policy makers aren't selected for their jobs on the basis of theoretical knowledge (p.24) and so they need to be able to understand a theory to use it (p. 25). I am not sue that the two-level game is simple enough, or predictive enough, to be of use to a policy maker. It is not a simple concept. It involves many game-theory models that a policy maker might not understand (p.447). It is also not terribly predictive if the information is incomplete. In order to determine if your win-set overlaps with another win-set, you have to have complete knowledge about the other player (p. 460). This is not practical in a policy setting where reality and the short time those decisions must be made within. Therefore, I am not sure that the two-game theory model, while interesting, is the right model for use with policy makers.
Telhami/Waltz: Neorealism and Foriegn Policy
Putname: Two-Level Games
Walt: Realtion Between International Relations Theory and Policy
Burgos: An N of 1
Part I: Summary
The main point of the Waltz article is that international relations (IR) theory cannot explain foreign policy (p. 54) because international relations theory must be at the system level and a theory that would explain foreign policy must take into account the state-level concerns of the performance of governments (p. 54-55). Waltz points out that the question when analyzing an IR theory should not be what variables should be excluded from the theory that might affect outcomes, but that what variables should be included in order to make it a true IR theory (P. 56). Waltz re-emphasizes that the point of a theory is to explain, not to predict, and therefore a theory of IR necessarily leaves variables out (p.57).
The Telhami article's main point is that although neorealism has much to say about foreign policy, through its analysis of IR theory, it is not a theory of foreign policy because neorealism doesn't explain the motives of states including the component parts (p.170). Telhami states that insights derived from neorealism provide a framework for further inquiry into foreign policy (p. 159). This is because the goals of security and power (p. 160-161) which are so essential for neorealism theory provide an important insight into state behavior some of the time. However, they don't explain the varied motives of states when they create foreign policy (p.163 -164). This is because if a state were to act in a way other than to pursue security and power, that state wouldn't be acting in accord with the neorealist theory (p.164). Therefore, while neorealist theory is an IR theory, it is not a theory of foreign policy (p.170).
The main point of the Burgos article is that IR theory, specifically relating to war, is too narrow and simple to be of any use to policy makers (p. 555). He states the realism doesn't seem to fit into the Iraq conflict, because the conflict has moral and ethical terms rather than power and security terms (p. 552). Also, IR theory treats was as a "costly lottery," so that states tend not to engage in war (p.552). However, that also does not explain the current state of the world (p. 553). Burgos also points out that the composition of an institution changes the behavior of that institution, and so theories dealing with war need to be able to take into account the composition of the Army (p.553). Lastly, current IR theory, and realism in particular, doesn't deal with the power of symbols and the various types of power (p. 554-555). All of these things are lacking from theories, but are important in practice. Therefore, Burgos states that it makes sense that policy makers, who have to deal with reality, don't pay attention to theory (p. 555).
The main point of the Walt article is that there is a gap between theory and policy because the work being done in the theory world isn't relevant to the policy world (p. 25). However, good theory (p. 26-28) can help policy makers because: (1) it can help them diagnose the problem they are facing (p.29-30); (2) it can help them anticipate events (p.31); (3) it can help them by providing a possible remedy (p.32-33); and (4) theory can provide benchmarks to enable an evaluation of success and failure (p.33-34). Current IR theory is too abstract (p.34) and too varied (p.35) to aid in any of these goals because the academic norms of the discipline prevent IR theorists from linking theory to policy (p.37-38). In order to make theory accessible and relevant to policy makers, the academic norms must change (p.40).
The Putnam article provides a possible framework for analysis of national and international affairs (p.427). The domestic and international affairs are tangled together because the state must be concerned about both (p.431) and therefore an analysis must take both levels into account (p.433). The solution, according to Putnam, is to use game theory to construct a two-level game where the national political leader appears at both boards (p.435) – domestic and international (p.434) and that one board can influence the other (p.434). He splits the game into two levels, bargaining which leads to a tentative agreement (level 1) and ratification (level 2) (p.436). The variable in the game is "win-sets" which are the variety of possibilities that will be agreed to at level 1 and ratified at level 2 (p.437). The variable of win-sets can take into account domestic variables such as public opinion, interest groups, and agencies (p.436) and international factors such as defection and reputation of countries (p.438). This framework accounts for the entanglement between domestic politics and international relations (p.460).
Part II: Analysis
Waltz states that his theory of neorealism is not a theory of foreign policy, nor is it meant to be (p.54). However Telhami seems to spend an extraordinary amount of effort proving that it is not a foreign policy theory (p.163). Telhami looks at the basics of neorealism – power (p. 160-161) and the balancing effects (p. 162) – and discounts them as not accounting for enough of foreign policy behavior to be a theory (p. 163). I think that some bigger concepts are missing in the analysis – namely that it's not a foreign policy theory because it wasn't designed to do anything except explain an international system (Waltz, p.54). Trying to salvage neorealism as a foreign policy theory by ignoring variables and outcomes (Waltz, p.55) or adding variables (Waltz, p.56), creates a new theory and doesn't salvage realism as a foreign policy theory, which it wasn't meant to be.
Rather, a new system for understanding multiple variables must come into play. The two-level game system presented in the Putnam article seems to be a start. It can take into account the variables that the Burgos article identified: morality (p.552), distribution of war-making power among branches of government (p.553), partisanship of the institutions (p.553), symbols (p.554) and different types of power (p.555). Under the two-level game, these variables would expand or contract the win-set by driving the domestic game (Putnam p.434) and shaping international opinion of the country (p.444). However, it seems as if every variable can be taken into account, somewhere, in the two-level game. This makes a theory – or game - bulky, hard to understand, and hard to use.
Walt makes the point that a good theory is logically consistent and empirically valid (p.26), complete, predictive (p.27) and simple (p.28). The simple part is especially important for policy usage because policy makers aren't selected for their jobs on the basis of theoretical knowledge (p.24) and so they need to be able to understand a theory to use it (p. 25). I am not sue that the two-level game is simple enough, or predictive enough, to be of use to a policy maker. It is not a simple concept. It involves many game-theory models that a policy maker might not understand (p.447). It is also not terribly predictive if the information is incomplete. In order to determine if your win-set overlaps with another win-set, you have to have complete knowledge about the other player (p. 460). This is not practical in a policy setting where reality and the short time those decisions must be made within. Therefore, I am not sure that the two-game theory model, while interesting, is the right model for use with policy makers.
Thursday, December 11, 2008
Mearshiemer and Grieco: Realism and Neorealism Revisited
Mearshiemer: Tragedy of Great Power Politics, chapters 1, 2, and 9
Grieco: Realist International Relations Theory
Part I: Summary
Mearsheimer has a theory of "offensive realism (p.4, 21)" which is that states are always aggressively pursing the goal of ultimate power and becoming a hegemony (p.29) because a hegemony is the ultimate means of guaranteeing a state's survival in an anarchic world (p.40). This means that states will aggressively (p.34) pursue maximization of their relative power because that is how a great power maximizes their security (p.21). This type of aggressiveness (p. 34) by states is caused by being apprehensive about the ultimate interests of other states, awareness that the states operate in a self-help system (anarchy (p.30)), and the understanding that the best way to ensure survival is to be the most powerful state in the system (drive to hegemony) (p.33). In offensive realism, the structure of the system (anarchy) is the determining factor from which all the other factors and assumptions of the theory flow – including the drive to hegemony (p.10). Due to this system, a status quo state (a state which isn't maximizing power) is rarely found because each state in the system is competing to maximize their power, rather than focusing on security alone (p.21).
The result of this aggressiveness, according to Mearsheimer, is that it causes war (p. 335). However there are two factors in determining the risk of an outbreak of wars: power and polarity (p. 5, 356-358). In considering polarity, bipolarity is more stable than balanced multipolarity which is more stable than unbalanced multipolarity (p. 5, 358). An unbalanced multipolarity is the most unstable because it has a potential regional hegemony and their drive for supremacy may lead to an outbreak of war (p. 345). Additionally, other great powers do not want the balance of power to be shifted to hegemony, and so they will work to "balance" the potential hegemony and that can result in war (p.345).
The Grieco article states that realism is a well-developed theory of international relations which focuses on the system that states function in, but that there are several problems (including the question of if the states are security or power maximizers (p.186)) and real world happenings that cannot be accounted for (international cooperation (p.184)), with the realist theory (p.191). The core of the realist theory is based on several assumptions that provide a model in which to view the world: the nation-state is the central actor (p.164), anarchy is the system (p. 164) and that states act rationally, autonomously and as units in the system (p. 165-166). These assumptions lead to several propositions that are common in realist theory: that states are interested in security (p. 166), that anarchy leads to states being defensive positionalists (p. 167), and that states are interested in the survival of their autonomy and independence (p. 167-168).
Grieco uses these assumptions and propositions to test whether the theory of realism has any utility to determine expectations about state behavior and international outcomes (p. 168-177). Specifically, Greico finds that there is solid evidence to support the claim that states do act in a manner that is free from domestic concerns (p. 169) and that the expectation of states acting in a balancing manner is sometimes true and that different realist theorists view balancing differently (p. 170-171). However, Greico also determines that the expectations of bipolarity being more stable (p. 173) and the prediction that states, acting under the realist theory, will lack of international cooperation (p. 176) are not empirically based, and they need more development (possibly with the addition of several variables) before these expectations of realism can be held to be true.
Part II: Analysis
Greico's main problem is that he tries to compact all the various realist theories into one theory that is based on main assumptions about the states and the propositions that realists derive from these assumptions about state behavior (p. 163). He does this in order to deal with realism as a whole in answering the questions of critics and proposing solutions. However, realism has many theorists, and many of these theorists do not have similar assumptions. While it would be difficult to find a realist that doesn't assume that the central actor is a nation-state, you do not have to look far to find realists who do not deal with anarchy as a central assumption (p. 164). Morgenthau and the Cottam theories do not deal with anarchy as a central proposition.
However, Greico assumes that all realist theories deal with anarchy (p. 165). A more creative approach would be renaming this assumption as a "self-interest" assumption – whereby a state acts in its own self-interest because… Under this type of model, anarchy would be a reason that states act in their own self-interest. In addition to the collapse of the differences in the realist theories, Greico tries to respond to all the common critiques of realism: lack of international change (p.178), unit-level variables (p.181), international cooperation (p.184) and the security vs. power maximization (p.186). Rather than trying to respond to each of these critiques, and thereby needing to collapse realism into one theory, it would have been interesting to see how each theory responds to these critiques on its own.
Mearsheimer's theory of offensive realism rests on five basic assumptions: the international system is anarchic, that great powers possess military capabilities, that states can never be certain about other state's intentions, survival is the primary goal of states, and that great powers are rational actors (p.30-31). Mearsheimer's contention is that these five assumptions force states to act aggressively (p.32). I do not see the utility of the first assumption. It could be replaced by an assumption that all states act in their best interest. Additionally, the third assumption – that intentions can never be sure – is blatantly incorrect. If you are unsure of the intentions of another state, a détente strategy is a method for determining them. Additionally, Mearsheimer says that the intention of all the states is to drive towards hegemony because that is their best chance for survival (p.40). Therefore, the intentions of all the states are included in the theory – they are not unknown. If the assumptions on which the theory is based are untrue, then the theory cannot logically flow from the assumptions and remain true as a theory.
Additionally, Mearsheimer lacks a description of power – except to say it is a means to an end of security. He equates power maximization to security maximization. Therefore, Mearsheimer is wrong in his theory of offensive realism.
Grieco: Realist International Relations Theory
Part I: Summary
Mearsheimer has a theory of "offensive realism (p.4, 21)" which is that states are always aggressively pursing the goal of ultimate power and becoming a hegemony (p.29) because a hegemony is the ultimate means of guaranteeing a state's survival in an anarchic world (p.40). This means that states will aggressively (p.34) pursue maximization of their relative power because that is how a great power maximizes their security (p.21). This type of aggressiveness (p. 34) by states is caused by being apprehensive about the ultimate interests of other states, awareness that the states operate in a self-help system (anarchy (p.30)), and the understanding that the best way to ensure survival is to be the most powerful state in the system (drive to hegemony) (p.33). In offensive realism, the structure of the system (anarchy) is the determining factor from which all the other factors and assumptions of the theory flow – including the drive to hegemony (p.10). Due to this system, a status quo state (a state which isn't maximizing power) is rarely found because each state in the system is competing to maximize their power, rather than focusing on security alone (p.21).
The result of this aggressiveness, according to Mearsheimer, is that it causes war (p. 335). However there are two factors in determining the risk of an outbreak of wars: power and polarity (p. 5, 356-358). In considering polarity, bipolarity is more stable than balanced multipolarity which is more stable than unbalanced multipolarity (p. 5, 358). An unbalanced multipolarity is the most unstable because it has a potential regional hegemony and their drive for supremacy may lead to an outbreak of war (p. 345). Additionally, other great powers do not want the balance of power to be shifted to hegemony, and so they will work to "balance" the potential hegemony and that can result in war (p.345).
The Grieco article states that realism is a well-developed theory of international relations which focuses on the system that states function in, but that there are several problems (including the question of if the states are security or power maximizers (p.186)) and real world happenings that cannot be accounted for (international cooperation (p.184)), with the realist theory (p.191). The core of the realist theory is based on several assumptions that provide a model in which to view the world: the nation-state is the central actor (p.164), anarchy is the system (p. 164) and that states act rationally, autonomously and as units in the system (p. 165-166). These assumptions lead to several propositions that are common in realist theory: that states are interested in security (p. 166), that anarchy leads to states being defensive positionalists (p. 167), and that states are interested in the survival of their autonomy and independence (p. 167-168).
Grieco uses these assumptions and propositions to test whether the theory of realism has any utility to determine expectations about state behavior and international outcomes (p. 168-177). Specifically, Greico finds that there is solid evidence to support the claim that states do act in a manner that is free from domestic concerns (p. 169) and that the expectation of states acting in a balancing manner is sometimes true and that different realist theorists view balancing differently (p. 170-171). However, Greico also determines that the expectations of bipolarity being more stable (p. 173) and the prediction that states, acting under the realist theory, will lack of international cooperation (p. 176) are not empirically based, and they need more development (possibly with the addition of several variables) before these expectations of realism can be held to be true.
Part II: Analysis
Greico's main problem is that he tries to compact all the various realist theories into one theory that is based on main assumptions about the states and the propositions that realists derive from these assumptions about state behavior (p. 163). He does this in order to deal with realism as a whole in answering the questions of critics and proposing solutions. However, realism has many theorists, and many of these theorists do not have similar assumptions. While it would be difficult to find a realist that doesn't assume that the central actor is a nation-state, you do not have to look far to find realists who do not deal with anarchy as a central assumption (p. 164). Morgenthau and the Cottam theories do not deal with anarchy as a central proposition.
However, Greico assumes that all realist theories deal with anarchy (p. 165). A more creative approach would be renaming this assumption as a "self-interest" assumption – whereby a state acts in its own self-interest because… Under this type of model, anarchy would be a reason that states act in their own self-interest. In addition to the collapse of the differences in the realist theories, Greico tries to respond to all the common critiques of realism: lack of international change (p.178), unit-level variables (p.181), international cooperation (p.184) and the security vs. power maximization (p.186). Rather than trying to respond to each of these critiques, and thereby needing to collapse realism into one theory, it would have been interesting to see how each theory responds to these critiques on its own.
Mearsheimer's theory of offensive realism rests on five basic assumptions: the international system is anarchic, that great powers possess military capabilities, that states can never be certain about other state's intentions, survival is the primary goal of states, and that great powers are rational actors (p.30-31). Mearsheimer's contention is that these five assumptions force states to act aggressively (p.32). I do not see the utility of the first assumption. It could be replaced by an assumption that all states act in their best interest. Additionally, the third assumption – that intentions can never be sure – is blatantly incorrect. If you are unsure of the intentions of another state, a détente strategy is a method for determining them. Additionally, Mearsheimer says that the intention of all the states is to drive towards hegemony because that is their best chance for survival (p.40). Therefore, the intentions of all the states are included in the theory – they are not unknown. If the assumptions on which the theory is based are untrue, then the theory cannot logically flow from the assumptions and remain true as a theory.
Additionally, Mearsheimer lacks a description of power – except to say it is a means to an end of security. He equates power maximization to security maximization. Therefore, Mearsheimer is wrong in his theory of offensive realism.
Wednesday, December 10, 2008
Waltz, Schweller and Brooks: Realism and Neorealism
Waltz: Realist Thoughts and Neorealist Theory
Schweller: Neorealism's Status Quo Bias
Brooks: Dueling Realism
PART I: Summary
In the Waltz article, the main point was that neorealism (Waltz's theory) differs from classical realism because classical realism is a thought whereas neorealism is a complete theory (p. 71). This distinction is made based on Waltz's definition of a theory: a construct that forms a domain (p. 69), or structure, that indicates some factors are more important than others (p.71) and specifies what the relation between that parts of the structure are (p.71). Additionally, Waltz insists that theory isolate one domain (p.71). Lastly Waltz insists that a theory must drastically simplify the world with its assumptions, which will, of necessity, convey an impractical, or false, picture of the world (p.72).
Waltz claims that classical realism developed concepts – such as power – but was a mere thought and not a theory because there is no separate structure to analyze the concept within (p.71). Waltz compares this to neorealism which has a structure – anarchy (p.74) and allows him to isolate the domain in which the theory operates, and so can analyze the causal relationship of the actors within the structure (p.77-78). Additionally, Waltz, by defining theory as separate from the reality of the world (p. 72) defines classical realism as a thought because it dealt with the realities of the world (development of foreign policy), rather than dealing with the world of international relations as an abstract concept (p.71). Waltz differentiates neorealism by saying it is not concerned with the realities, but with the abstract concept of power as a means and not an end (p.80). In this manner, Waltz claims that classical realism is a thought, and neorealism is a theory.
The main point of the Brooks article is that realism really has two different branches: neorealism (which is based on Waltz) (p.445) and postclassical realism (based on everything else) (p.445) that can be separated based on their main assumption (p.446) of possibility of conflict (p.447) vs. probability of conflict (p. 456). Furthermore, the article states that two other differences in assumptions follow from this distinction (p.446): neorealism assumes that states heavily discount the future because short-term needs of security trump everything else (p.450) and military preparedness trumps all other concerns (p.452), while postclassical realism does not regard the future as subordinate to the short-term security needs (p.458) and there can be trade-offs between military and economic needs (p.461). As a result of these variations in assumptions, there has been very little useful dialogue between the branches of realism (p.472) and there has been confusion between the two branches about what is being tested in the various theories (p.473).
The main point in the Schweller article is that neorealism overlooks the possibility of an aggressor in the system, and instead focuses on a status-quo explanation of international relations (p.92, 101) – which doesn't create the security dilemma that neorealism is concerned with, because there can be no aggressor (p.91, 102). Status-quo states maximize security because their concern for their survival (p.101) – or what they posses – is more important than what the might want (p.99). Waltz describes a security dilemma as a situation in which states are not sure of each other's intentions, and therefore arm for the sake of security, which causes other states to feel insecure and arm more heavily (p.117). However, in Waltz's system, this behavior is irrational because you know the intent of the other states – their security and survival (p.118).
PART II: Analysis
The Waltz article seems very clear about what the separation is, for Waltz, of theory from thought. His main distinction seems to be that theory is abstract, whereas thought is concerned with actual explanatory issues (p.71-72). Waltz discards the notion that a theory ought to be concerned with prediction and manipulation in order to lead to prediction (p. 73). This certainly explains the lack of predictive value in Waltz's theory. However, it does not explain why a theory shouldn't be predictive. He simply states that being predictive is a quality associated with testing the theory rather than creating the theory (p.73-74). It is almost as if he creates his theory on false assumptions (p.72) and doesn't care if it can be tested – because that's not the point of a theory. However, how is this scientific, as Waltz claims to be (p.73)?
In the Brooks article, there are various decision-making models examined for neorealism (Waltz) (p. 454), and the only models that work for neorealism are models that represent a static decision where the decision will always be the same no matter what the situation (p.454). This seems to be because Waltz is not concerned with reality and how a theory can be tested (p.72-73 of Waltz) – he is only concerned with explaining a small section of the world based on simplified assumptions (p. 71 of Waltz). This lack of concern with reality is demonstrated when, in the Brooks article, postclassical realism (with its many variables of economy, military and technology (p.456)) can deal with the real world better than neorealism can (pp. 465 (Japan/Germany), 465 (Ukraine), 467 (cooperation)). However, this article makes a case for realism – at least the postclassical kind with a variety of variables –being relevant to the real world today. This is counter to some of the other articles which indicate that realism, with its power emphasis, isn't relevant in today's world of ideologies and multiple variables. Rather, this article seems to suggest that the more variables realism has, the more utility it will have in the world today.
The last critique of neorealism is based on the circular argument of neorealism. Basically, states arm because they fear for their security and they fear for their security because other states are arming (p. 117). This type of spiral conflict would not be necessary if neorealism had a variable to prevent it – mainly a change in the system. However, when a theory is structurally static, as neorealism is, it prevents the concept of change from entering into the system. Hence, the logic that the system is based on is circular and faulty. Notice that anarchy is absent from this logic circle, so is it so important to the neorealism viewpoint as the other points and assumptions of the theory?
Schweller: Neorealism's Status Quo Bias
Brooks: Dueling Realism
PART I: Summary
In the Waltz article, the main point was that neorealism (Waltz's theory) differs from classical realism because classical realism is a thought whereas neorealism is a complete theory (p. 71). This distinction is made based on Waltz's definition of a theory: a construct that forms a domain (p. 69), or structure, that indicates some factors are more important than others (p.71) and specifies what the relation between that parts of the structure are (p.71). Additionally, Waltz insists that theory isolate one domain (p.71). Lastly Waltz insists that a theory must drastically simplify the world with its assumptions, which will, of necessity, convey an impractical, or false, picture of the world (p.72).
Waltz claims that classical realism developed concepts – such as power – but was a mere thought and not a theory because there is no separate structure to analyze the concept within (p.71). Waltz compares this to neorealism which has a structure – anarchy (p.74) and allows him to isolate the domain in which the theory operates, and so can analyze the causal relationship of the actors within the structure (p.77-78). Additionally, Waltz, by defining theory as separate from the reality of the world (p. 72) defines classical realism as a thought because it dealt with the realities of the world (development of foreign policy), rather than dealing with the world of international relations as an abstract concept (p.71). Waltz differentiates neorealism by saying it is not concerned with the realities, but with the abstract concept of power as a means and not an end (p.80). In this manner, Waltz claims that classical realism is a thought, and neorealism is a theory.
The main point of the Brooks article is that realism really has two different branches: neorealism (which is based on Waltz) (p.445) and postclassical realism (based on everything else) (p.445) that can be separated based on their main assumption (p.446) of possibility of conflict (p.447) vs. probability of conflict (p. 456). Furthermore, the article states that two other differences in assumptions follow from this distinction (p.446): neorealism assumes that states heavily discount the future because short-term needs of security trump everything else (p.450) and military preparedness trumps all other concerns (p.452), while postclassical realism does not regard the future as subordinate to the short-term security needs (p.458) and there can be trade-offs between military and economic needs (p.461). As a result of these variations in assumptions, there has been very little useful dialogue between the branches of realism (p.472) and there has been confusion between the two branches about what is being tested in the various theories (p.473).
The main point in the Schweller article is that neorealism overlooks the possibility of an aggressor in the system, and instead focuses on a status-quo explanation of international relations (p.92, 101) – which doesn't create the security dilemma that neorealism is concerned with, because there can be no aggressor (p.91, 102). Status-quo states maximize security because their concern for their survival (p.101) – or what they posses – is more important than what the might want (p.99). Waltz describes a security dilemma as a situation in which states are not sure of each other's intentions, and therefore arm for the sake of security, which causes other states to feel insecure and arm more heavily (p.117). However, in Waltz's system, this behavior is irrational because you know the intent of the other states – their security and survival (p.118).
PART II: Analysis
The Waltz article seems very clear about what the separation is, for Waltz, of theory from thought. His main distinction seems to be that theory is abstract, whereas thought is concerned with actual explanatory issues (p.71-72). Waltz discards the notion that a theory ought to be concerned with prediction and manipulation in order to lead to prediction (p. 73). This certainly explains the lack of predictive value in Waltz's theory. However, it does not explain why a theory shouldn't be predictive. He simply states that being predictive is a quality associated with testing the theory rather than creating the theory (p.73-74). It is almost as if he creates his theory on false assumptions (p.72) and doesn't care if it can be tested – because that's not the point of a theory. However, how is this scientific, as Waltz claims to be (p.73)?
In the Brooks article, there are various decision-making models examined for neorealism (Waltz) (p. 454), and the only models that work for neorealism are models that represent a static decision where the decision will always be the same no matter what the situation (p.454). This seems to be because Waltz is not concerned with reality and how a theory can be tested (p.72-73 of Waltz) – he is only concerned with explaining a small section of the world based on simplified assumptions (p. 71 of Waltz). This lack of concern with reality is demonstrated when, in the Brooks article, postclassical realism (with its many variables of economy, military and technology (p.456)) can deal with the real world better than neorealism can (pp. 465 (Japan/Germany), 465 (Ukraine), 467 (cooperation)). However, this article makes a case for realism – at least the postclassical kind with a variety of variables –being relevant to the real world today. This is counter to some of the other articles which indicate that realism, with its power emphasis, isn't relevant in today's world of ideologies and multiple variables. Rather, this article seems to suggest that the more variables realism has, the more utility it will have in the world today.
The last critique of neorealism is based on the circular argument of neorealism. Basically, states arm because they fear for their security and they fear for their security because other states are arming (p. 117). This type of spiral conflict would not be necessary if neorealism had a variable to prevent it – mainly a change in the system. However, when a theory is structurally static, as neorealism is, it prevents the concept of change from entering into the system. Hence, the logic that the system is based on is circular and faulty. Notice that anarchy is absent from this logic circle, so is it so important to the neorealism viewpoint as the other points and assumptions of the theory?
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